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The goal of the present project is to elaborate on proposals that could help promote 
transformation of the continuing state of mutual nuclear deterrence, foremost between the 
biggest nuclear powers — Russia and the United States — into a new mode of relationship 
based on mutual management of nuclear weapon (NW) interaction and impact on 
international security. Transformation of this kind, beginning in a bilateral format, will at 
some future point have to embrace multilateral strategic relations among the five principal 
nuclear powers and new nuclear weapon states (NWS), as well as some aspects of 
conventional forces development, deployment and employment. 
Even when dramatic changes take place in the political relations between nuclear 
states which make them stop seeing each other as adversaries, as with Russia and the United 
States after the Cold War was over, their armed forces, and foremost nuclear forces, retain the 
powerful momentum of confrontation and competition.  These forces cannot adjust to new 
cooperative political relations on their own without well designed and consistent political and 
technical efforts on both sides.  
Furthermore, newly emerging adversaries, contingencies, and challenges brought 
about by nuclear proliferation and various conflicts of national interests, may destabilize 
strategic relations between the former enemies.  The result can be increased tensions in their 
strategic policies with highly detrimental political, military, and legal arms control 
consequences. 
For example, the US decision of 2002 to test and deploy a strategic ballistic missile 
defense (BMD) system, allegedly designed to defend the nation from the new countries 
(“rogue states”) possessing ballistic missiles, and Washington’s withdrawal from the 1972 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty made Russia place increased reliance on its offensive 
strategic nuclear forces (SNF). Thus, Moscow extended the service lives of  its MIRVed 
heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and even purchased a few dozen missiles 
from Ukraine’s stockpile. Also, as reported by President Vladimir Putin, Russia has 
accelerated development of a new strategic offensive weapon system fitted with a gliding and 
maneuvering re-entry vehicle designed to penetrate “any BMD system.”  Although no 
specific opponent has been mentioned in accordance with the “political correctness” of post-
Cold War times, this new system, for obvious reasons, may only be designed to target the 
United States. 
Russia reacted in a similar way to a new US program of nuclear earth- penetrating 
warheads allegedly designed to combat underground bunkers of terrorists and “rogue states.” 
Apparently this development was projected on Russia’s own hardened sites. As Russia’s 
Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said, “Moscow is attentively tracking the developments in 
the US strategic nuclear forces. In particular, we are not indifferent to the US programs of 
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developing mini-nuclear weapons, for each new type of weapons adds up new elements to the 
general picture of global stability. We are to take it into account in our military planning.”1
Since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence between Russia and the United 
States has been receding into the background in terms of day-to-day foreign policy and 
official public relations. While still retaining thousands of nuclear warheads, these countries 
have ceased to be global rivals and the likelihood of a deliberate war between them has come 
close to zero. Despite serious differences on some issues, such as Yugoslavia (1999) Iraq 
(2003), Russian domestic politics and elections in Ukraine (2005), NATO extension (1999 
and 2003), and US activities in post-Soviet space, Moscow and Washington are no longer the 
leaders of the two coalitions of states and political-ideological movements that had been 
dividing the world for almost five decades. Their relations — in spite of continuous ups and 
downs, frictions, disagreements and mutual recriminations — comprise numerous and 
important areas of cooperation.  
This cooperation has embraced various economic and political spheres, peace-keeping 
operations, resolution of regional conflicts, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD), the struggle against terrorism, joint ground and naval force exercises, programs of 
securing and eliminating stockpiles of nuclear and chemical weapons, safe disposal of 
nuclear materials and old nuclear submarines, salvage operations at sea, and joint space 
manned systems. 
Since the early nineties, the United States and Russia have halved their strategic 
nuclear forces in terms of nuclear re-entry vehicles (warheads) under the Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START I) of 1991-94, and are expected to reduce them by another 60 
percent by 2012 under the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT). Combined 
with cuts in their tactical nuclear arms, the reductions will apparently amount to at least 80 
percent over the 20-year period since the early 1990s. 
But there is also the other side of the coin. Unlike before, the United States, Russia 
and some other great powers have openly or tacitly rejected the idea of nuclear disarmament 
as an indispensable, even if faraway, condition of general security. What is much worse, they 
are dismantling the complex of central nuclear disarmament agreements to keep maximum 
freedom of action in technical development and plans for combat use of nuclear weapons as 
reflected in their official doctrines, arms programs, and military budgets. 
For instance, the United States does not consider it worthwhile even to discuss the 
subsequent (following the Moscow Treaty of 2002) measures of strategic nuclear reductions 
in the foreseeable future, and has rejected the ABM Treaty and the Comprehensive Test-Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. It has apparently also lost interest in the Fissile Materials Cut-Off 
Treaty (FMCT), as well as universal measures to enhance the effectiveness of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
Moreover, Washington is now emphasizing the right to launch pre-emptive selective 
nuclear strikes, thereby promoting a doctrine of actual nuclear war-fighting, rather than of 
traditional nuclear deterrence. The United States’ nuclear triad was fully upgraded in the 
1980s and 1990s and it will last them for many decades in the future.  A serious program, 
although not without disputes and setbacks, is now underway in the United States to develop 
                                                 
1 Sergei Ivanov explains to Britons the goals and tasks of the Russia Nuclear Forces 
http:/www.rol.ru/news/misc/news/04/07/14_010.htm (visited on December 30, 2004). 
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advanced nuclear weapons allegedly designed to destroy hardened bunkers and other 
installations of “rogue countries” and terrorists with less fall-out and collateral damage. 
This example is followed by Russia, although with some reservations and a vast 
variety of controversial official declarations. After a rather weak resistance, Moscow has, in 
fact, resigned itself to United States’ current lack of interest in arms control treaties, and 
demonstrated that it cannot oppose it effectively at political, diplomatic, or military-technical 
levels. Instead, with quite scarce funding, Russia unwisely attempts to carry out a ‘balanced 
modernization’ of all legs of its nuclear triad, shrinks from discussing tactical nuclear 
weapons, and seeks to make up for its setbacks through the export of nuclear technologies 
and materials, as well as massive arms sales abroad. 
As early as 1993, the democratic Russia officially rejected the no-first-use 
commitment taken by the totalitarian Soviet Union in 1982. During 2000 and 2001, Moscow 
reconfirmed the position, and now it says that nuclear weapons play a leading role in ensuring 
its national security.  Moscow even admits the possibility of “a selective and limited combat 
use” of the strategic weapons in order to “de-escalate the aggression.”2 This implies 
accomplishing specific tasks of conducting and terminating nuclear warfare, rather than 
merely of deterring aggression through the capability of inflicting “devastating retaliation,” as 
previously claimed. 
Great Britain, France, and China are not going to undertake any limitations of their 
nuclear forces through arms control treaties, alleging that they lag far behind the two major 
nuclear powers. They are implementing planned long-term modernizations, and, in some 
respects, a build-up of nuclear arsenals. 
Now, as never before, nuclear deterrence looks like a factor that is most likely to 
remain forever a part of international relations, at least until another more devastating or 
efficient weapon is invented. Moreover, this posture is taken not because of the colossal 
technical or political difficulties of achieving “general and complete nuclear disarmament,” 
but because of presumably considerable “inherent advantages” of nuclear weapons as means 
of sustaining national security and “civilizing” international relations by making nations more 
responsible. Obviously, the Big Five openly or tacitly treat nuclear deterrence as an 
indispensable and legitimate instrument of their security and military policies, while claiming 
that other countries have no right to acquire nuclear weapons. 
Using the traditional Chinese mode of presenting intellectual subject matter (and 
paying respect to the newly acquired popularity of China’s doctrines and policies among 
some Western and Russian experts) the authors of this study build their research around a 
concept, that may be called “3 x 3 x 3” (or a “cubed triple”) package of assumptions, 
conclusions, and proposals. To be more precise this formula implies that there are:  
• three major paradoxes of post-Cold War nuclear deterrence in the world;  
• three principle reasons why nuclear deterrence will not serve great powers’ national 
security and international security in the long run; and 
• three main avenues of action to transform mutual nuclear deterrence into a more 
constructive and reliable model of strategic relationship, while staying short of 
“general and complete nuclear disarmament.” 
                                                 
2 Aktualnye zadachi razvitia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Urgent Tasks of the Armed Forces 
of the Russian Federation). October 2003. Moscow, pp. 41-42. 
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The latter goal, as noble as it is, at this moment seems very distant and unrealistic, 
because it would require immense changes in the way international politics has been 
conducted and conflicts have been resolved during the centuries of known history. These 
broader changes are clearly far beyond the reach and task of this study.   
As for the “cubed triple,” the authors of this paper believe that the decade and a half 
which has elapsed since the end of Cold War has demonstrated at least three great paradoxes 
in the sphere of nuclear weapons. The first is that mutual nuclear deterrence between the 
United States and the Soviet Union/Russia has smoothly outlived their global rivalry and 
confrontation, with which it had been closely associated from 1945 to 1991, and continued in 
its self-perpetuating momentum even after the collapse of one of the main subjects of 
deterrence — the Soviet superpower. These inexorable dynamics of mutual nuclear 
deterrence are acquiring a growing and negative “feedback effect” on political relations 
between former opponents, sustaining a background mistrust and fear of the tacit evil 
intentions of the “strategic partner,” of inadvertent or accidental nuclear attack, of possible 
loss of control over nuclear weapons leading to their acquisition by rebellious groups or 
terrorists, of the one’s plans to gain control over the other’s NWs or to deliver a disarming 
strike against nuclear sites — all this in the absence of any real political ground for such 
horrific scenarios or actions.    
The second paradox is that with the removal of the fear of escalation of any nuclear 
weapon use to a global catastrophe, the United States, Russia and some other NWS have 
become much more “easygoing” in contemplating initiation of the actual combat use of 
nuclear weapons to perform various specific military missions. Thus, the end of Cold War 
has actually lowered, not raised the nuclear threshold, to say nothing of abandoning nuclear 
warfare planning altogether. 
The third paradox is that with the end of Cold War, instead of doing away with 
nuclear deterrence and eventually the nuclear weapons themselves, the focus up to now has 
been on doing away with the regimes of nuclear arms limitations and reductions, 
transparency, and confidence-building. The victims of this process (primarily at the initiative 
of current US policy-makers) already include the ABM Treaty, START II and the START III 
Framework Treaty, an agreement on delineation between strategic and tactical BMD systems, 
near-term entry into force of the CTBT, constructive negotiations on the FMCT, and 
potentially even the NPT—at least this is how it looks from the results of a disastrous NPT 
review conference in May 2005. The whole structure of nuclear arms control is collapsing 
with most dire predictable consequences through the growth of new threats and risks. 
Of the three main reasons why nuclear deterrence should be superseded by some type 
of constructive strategic relationship between the United States (the West) and Russia, and 
eventually among all NWS, the first is its irrelevance to the real threats and challenges of the 
post-Cold War era. Nuclear deterrence remains effective against the least probable or non-
existent threats: nuclear or massive conventional attacks by great powers (and their alliances) 
against each other. But it does not work against new, “real and present dangers”: nuclear 
proliferation, international terrorism, ethnic and religious conflicts, drug and arms traffic, 
trans-border crime, and illegal migration, etc. Whether nuclear disarmament might prevent 
nuclear proliferation is the major debatable point. However it is certain that nuclear 
deterrence cannot stop proliferation and it is quite probable that deterrence encourages further 
expansion of the “nuclear club.”   
 11
The second reason is that the relations involved in mutual nuclear deterrence place 
tangible limitations on the ability of great powers to genuinely cooperate in dealing with new 
threats and challenges. The degree of cooperation of the Cold War times, when most arms 
control treaties, including the NPT, were concluded, is not enough for the new era. Such 
endeavors as the cooperation of secret service and special forces, joint counter-proliferation 
policies (proliferation security initiative — PSI, and actual combat operations against 
terrorists, rogue and failed states), officially initiated joint early warning and BMD systems, 
much more stringent nuclear and missile export control regimes, programs of greater safety 
and accounting of nuclear warheads and nuclear materials (implying broad transparency and 
access to each other’s secret sites), verifiable cessation of production of weapons grade 
nuclear materials in the world,  ambitious Global Partnership projects — all this requires a 
greater magnitude of  trust and cooperative efforts among partner states.  And all these are 
impossible to imagine while the US and Russia still target thousands of nuclear warheads at 
each other, keep missiles on hair-trigger alert, and modernize nuclear forces to preserve 
robust retaliatory capabilities against each other. Besides, as mentioned above, the 
momentum of nuclear deterrence in combination with new threats and missions may 
destabilize the very strategic relations among great powers and still further undercut their 
ability to think and act together.  
Last but not least is the problem of resource allocation. Sustaining nuclear deterrence 
at current levels, and at even reduced levels (down to 1700-2200 deployed warheads under 
SORT), is an expensive luxury, taking into account that the two biggest powers assign the 
bulk of these forces the mission of destroying each other, as well as serving “as a hedge 
against future uncertainty”. This aimless “hedge” may be relatively inexpensive for the 
United States, which has the largest overall defense budget in the world (about as big as the 
sum of all other main military states), and which has fully modernized its strategic nuclear 
forces (SNF) during the 1980s and 1990s, having invested in “strategic capital” that will last 
for decades in future. Still, even for the United States it would be easy to find a much better 
allocation of these resources within its defense policy or outside it. 
The burden of maintaining robust nuclear deterrence is relatively heavier for Russia, 
which is now implementing a “balanced modernization” of all elements of its strategic triad 
and planning to keep up with SORT ceilings of 1700 to 2200 warheads. Having huge 
problems of military reform to fund and resolve, as well as being badly in need of 
modernization and restructuring of its conventional forces, Russia suffers a lot from the 
wasteful amount of money spent on its NWs. The share of expenditures for nuclear deterrent 
is relatively still bigger for France, Britain and China.  
By maintaining mutual nuclear deterrence, the great powers are wasting huge 
resources, which otherwise could be used for different, more appropriate and relevant, 
military and security tasks and missions. Moreover, large scientific and technical intellectual 
resources are tied up by nuclear deterrence. Big state, business, research, and political 
organizations are locked into sustaining nuclear confrontation in economic, technical, and 
mental respects instead of addressing the more realistic and urgent needs of national and 
international security. 
Another more general objection to nuclear deterrence is of a different nature. It is not 
directly linked to nuclear weapons considerations, so the authors do not include it into their 
“3 x 3 x 3” package. Still it is worth mentioning, if only in passing. Russian domestic 
economic and political evolution is inseparable from its foreign policy. It is impossible to 
imagine Russia evolving as an advanced market economy and democracy without good 
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relations with the United States and gradual economic, political and security integration with 
the European Union.  
For the Western community, consistent cooperation with, and integration of, Russia is 
potentially an immense asset in providing for security in Eurasia.  The benefits include 
gaining from Russia’s science, technology, and cultural resources, coping with the 
unpredictable future of the supply of energy and raw materials, containing Islamic radicalism, 
dealing with proliferation of WMD, dealing with international terrorism, and managing 
relations with a growing China.    
Mutual nuclear deterrence between Russia, on the one hand, and the United States, 
Britain and France, on the other, is a latent but real barrier, placing tangible limitations on 
such cooperation and integration. Of course it would be too presumptuous to claim that 
Russian democratic development and economic reforms directly depend on doing away with 
nuclear deterrence. But transforming deterrence as an important aspect of forging much 
closer security relations with the West would certainly be quite beneficial to Russia’s 
domestic progress in democracy, and its economic integration with the Western community. 
The time frame for both avenues, if the efforts to pursue them are successful, is comparable 
and compatible: two to three decades.  
Lastly, the triad routes for revising nuclear deterrence and eventually doing away with 
it is as follows. One is further reducing and de-alerting the two biggest nuclear forces of the 
world: Russian and American.  Another is developing and employing a joint ballistic missile 
early warning system (BMEWS) and a missile proliferation monitoring system. And the third 
is developing and deploying joint BMD systems. Initially the second and third avenues would 
be addressed to nuclear and missile proliferation threats, but eventually — in parallel with 
transforming nuclear forces of both sides — they would embrace a growing part of the 
strategic assets of the two powers and their allies, and would transform their present mutual 
nuclear deterrence into a qualitatively new type of strategic relationship.  
This new relationship could be called “nuclear partnership,” “joint management of 
nuclear weapons,” “cooperative nuclear weapons policies,” “common nuclear security 
framework,” “mutual nuclear insurance (assurance) strategy,” or a number of other names, 
depending on one’s tastes and semantic skills. One way or the other, the main problem is not 
the term, but the substance, and it is the substance which is the subject of this study. 
The next section of this paper deals with the historic experience of nuclear deterrence. 
Presently, as applied to the policies of the Big Five, nuclear deterrence is commonly 
perceived as a mythological phenomena, as something naturally emerging in the past decades 
and serving as a guarantee against a third world war. Historical and methodological analysis 
does not support such an assessment, although neither does it refute it completely. In contrast 
to some claims made by many politicians and experts, the evolution of nuclear deterrence, 
along with its character and impact on the likelihood of war, looks more ambiguous. Analysis 
of this matter gives much food for thought and creates apprehensions concerning the past and 
future of nuclear deterrence in the strategic relations among the Big Five powers.  
The third section addresses the basic aspects of the nuclear policies of Russia and the 
United States, and outlines those of Great Britain, France, and China. Their strategic 
concepts, forces and programs of nuclear force development are investigated, for these 
factors are much more accurate and reliable indicators of an actual nuclear policy than are 
their official political declarations, which tend to be ambiguous and controversial. 
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The fourth section addresses the present dynamics of nuclear deterrence, its feedback 
effect on political relations, and the relevance and potential new roles of arms control in post-
Cold War era. 
The fifth section describes possible measures of transforming US and Russian 
offensive nuclear forces in order, first of all, to stabilize their balance at still lower levels (in 
view of some destabilizing prospects), to move them away from hair-trigger alert statues,  
and to unlock them from overwhelmingly targeting each other. These initial steps would lay 
the groundwork for abandoning mutual nuclear deterrence as the cornerstone of strategic 
postures of both nations. 
The sixth section presents proposals for building on the initial initiatives to do away 
with mutual deterrence by integrating early warning systems and antimissile defense systems 
of the United States and Russia.  Methods of integrating third nuclear weapon states into the 
new mode of strategic relationship are also suggested. 
The conclusion contains some general observations on the dialectics and dilemmas of 
nuclear weapons, as well as a detailed list and tentative timeframe of technically, 
strategically, and politically realistic steps to be implemented in bilateral and multilateral 
mode to achieve the stated goal: getting free of the exhausting and deadlocked chains of 
nuclear deterrence.  
2. Controversial Nuclear Deterrence 
Despite common expectations of the late 1980s and early 1990s, nuclear weapons and 
concepts for their further development and combat employment (which constitute the notion 
of nuclear deterrence), have survived the end of the Cold War. In the beginning of the 21st 
century, they look like they will be around forever, even if in new military balances and new 
international settings. 
 
Even when political relations between certain nations change drastically and they stop 
viewing each other as enemies (as did Russia and the US at the end of the Cold War), their 
armed forces face new opponents and new targets presented by nuclear proliferation. This 
may in many cases destabilize the strategic relations between the former enemies/new 
partners and once again lead to an increased emphasis on nuclear confrontation and 
competition in their strategic relations, with all of the attendant political, security, and treaty-
related legal consequences. 
After the end of Cold War, nuclear deterrence (at least between Russia and the US), 
began to be seen as only secondarily important. Although they continued to maintain 
thousands of nuclear warheads, they significantly reduced their nuclear forces and the 
programs to renovate them were largely curtailed, at least compared to the rounds of massive 
and fast arms races in the 1950s (bombers race), 1960s (ballistic missiles race), 1970s (MIRV 
race) and 1980s (counterforce MIRV and cruise missiles race). The two powers ceased being 
the chief opponents on the world stage and the likelihood of an intentional war between them 
decreased to practically zero. Confrontation was replaced by growing economic and political 
cooperation despite deep disagreements on a number of problems (Yugoslavia in 1999, Iraq 
in 2003, NATO expansion in 1997 and 2003, elections in Ukraine in 2005, and Russia’s 
domestic politics from 2000 to 2005), There was also cooperation in securing and eliminating 
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stocks of nuclear and chemical weapons and nuclear materials, and in dismantling nuclear 
submarines. 
By the warhead numbers, SNF of the US and the RF have been cut by about 50 
percent since the early 1990s (in line with the START I Treaty), while by 2012 they are to be 
reduced by another 60 percent (SORT of 2002). Together with tactical nuclear forces, the 
overall reductions during the 20 years since early 1990s would amount probably to around 80 
percent.  
Over this time period, through nuclear proliferation, the nuclear forces of other 
nations may significantly grow both in absolute and relative terms (see Figure 1). Of course, 
the illustration below is the worst case scenario. What is more probable in the next 10 to 15 
years, is “8+2” (the present NWS plus DPRK and Iran), or “8+3” (those mentioned plus 
Japan).  Worst case scenarios, however, should not be discarded, and the final outcome may 
be even more worrisome than the one below. Arab states might eventually overcome their 
rivalries and join financial, technical, and political resources to create collectively owned and 
operated nuclear weapons (thus doing something NATO failed to do in the early 1960s). In 
the Pacific, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Australia could also join the “club.” These developments 
would have enormous international, political, and military consequences despite the US, 
Russia, and possibly China, maintaining (or in the case of China achieving) an overwhelming 
nuclear superiority over any other nation or coalition of nations with NWs.  
Hence, it is not surprising that since the early  1990s, nuclear and missile 
proliferation, and later nuclear terrorism, have moved to the center of international security 
anxieties and policies of the United States, and in their wake (at least at a declaratory level) of 
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but also to the significant advantages that are supposedly inherent to nuclear weapons in 
providing security and "civilizing" international relations by encouraging restraint in the use 
of force.  A historical analysis of the evolution, present state, and future prospects of nuclear 
deterrence — along with its various modes and practical implementation in weapon systems 
and operation plans — raises serious doubts about such a benign evaluation of the doctrine. 
  
2.1. The Paradoxes of Nuclear Deterrence 
As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear deterrence will remain the most important 
means for the indirect use of this type of weapon and the basic element of strategic relations 
with the nations that possess this kind of weapon. In an ideal world, nuclear deterrence would 
mean that nuclear weapons are not a means for waging war.  Rather, they would be political 
instruments that guarantee that nuclear weapons would not actually be used in practice — 
neither in the context of a premeditated attack, nor as a result of the escalation of a non-
nuclear conflict between nuclear powers. Now, in the sixth decade of the nuclear era, this 
position is commonly taken for granted. However, historically, this has not always been so, 
and the validity of this theory of strategic behavior has always been, and continues to be, 
subject to question. As for the future, it may be quite different and more controversial still. 
Deterrence and war-fighting. In order for nuclear weapons to be used as an instrument 
of psychological pressure intended to deter an enemy, a full military political theory had to be 
created, which did not happen immediately. Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, atomic and 
hydrogen warheads deliverable as bombs dropped by aircraft and warheads in missiles were 
produced by the United States in huge numbers.  They were generally considered to be 
weapons of total destruction of an enemy’s armed forces and urban-industrial targets (cities), 
if the USSR were to attack US allies in Europe or Asia (the strategy of "massive retaliation").  
If deterrence had any place in this strategy, it was as a secondary product or a political 
by-product, not the main goal of US military policy and forces development. Only by the end 
of the 1950s, following 15 years of NW stockpiling and, most importantly, after the Soviet 
Union had developed similar weapons and delivery systems, did the concept of deterrence 
occupy the center stage in American military and political strategy.  Only then did the 
political leadership in the United States grudgingly recognize that nuclear weapons are not 
viable for direct military use. As President Dwight Eisenhower was the first to say at the top 
state level in the mid-1950s, “only a lunatic would see victory in the total destruction of a 
human race.” In the meantime, the number of nuclear bombs reached many thousands, and 
land and sea-based ballistic missiles began to enter service.  
Strategic theory in the United States was developed not by generals, as a rule, but by 
civilian specialists, including natural and social scientists4. The works of such theoreticians as 
H. Kissinger, B. Brodie, T. Shelling, A. Wohlstetter, A. Yarmolinsky, W. Panofsky, R. 
Bowie, J. Kistiakowsky, G. Kennan, and others, gave rise to a theory which saw nuclear 
weapons not simply as a more destructive means for waging war, but as a qualitatively new 
kind of weapon that could destroy the entire world and leave no victors. This led to the 
epochal conclusion that nuclear weapons must be used not for defeating an enemy in war, but 
for preventing such a war from happening in the first place, or, more accurately, for 
dissuading a potential enemy from undertaking actions that could culminate in a big war. 
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In the 1960s, following a number of experiments with the concepts of "counterforce" 
and "damage limitation," US nuclear strategy became firmly centered around the concept of 
"assured destruction." The chief theoretician and practitioner of this strategy was US 
Secretary of Defense R. McNamara and his civilian assistants, called “whiz kids” (A. 
Enthoven, H. York, G. Rathjens, J. Ruina, H. Brown, D. Ellsberg, and others). It presupposed 
maintaining a strategic arsenal capable of surviving an enemy nuclear strike in sufficient 
numbers to cause the enemy unacceptable damage in a counterstrike (which was set to be an 
immediate destruction of up to 70 percent of the industrial potential and 25 percent of the 
population). 
No doubt, even under McNamara’s rule in the Pentagon, US official doctrinal 
declarations were not fully reflective of the actual operational planning (SIOP and target 
lists).  Such planning included first strike and launch-on-warning options, in addition to 
second-strike, and emphasized attacking military sites rather than urban-industrial targets. 
Still, official doctrines reflected Washington’s general ideas of strategic forces development, 
deployment and employment criteria, as well as the logic of sufficiency, which was 
persuasively demonstrated by McNamara’s “flat of the curve” models of assured destruction. 
This philosophy of sufficiency and a less biased view of the main opponent’s motives for 
NW build-up (the so called “action-reaction” phenomenon) provided the conceptual 
framework for the practical strategic arms control and reductions talks and treaties of the 
1970s to the 1990s, in contrast to propagandistic “talk-shows” around “general and complete 
nuclear disarmament” of the late 1940s to the early 1960s.  
The Soviet Union arrived at similar conclusions about NW, nuclear war, and 
sufficiency significantly later, since no social scientists, natural scientists, or military officials 
could freely discuss such topics. All were expected to follow unswervingly the dogmas of 
Marxism-Leninism and the rather wretched official military doctrines spun by the military 
leadership. At the ideological level, the theory of deterrence was branded as being the 
handmaiden of the "aggressive policy of imperialism," against which stood the "peace-loving 
course of the USSR."  All of this was against the background of Khruschev's hysterical 
missile bluff, which also was a kind of "offensive deterrence," or, more accurately, of 
"spooking" the West during the Suez, Berlin, and Cuban missile crises of the 1950s through 
the early 1960s. At the level of military strategy, under the careful watch of the Main Political 
Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy and the marshals (heroic victors of the Great 
Patriotic War), nuclear weapons were viewed just as much more destructive arms, fitting in 
the classic canons on conducting world war and achieving victory in it. 
   Strategic theory in the West was based on certain connections between politics and 
military strategy, and vice versa, which was enhanced through free discussion between 
political scientists and military experts, and greater openness of military information, as well 
as the regular movement of civilians and military personnel between government posts and 
the academic world.   
By contrast, in the USSR there was a "watertight" separation between politics and 
strategy and civilian and military specialists, and complete defense secrecy. Hence, the 
fundamental thesis of Soviet military doctrine was: the USSR's policies are peaceful, but if 
war begins, the Army and the people "under the wise leadership of the CPSU," will achieve 
the defeat of the enemy and will be victorious. The nuclear and conventional armed forces of 
the country were to be ready for this victory, to which end they were to work to achieve 
supremacy over the enemy and be ready to undertake offensive action. The thought that these 
preparations in themselves could cast doubt upon "peaceful" Soviet policy and impel the 
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other side to undertake countermeasures was considered a monstrous heresy.  Up until the 
late 1960s, it could cost somebody their freedom, and even up through the early 1980s could 
have elicited drastic "consequences" for their career.  
Of course, in the 1990s, the situation in Russia changed fundamentally.  Access to 
military information, discussion, and work movement by military and civilian specialists, all 
increased, as did freedom of thought and opinions. But in many respects the Soviet heritage 
has not died out to the present day — there is inadequate openness of information and 
decisions on military matters are made completely behind the scenes.  Most importantly, 
there is a stable stereotype of reasoning that military matters are the affair of the military, and 
political matters are the affair of the politicians and political scientists. This has to a great 
extent bred the contradictions and inconsistencies in Russian foreign and military policies and 
the national security policies on the whole, about which more is written below. 
Only at the beginning of the 1970s did the Soviet Union start to change its official 
position on nuclear war and weapons. With many conditions and reservations, the idea was 
accepted of the impossibility of gaining victory in a nuclear war because of its totally 
destructive consequences.  Consequently, the view was adopted that nuclear weapons were 
good only for "deterrence against imperialist aggression." This shift was greatly facilitated by 
the ideological argument with China (reflecting the great political schism of the communist 
world), the leadership of which was openly pronouncing the possibility of achieving the 
victory of communism through all-out nuclear war. In 1982, Moscow took the symbolic but 
politically significant step towards reinforcing the strategy of deterrence by declaring that it 
would not be the first to use nuclear weapons.  
In practice, the relationship between the two principle views on NW (as tools of 
deterrence or war-fighting) is quite contradictory and mute. Strategic nuclear forces are 
carrying out the political mission of deterrence solely through their capability to conduct 
military operations. They have operational plans, lists of targets to strike, and flight programs 
entered into the on-board computers of the ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. The 
operational plans, as a rule, anticipate the use of these weapons at some level of effectiveness 
for the pre-planned first strike, pre-emptive strike, delayed retaliatory strike, strike (launch) 
on warning (LOW), strike (launch) under attack (LUA). The latter two scenarios require 
launching upon receiving signals from satellites in space and the ballistic missile early 
warning system before the enemy's warheads reach their targets or as they are exploding over 
their targets.  
In theory, the needs of pure deterrence (no war-fighting) could be met simply with 
realistic replicas of missiles and aircraft, while the exclusive task fighting a war (no 
deterrence) could be performed by nuclear arms whose existence is held in full secrecy. In  
reality, though, with the systems that actually exist — land-based intercontinental ballistic 
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) on  nuclear submarines with ballistic 
missiles (SSBN), heavy bombers (HB) with gravity bombs or air-launched cruise missiles 
(ALCM) — the line between deterrence and war-fighting has always been and remains rather 
vague and blurred. Hence, it is more appropriate to think instead in terms of the priorities of 
various kinds of operational plans or target lists, which in turn reflect priorities given either to 
deterrence or to actual war-fighting. 
For example, weapons that have a high survivability and are targeted on industrial 
targets (land-based mobile ICBMs and SLBM of lower accuracy) may be considered to be 
objectively more suitable for a retaliatory strike, and thus serve as primary weapons of 
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deterrence policy. On the contrary, the forces that are more vulnerable at their launch 
positions and/or which are targeted mainly on the enemy's nuclear and conventional forces 
(ICBMs with multiple warheads launched from fixed silos and SLBMs with highly accurate 
high-yield warheads) objectively indicate priorities of a strategy for actually conducting war. 
In this case, NW are primarily assigned to deliver a disarming (counterforce) or damage-
limiting strike, which may be interpreted as having the goal of winning a nuclear war. The 
logic here is that it is precisely the certainty of terrible losses that makes victory unattainable 
and nuclear war itself unthinkable, hence a strategy of avoiding or limiting damage may 
indicate the goal of winning nuclear war or making it less unacceptable. Theoretically it is 
possible to deter the enemy by a strategy of winning nuclear war, but since it is predicated on 
one’s own first nuclear strike, it cannot logically be seen as deterrence of nuclear attack by 
the opponent, but rather as deterrence against other actions that will discussed below.  
In the USSR at the end of the 1970s and early 1980s, the SNF corresponded more 
closely to the model of forces for war-fighting (about 70 percent of  warheads were on 
ICBMs with MIRVs based in silos), although at the political level, deterrence was placed at 
the forefront. From the 1990s on through the foreseeable future in the RF, the SNF will 
correspond predominantly to the deterrence (second strike) model. Their first strike 
(counterforce) capability will be degrading, although their survivability will also deteriorate, 
if their present modernization program is not corrected or new arms control agreements are 
not achieved. Paradoxically, at the declaratory level since 1993, the mission of Russian NW 
openly proclaims their possible employment in a first strike, which is associated much more 
with war-fighting, rather than deterrence.  
It is interesting to note that in the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet forces also corresponded 
objectively to the deterrence model in their capabilities for lack of any ability to deliver a 
disarming strike against the United States. In light of dogmatic ideology and the complete 
closure of military policy to non-departmental criticism, however, their doctrinal goals were 
to "defeat the enemy decisively" and to "win in global nuclear war.” At the same time, first 
use of Soviet nuclear forces could be motivated by their high vulnerability at launch positions 
and poor effectiveness of C3I and early warning systems, which left little hope that they could 
survive a US nuclear preemption, at least until mid-1960s when sufficient number of SSBNs 
and silo-based ICBMs were deployed. (At that time and until the late 1970s, hardened silos 
provided high survivability against ballistic missiles with then relatively poor accuracy. Much 
higher accuracy and yield of MIRV warheads has made silos vulnerable since the early 
1980s.) 
 The United States’ NW were openly intended for victory over the USSR and China 
through the total destruction of their military potential and administrative and industrial 
centers, which in the 1940s and 1950s was based on the fact that continental United States 
(CONUS) territory was out of range of the Soviet Union’s NW. After losing this geographic 
advantage during the first half of the 1960s, this war-fighting strategy relied upon the 
supremacy of the American SNF many times over (which was seen as a basis of counterforce 
or damage-limitation strikes), and on forward-based nuclear forces in Eurasia capable of 
enhancing a disarming strike on the strategic forces of the Soviet Union. Only after the mid-
1960s, with the growing numbers and survivability of Soviet SNF, and in particular through 
the political experience of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis (which revealed the dubious 
practical applicability of nuclear war-fighting plans), did the relative concepts of “conducting 
war” and “deterring war” switch places in Washington's military policy, seriously and for the 
long term, in favor of deterrence. 
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In the 1970s and 1980s, and especially the 1990s, despite the increasing accuracy, 
selectivity, and flexibility in use of the SNF (i.e., expanding their capabilities in actually 
conducting war), the fact that the strategic balance between the USSR and the US had evened 
out and retaliatory capabilities had become more assured worked to increase the emphasis on 
deterrence. Negotiations on SALT/START were progressing and political relations were 
improving, which also helped achieve this end. Subsequently, in the 1990s even deterrence 
was removed to the background in the two powers’ political relations, which were reoriented 
towards cooperation and partnership. 
In the foreseeable future, the relationship between deterring and conducting war in 
Russian military policy may become even more ambivalent. With the maintenance of 
generally good political relations between the RF and the US, both the doctrine of mutual 
deterrence and the military and technical reality standing behind such deterrence would be of 
very little importance. But if political tensions rise, the leadership in Russia might be faced 
with a very unpleasant reality.  
The decisions made in 2000 and 2001 to transfer resources to the conventional forces 
from the SNF brought little in the way of tangible benefits to the former, while deeply 
hampering the latter. As a result, in 10 to 15 years, over 90 percent of the Russian SNF could 
be exceedingly vulnerable to a salvo of less than a hundred "Trident-2" SLBMs which 
corresponds to only 3 to 4 (of 14) American strategic submarines. By contrast, the United 
States will have 80 percent of its nuclear forces (in numbers of warheads) that are not 
vulnerable and simultaneously will have a high disarming counterforce strike capability 
against Russian SNF. This all falls within the US-Russian treaty of 2002 on the reduction of 
strategic offensive weapons to 1700-2200 nuclear warheads. 
In contrast with the American SNF, the SNF of Russia and their C3I system will not 
be able to survive a first strike by the United States and cause an adequate amount of damage 
in retaliation. The only possibility for them to cause such damage would be by carrying out a 
preemptive strike or LOW strike in response. In the former case, Russia would suffer 
destruction through nuclear retaliation by the United States and its allies. In the latter, given 
the unreliability of the Russian Missile Attack Early Warning System (due to degradation of 
the space systems and location of half of the radar stations outside of the RF within the 
territory of the CIS), the risk of accidental nuclear conflict will be exceptionally high due to 
technical breakdowns in warning systems or errors in the evaluation of information when 
there is absolutely no time to spare in deciding to launch missiles — with approximately 
equal amounts of resulting damage. This will be all the more dangerous under a multi-polar 
nuclear balance and an expanding number of nations possessing ballistic missiles and WMD 
launchers near Russian territory (See Figure 2).  
It would be possible not to worry about these apocalyptic scenarios because of the 
nearly unthinkable nature of a deliberate nuclear war between the RF and the US.  If, 
however, it is accepted that deterrence does in fact play a role in preventing war and insuring 
security and that it will stay as a basis of US-Russian strategic relationship for a long time, 
then the technical and military state of deterrence is also of serious significance. Otherwise, it 
would have to be concluded that mutual deterrence is simply irrelevant for security in US-
Russian strategic relations, despite relatively big resources dedicated to its maintenance 
(especially by Russia), and the absence of any alternative mode of  nuclear postures and 
strategic relations between the two nations. The latter would be quite a schizophrenic way of 
thinking about such important, explosive, and expensive subject as nuclear weapons. 
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Historically, such a mentality may not be unprecedented, but it should clearly not be desirable 
after the end of Cold War and in an era of partnership and cooperation.    
 
Figure 2. The potential threats to Russia caused by the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction and missile technology (Israel in the drawing is shown with the number 1, 
and the DPRK is shown with the number 2) 
As for the present moment, factors of single order must not be viewed in different 
planes. The decision by the Russian leadership to extend the service lives of the heavy SS-18 
ICBMs (RT-36M) and purchase SS-19 ICBMs (type UR-100N UTTKh) from Ukraine, as 
noted by President Putin at the General Staff conference on October 2, 2003, in order to 
maintain the numerical levels of SNF  and their capability to defeat "any BMD system," was 
intended exclusively to deter the United States (albeit with obsolete systems that were already 
vulnerable to a hypothetical strike by American "Peacekeeper" and "Trident-2" missiles as far 
back as the late 1980s). It is too early to speculate on the cost-effectiveness of the new 
strategic system with gliding and maneuvering warheads, development of which the Russian 
president declared in early 2004, but it is clear that this system would also be assigned the 
mission of deterring the United States despite its BMD deployment program.  Likewise, the 
development of the expensive new SSBN/SLBM system — Borey class 955 (Yuriy 
Dolgorukiy type) boomer, equipped with the Bulava-30 2 missile system for deployment in 
northern waters — has no other purpose than to bolster deterrence against the United States 
and NATO (even more so because of its location).  
The United States takes the task of maintaining a robust deterrence posture no less 
seriously in strategic and technical terms, even though it is no longer overtly declared in 
official nuclear posture and policy statements. This deterrence posture has multiple 
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operational options and a huge “margin of safety,” and is overwhelmingly directed at Russia.  
American reluctance to reduce SNF below 1700-2200 warheads, its insistence on maintaining 
a two-ocean Trident SSBN navy (to cover thoroughly both the European part of Russia, as 
well as China and Russian Siberia), its relocation of counterforce W-87 warheads from 
dismantled MX Peacekeeper missiles to Minuteman-3 ICBMs, its retention of several 
hundred tactical nuclear bombs in Europe, and other choices are all indicative of such 
strategic policy.  
Since the maintenance of a deterrent capability is considered so important by both 
sides, the fact must not be taken too lightly that the Russian SNF planned for the next 10 to 
15 years will be extremely vulnerable and incapable of surviving a first strike to launch a 
retaliatory strike,. Moreover, continued reliance on the concept of a launch-on-warning will 
pose a greater danger of a nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or a third party 
provocation.  
This is the first paradox of nuclear deterrence and it lies in the classic and up to now 
the most stable or “pure” Russian-American model of this kind of strategic relationship. 
Deterrence is meaningless without the capability of the strategic forces to conduct actual 
combat operations.  At the same time, preserving such a capability may oblige Russia in the 
foreseeable future to increasingly rely on first-strike or launch-on-warning concepts that are 
prone to a catastrophic collapse of deterrence leading to inadvertent nuclear war. In an acute 
crisis, Russian first strike/LOW strategic posture might make it look as though a nuclear 
exchange was unavoidable, and thus could provoke the United States to capitalize on its huge 
nuclear superiority by implementing a preemptive strike.  Knowing this, Russia, in turn, 
might be still more trigger-happy. Under such conditions, political miscalculation, technical 
failure, a provocative third party’s missile attack or a terrorist nuclear explosion in either (or 
both) capitals might trigger a nuclear holocaust, a disaster that the two nations managed to 
avoid during four decades of the Cold War.  
Thus, even the central deterrence between the RF and the US may contain the seeds of 
its own collapse.  This is true under Moscow's current strategic modernization program. It is 
also true with Washington’s lack of desire to continue nuclear arms reduction and limitation 
talks, to say nothing of jointly elaborating a new policy designed to supersede mutual nuclear 
deterrence by an alternative kind of strategic relationship, immune to traditional factors of 
instability. 
Tactical nuclear weapons.  The second problem arises because, even more than with 
the strategic weapons, the "grey zone" of ambiguity between deterrence and nuclear war-
fighting affects operational-tactical and tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), sometimes also 
called sub-strategic nuclear arms. Tactical nuclear weapons have traditionally been used 
mainly on dual-use delivery systems: strike aircraft; mid-range bombers; artillery and 
surface-to-surface rockets for ground forces; demolition munitions (nuclear mines); anti-
aircraft air-to-surface missiles and air defense fighter-interceptors; naval rockets and 
torpedoes of various types on submarines and surface ships; and carrier-based and land-based 
naval aviation. At the peak of the Cold War, the United States had up to 20,000 TNW, and 
the USSR had over 30,000 TNW warheads. Even now, based on available information, the 
United States and Russia continue to maintain thousands of NW of this class, while 200-400 
US tactical nuclear bombs remain stored in Western Europe.  
 Although in the broadest sense the presence of TNW in the conventional Western and 
USSR/Russian forces may be said to comprise part of nuclear deterrence, in practice these 
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weapons have always been seen primarily as arms for fighting war, at least much more so 
than the strategic weapons. In light of their destructive power, TNW were viewed as helping 
to achieve a quicker success in the theater of military operations or to compensate for enemy 
superiority in conventional forces. Such views affected the policies for producing, perfecting, 
storing, deploying, and using tactical nuclear weapons, as well as the principles for 
authorizing their employment and guarding against their unauthorized use, which are much 
less stringent than for SNF.  
In the area of TNW, it is nearly impossible to draw a line between deterring and 
waging war. At the same time, however, the very differentiation of NW into strategic and 
tactical categories is itself very contextual. For the USSR, the American TNW, in the form of 
the forward-based nuclear systems (FBS) in Eurasia, were always equated to strategic 
weapons, since they could reach deep into the territory of the USSR if fired from forward 
bases and from surrounding seas. For Western Europe and the Soviet neighbors in Asia, the 
USSR's TNW were equivalent to strategic weapons in terms of range and destructive power. 
Since tactical nuclear weapons are much more closely intermixed with conventional 
forces both technically and operationally than SNF, they can be quickly integrated into 
conventional warfare, either as munitions on dual-purpose delivery systems, or as targets of 
conventional strikes (whether intentional or not).  
As long as TNW remain an element of US and Russian nuclear arsenals and 
operational plans, the line between nuclear deterrence and war-fighting, or between nuclear 
first and second strikes, or even between conventional and nuclear war will remain blurred. 
This will add an additional factor of instability into the US-Russian nuclear deterrence 
relationship. 
“Enhanced and extended deterrence.” The third general problem of deterrence lies in 
the fact that there is an ambiguous meaning attached to the very core of the concept. In 
common usage, deterrence implies that nuclear weapons will deter a potential opponent from 
implementing a nuclear strike. This function is called "minimal" or "finite deterrence," and 
logically implies the ability and probability of a second strike by a small and relatively 
invulnerable force on a limited number of the aggressor’s most valuable administrative and 
industrial targets.  
The forces and the concepts of "minimal deterrence," in whatever terms it has been or 
is formulated by the countries at the official level, in fact were maintained by the Soviet 
Union against the United States until the mid-1960s.  They were maintained by Great Britain, 
France and Israel against the USSR until the end of the 1980s (after which the nuclear 
firepower of the first two grew sharply following deployment of MIRVed missiles), as well 
as by China with respect to the Soviet Union until the early-1990s, and against the United 
States in the near future. 
Nuclear weapons were, however, frequently intended not only to deter enemy nuclear 
attack, but also to deter other undesirable actions, foremost being aggression with the use of 
other types of WMD or conventional forces only, as well as other actions that could lead to 
an armed conflict. This is called "enhanced deterrence." This version of deterrence is much 
more widely used than is usually assumed, while what is thought of as deterrence in general 
is only one of its types — namely "minimal deterrence." When thinking of broader notions of 
deterrence, it is not always understood that these notions usually imply the first use of nuclear 
weapons — i.e. the initiation of a nuclear war.  
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Naturally, each side contemplating nuclear first use to deter conventional aggression 
assumes that it would be acting in a purely defensive and legitimate way, and that all the 
responsibility for nuclear employment would lie with the aggressor.  In reality, however, an 
armed conflict or war does not always have a clearly defined, broadly agreed aggressor and 
victim. Examples of this from the Cold War were the wars of the 1950s through the 1980s in 
Korea, Indochina, Afghanistan; the three wars in the Middle East; and following the Cold 
War, the wars in Yugoslavia in 1999 and in Iraq in 2003. Characteristically, in none of these 
instances did those on either side of the conflict recognize themselves as aggressor.  Neither 
the UN nor the international community was unanimous on this point either. Theoretically, 
both sides in any of the above conflicts, if being defeated and possessing nuclear weapons, 
could have considered themselves justified in using those weapons first to achieve "enhanced 
deterrence." 
Since the end of WWII, the US relied upon "enhanced deterrence" to prevent an 
attack by the superior conventional armies of the USSR and Warsaw Pact against its allies in 
NATO, and in Asia to prevent an attack by the USSR and/or China and DPRK on US allies 
in the Western Pacific. Washington has never abandoned this kind of deterrence and has 
always implied its willingness to use NW first in extraordinary circumstances. In recent 
times, this has applied to the "rogue nations" if they use chemical or bacteriological weapons 
against the US, or are seen as having nuclear capability. This is allegedly the main 
justification of the plans to develop new types of nuclear warheads capable of destroying 
command bunkers and WMD storage facilities. 
Russian military doctrine has also long included a NW first-strike policy. This was 
rescinded in 1982, but again openly revived in 1993, and confirmed in a clarified form in 
2000. "Enhanced deterrence" for Moscow's part unambiguously assumes a first use of nuclear 
weapons "in response to large-scale aggression by conventional weapons in situations 
deemed critical to the national security of the RF."3 It is clear that Russia is now viewing 
deterrence specifically in its enhanced version, in light of how increasingly far behind 
NATO’s conventional forces Russia is now — and will be behind China in the foreseeable 
future.  This conception might be theoretically justified by the disparity in conventional 
forces, but it could work in practice only if it were reinforced not just by a declared 
willingness to use nuclear weapons first, but also by the corresponding material balance of 
nuclear forces. Put simply, it requires superiority over the other side both in TNW and SNF, 
so that an enemy wouldn't have the potential at either level to preemptively disarm Russia, or 
to inflict on it unacceptable damage in retaliation.  
For this reason, the Russian strategy is hardly credible with respect to NATO. After 
all, with a growing quantitative and qualitative supremacy in conventional forces, NATO 
could rapidly create superiority in TNW by bringing American weapons into the theater.  
Meanwhile, in SNF, US forces (especially together with the English and French) will for the 
next 10 to 15 years continue to expand their superiority over Russia, including in their 
capability to deliver a disarming strike against the Russian tactical and strategic nuclear 
forces.  
It is true that deterrence in the Western direction may not cause concern, since 
deliberate conventional war and nuclear war between Russia and the European Union/NATO 
are unthinkable. The economic and political interests of the democratic countries of Western 
Europe, and the unacceptability to their communities of even minor losses, will serve as the 
                                                 
3 Military doctrine of the Russian Federation// Nezavisimaya gazeta.-/ 74 of 22 April 2000. 
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primary guarantee against attacking the RF or its allies. But if, hypothetically, in place of the 
Western European powers there were an aggressive authoritarian power (or union) with the 
same military capabilities, then the Russian strategy of “enhanced deterrence” in its current 
mode would be put to a severe test. 
In this sense, the strategic situation along the eastern borders of the RF cannot but 
cause concern. At present, both the political relations between Russia and China and the 
balance of military forces between them are satisfactory from the standpoint of security. But 
in 10 to 15 years, the relations could worsen, and there might be grounds for a conflict of 
interest between the two countries, while the balance of forces, both conventional and 
nuclear, including the strategic forces, could significantly shift to the detriment of the RF. 
This threatens to destroy its concept of "enhanced deterrence" in its eastern azimuth.  
Within Russia, the current strategy is commonly accepted and supported simply 
because there is no systematic open discussion of such matters in the country. There is also 
no broadly knowledgeable parliament, mass media, or public organizations to serve as a 
forum. The military and political leadership may deign to ignore independent criticism 
coming from individual experts and make all decisions behind the scenes. 
Other nations have also endorsed the strategy of "enhanced deterrence," as did Great 
Britain and France in declaring their nuclear forces to be for deterring both a nuclear strike by 
the USSR and an attack by conventional Warsaw Pact forces. Their nuclear potential, 
however, as is now the case with Russia and NATO, did not objectively provide the basis for 
an "enhanced deterrence" of the Soviet Union. But in contrast to the current position of the 
RF, they had a strong protector and defender in the United States, under whose huge "nuclear 
umbrella" these two countries could afford all their strategic experiments. In the coming 10 to 
15 years, the nuclear forces of Great Britain and France (with full complements of warheads 
for their SLBMs with MIRV) will become comparable to the Russian SNF for the first time 
in history, while the number of warheads on highly survivable missiles capable of mounting 
counter-force strikes will for the first time exceed them even without counting US systems. 
Israel has used a variation of this same strategy by using its undeclared NW to deter 
attack by the conventional armies of Arab nations. If a critical situation arises, Israel will 
make a first nuclear strike against them. This strategy has been, and continues to be, quite 
credible, since the Arab countries and their Islamic brethren don't have their own NW yet. 
Israel’s strategy explains theist attack on the nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1982 and its alarm at 
the Iranian nuclear programs. The development of NW by Pakistan in 1998 was undoubtedly 
a watershed event that threatened Israel by opening the way to an Islamic atom bomb.  
The objective geostrategic difference between the USSR/Russia and the United States 
has shaped their use of this strategic notion. Since United States’ geographic location and its 
sea power made a large scale conventional attack on it virtually impossible, the option of the 
first use of NW in response to a conventional aggression was only associated with defense of 
its allies in Europe and the Far East. Hence, for the United States, a more common term to 
define this concept is so-called "extended deterrence."  This model anticipates the granting of 
nuclear guarantees for the security of allied nations, meaning the promise to use NW in 
response to an attack on the allies by either conventional or nuclear weapons of a common 
enemy.  
For the Soviet Union, and still more for Russia, it has been different.  Moscow had to 
take into account the contingency of being directly attacked by conventional forces of the 
enemy in the west or in the east, in addition to its commitments to allies. True, for the USSR 
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this was not too scary in view of its (and its alliance’s) conventional superiority over NATO 
and China. For Russia, which is becoming ever more inferior in conventional forces, and 
which has also lost most of its allies while facing NATO and China right on its borders, the 
concept of “enhanced deterrence” occupies the central place in doctrine and strategy beside 
the concept of “extended deterrence.” 
For half a century, the strategy of “extended deterrence” was the basis of allied 
relations in NATO and the Warsaw Pact. It continues by default to the present day in NATO, 
even though the nations of Western Europe are no longer threatened by any attack from the 
East.  Moreover, NATO has a growing supremacy over Russia in conventional forces and in 
the near future will gain supremacy in nuclear weapons as well. 
In the meantime, this deterrence model assumes that claims will be even further-
ranging and the demands on its material basis will be even greater, which determines whether 
the strategy is a realistic instrument of policy and war, or just an empty rhetorical bluff. It is 
clear that the concept of “extended deterrence” also provides for the first use of nuclear 
weapons and thus the initiation of a nuclear war. But in contrast to "enhanced deterrence," 
these actions (prone to the most catastrophic consequences, especially if the enemy also has 
NW) must be undertaken, not in the name of protecting the vitally important interests of 
one’s own country, but for the sake of another nation. 
 In order to have credibility, such a strategy must rely either on a nuclear weapons 
monopoly or an overwhelming nuclear superiority over the opponent. In 1949, the US gave 
guarantees to NATO that were based on its nuclear monopoly.  But in 1952, Great Britain 
acquired its own NW in order to avoid full reliance on the willingness of the US to keep its 
promises in case of a major war in Europe. After the creation of Soviet ICBMs, France also 
began to doubt the reliability of US nuclear guarantees, which added to its determination to 
acquire its own NW (in 1960), and in 1967, France left the NATO military organization. 
Thus, mistrust was expressed for US promises in case of an outbreak of war, to use the 
vernacular of the day, "to trade New York for Paris." As strategic parity developed between 
the USSR and the US, American "extended deterrence" under NATO became even more 
dubious and caused deepening conflicts within the alliance (i.e. the crises of the early 1980s, 
precipitated by US deployment of medium range missiles in Europe). But then the Cold War 
ended unexpectedly, the Warsaw Pact and the USSR collapsed, and the question of the 
reliability of American nuclear commitments was removed from the NATO agenda. 
Russia has made promises such as these quite easily to its partners in the Collective 
Security Treaty (CST signed in Tashkent in 1992). This easygoing attitude might exist 
because a direct attack on Russian allies from abroad is not considered very likely. It might 
also be that “extended deterrence” isn't given too serious a meaning, or that the underlying 
strategic sense of such guarantees is simply not understood by present Russian political 
leadership and military commanders. In any case, while Russia's allies under the CST are not 
threatened by aggression from a nuclear power (or union), the guarantees of "extended 
deterrence" look quite nice, like an unnecessary insurance bonus. But if the situation were to 
change in the future, Russian leadership may face a dramatic dilemma and an agonizing 
decision to support the creditability of its promise to "trade Moscow for Minsk or Yerevan" 
(not to mention Dushanbe, Bishkek or Alma-Ata). 
Thus, yet another factor of great ambiguity in nuclear deterrence in the modern world 
is the fact that, in contrast to how it has been widely presented, in only a small number of 
cases and during limited periods of time has deterrence been perceived and practiced in the 
 27
narrow meaning of the concept — i.e. as a strategy for preventing nuclear war. Much more 
frequently, deterrence has been given and continues to be given a broader strategic meaning 
that provides for the first use of nuclear weapons. This is yet another inherent contradiction in 
nuclear deterrence: it commonly assumes the willingness to initiate a nuclear war.  
Fortunately, over the past half-century, this apocalyptic paradox has mostly remained 
in the domain of theory. But in the future, proliferation of NW and the ever more multipolar 
nuclear relationships between states, threaten to place it in the range of the practical. 
2.2. The Rationality of Nuclear Deterrence 
The idea of nuclear deterrence has so engrained itself into the blood and fiber of 
military and political relations between nations over the past half-century that it is universally 
accepted to be completely rational and lacking in alternatives. Without a doubt, nuclear 
deterrence is less irrational than the doctrine of actually conducting nuclear war, especially 
between nuclear powers. However, if judged from other than a strictly military and strategic 
angle, for example from the social and political point of view, then the rationality of 
deterrence looks much more dubious. 
 
Even the more defensive (in the sense of excluding first strike) and stabilizing variant 
of this strategy — "minimal deterrence" — is quite paradoxical. After all, what is being 
suggested is striking back to retaliate for a nuclear attack by destroying tens of millions of 
civilians in the other country. This act of revenge, in the first place, is irrational, since the 
slaughter of the population of the other country will not return the lives of the citizens of the 
attacked country nor will it rebuild the destroyed materials. More than that, in contrast with 
the strategic bombing of Germany and Japan in WWII, as controversial as they were, a 
nuclear strike against civilians will in no way affect the ability of the enemy to continue the 
war, which will depend entirely on its surviving nuclear weapons and the functioning of its 
command-control system. 
In the second place, if in the pre-nuclear age it used to be impossible to start or 
conduct a war without the support of at least a portion of the population in the aggressor's 
country, a nuclear war can be started without any agreement on the part of the nation, simply 
through upper leadership issuing an order to the crews of the missile launch control centers 
(and in the newest command-control systems foregoing even them and connecting directly 
with the launchers). The people, who are the main targets in a nuclear retaliation, have no 
direct responsibility for the aggressive decision made by the upper leadership in the 
government. This is especially true in authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, where the people 
not only do not elect their own leaders, but may not even be seen by the latter as being of the 
greatest value. This attitude towards the population was demonstrated, for example, by the 
leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), when in the 1950s and 1960s it 
proclaimed total war as the path to "final victory" over imperialism.  
At the end of the 1970s, suspecting the Soviet leaders of the same attitude towards 
their people, US President J. Carter in his Presidential Directive PD-59 asserted a so-called 
"countervailing strategy," which called for strikes against what the Soviet leaders were 
thought to value above all else — their own lives.  This meant the destruction of the hardened 
underground bunkers and nuclear-proof shelters, as well as other sites where the party and 
government leaders could take refuge.10  It goes without saying that this concept evoked an 
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extremely painful reaction in the USSR, where they called it the "strategy of decapitating 
strikes" and evaluated it as a the latest scandalously aggressive step in the American strategy 
of launching a disarming strike against the USSR. This fear led to enhanced Soviet reliance 
on launch-on-warning strategy, thus increasing the danger to both sides. 
Other attempts to make nuclear deterrence more rational also, as a rule, had the 
opposite effect. For example, the improved ability of SNF to launch counterforce strikes 
against the aggressor’s reserve strategic forces, which may not have been used during its first 
strike, would definitely be seen as an enhancement of the potential for making not a second, 
but a disarming first strike. And not without justification; the missile launch silos, submarine 
and bomber bases, and deployment areas of the land-based mobile ICBM's are all the very 
targets that need to be taken out in the first strike in order to avoid retaliation or reduce the 
damage from it. The response to such strategic experiments, aside from increasing the 
survivability of SNF, has generally been to give greater priority to the concept and the 
technical systems for LOW concepts and to plan for the use of more massive numbers of 
weapons. 
Hence, the principal attribute of nuclear deterrence is that while being generally 
accepted by politicians and public in peacetime, it could suddenly look horrible in a crisis 
situation, when it is really supposed to do the job of preventing war. It is then that its practical 
implications come to the forefront of decision-makers’ deliberations. Since deterrence may 
fail in many ways (crisis escalation, technical accident, miscalculation of the military, etc.), 
the decision to carry out the threat on which deterrence is based seems to be the ultimate 
irrationality. As a rule, efforts to enhance the credibility of deterrence by improving its 
applicability (through selective targeting and reduction of the collateral damage effects of the 
NW, and through plans for the use of limited numbers of warheads, etc.) are usually 
perceived by the other side as indicating an increasingly aggressive stance in nuclear strategy 
towards a first strike capability to achieve victory in nuclear war.  
The fundamental paradox of nuclear deterrence lies in the fact that the deterrence 
posture that is the best in making nuclear war unthinkable (massive strikes, maximum 
damage, high speed and certainty of retribution — up to a fully automatic nuclear 
counterattack, called “doomsday machine” in the US and “dead hand” in the USSR) would 
be the worst option if deterrence failed and NW were actually used. But at the same time, 
attempts to "build into" the forces any "more rational" options for the use of NW in case 
deterrence fails tend unavoidably to lower the "nuclear threshold" and weaken deterrence 
itself.  
Finally, there is another, perhaps the most important, factor in the paradoxical nature 
of deterrence.  Considering the catastrophic consequences of its use, especially its use in 
error, no other class of weapon needs to be effectively controlled by the political leadership to 
such a great extent. The paradox is that at the same time, it is more difficult to ensure real 
political control over the use of nuclear weapons than with any other kind of weapon.  This is 
caused by the technical characteristics of NW, in particular the SNF, which could require the 
actions of thousands of people at all levels operating the most technically complex systems to 
be synchronized to the minute.  This synchronization must occur under intense pressure and 
in a situation when the systems of command and control, early warning systems and weapons 
themselves, are targeted by the enemy’s nuclear forces and may be hit at any moment. All of 
the following must be considered: the flight time of strategic missiles (maximum of 30 
minutes for ICBMs, minimum of around 10 minutes for SLBMs); the time needed to receive, 
verify and evaluate the signals of missile attack early warning systems; the time to issue the 
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order for subordinates to launch missiles; and the time to prepare the launch, fire a missile 
from its launch silo, and have it get away from the probable attack zone. In the best case 
scenario, the top leadership has only several minutes to make a political decision. In the worst 
case scenario, it has "negative time," — i.e. the flight time of the enemy's missiles is less than 
the time it takes to receive and evaluate the attack information, plus the time needed to launch 
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Figure 3. Time Scale of Command-Control and Missile Attack Warning System 
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Figure 4. Time Scale of Command-Control and Missile Attack Warning System 
Functioning (the case of a SLBMs attack) 
Moreover, at such time the leadership will act on the basis of reports from 
subordinates and their evaluations of the situation, and will not be able to re-check this 
information, or depart from already established operational plans. Otherwise, leadership 
would have to face the risk that retaliatory strike would not be implemented at all. In essence, 
the role of leader is relegated to a formality, and when the time comes, a leader must act like 
a monkey trained on a machine to pull a lever when a light shines to get a banana. This is all 
particularly true in the context of concepts of a launch-on-warning or launch-under-attack and 
will be greatly aggravated by the growth of the number of countries possessing nuclear 
missiles and with the broadening of the scope of potential attack azimuths. 
During peacetime, government leaders, to judge from the numerous ridiculous 
statements they make on the subject, never get around to thoroughly studying the apparently 
surrealistic scenarios of, and plans for, nuclear war. There is seldom access for state leaders 
to independent critical expertise that could disabuse them of many of the absurdities and 
dangers in nuclear military planning (and those experts usually do not possess top secret 
information on the subject). And yet, in the course of routine operational planning, the 
military is always making the guarantee of launching NW under the worst circumstances 
(called “positive control”) its top priority, instead of guarding against nuclear war breaking 
out by mistake, unauthorized actions, false signals, or technical breakdown (“negative 
control”). Numerous organizational and technical trade-offs between positive and negative 
control are usually resolved in favor of the former— implementing the assigned mission is 
always the military’s top priority.  
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In a real crisis situation, if the use of NW is no longer an abstraction, but a reality, 
there will be neither the possibility nor the time to review the technical characteristics of 
various systems or the operational plans for using nuclear weapons. Thus, the government 
leadership will be held hostage to secret departmental decisions that were closed to any 
criticism and adopted many years ago in different circumstances and based on completely 
inappropriate considerations. 
An impressive classic historic analogy, with all the conditionality that accompanies 
such analogies, are the plans for troop transportation by railways made by the German 
General Staff before 1914, which, naturally, the Kaiser and his government were loath to 
review during peacetime.  When the international crisis began in the Summer of 1914, the 
German leadership found itself faced with a choice: either begin the planned shipments under 
the well-known Shliffen Plan, which provided for an attack to the West and then to the East, 
or change the plan and doom both the troop transportation to complete chaos and Germany to 
a defeat in the War on two fronts.  Berlin chose the former, prepared through the scrupulous 
technical work of military specialists during peacetime, based on strictly operational 
considerations and blind to all dramatic turns and dilemmas of the political crisis of 1914. 
The political leadership ended up as hostages to a pre-planned military strategy and the 
military technical base of operational planning. This made WWI unavoidable — with the 
well-known consequences for Germany and the entire world, felt all the way to the end of the 
20th century.  
A historical analysis of the development of that tragedy that was stunningly influential 
was presented in the book The Guns of August by the famous American historian, B. 
Tuchman. President Kennedy read this book shortly before the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
October 1962, and was deeply impressed by it. At the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the 
leaders of the US and the USSR had nearly crossed the Rubicon of a nuclear conflict, being 
trapped in the dynamics of the military and political escalation of the crisis and nearly losing 
control over the situation, with incomparably worse potential consequences than in August 
1914. It could be that Tuchman's book prompted Kennedy to exercise extra caution and 
flexibility and to adopt a more critical attitude to the recommendations from the US military 
command in those dramatic days. This allowed both sides to step back in time from the brink 
of the abyss.  
Unfortunately, from all appearances, neither Khruschev nor the subsequent Soviet and 
Russian leaders have read books such as this. Neither is it clear whether subsequent 
American leaders have read such books. Otherwise, they would have scrutinized the details 
of the nuclear strategy and weapons programs much more deeply during peacetime, bringing 
in independent experts and not relying totally on the military agencies, so as to retain real 
control over the course of events when the fateful hour comes.  
2.3. Mutual Deterrence — the Rule or the Exception? 
Analysis of historical experience and the current situation shows that the relations of 
mutual deterrence between nuclear powers are more of an exception than a rule, especially if 
stable deterrence is meant, which is supposed to minimize the probability of nuclear war. 
Aside from all of the above-mentioned specific versions of deterrence, the latter may exist in 
its most general form in two forms. 
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One may be called "existential" deterrence — the political and psychological effects 
of prudence and caution that nuclear weapons are able to inspire in the opposing side(s) by 
the mere fact of their presence.  This is independent of technical characteristics, numbers of 
such weapons, their command-control systems, or of the effectiveness of their use. 
"Existential" deterrence is inherent to NW simply in light of a certain probability of their use 
in the event of war, inasmuch as the side(s) in the conflict does (do) possess them, and 
because of the huge destructive consequences of the use of even individual weapons of this 
class. At the same time, the role of such a level of deterrence is seriously dependent on the 
acuteness of conflict in the political relations of the sides, the degree to which third countries 
would get involved, regional military balances, and so on. If the crisis is severe indeed, and 
there are no allied obligations on the part of third powers, this type of deterrence could lead to 
the outbreak of a nuclear war, since the state that launches a first strike would as a rule gain 
great military advantage.  
In contrast to this, the other general form of deterrence, which may be called 
"qualified deterrence," assumes the reasonable likelihood that the nuclear forces will succeed 
in meeting whatever specific goals they have been given under the assumed circumstances of 
a war breaking out. There are numerous versions of this kind of deterrence, from "minimal," 
to "extended," and everything in between. A variety of versions of “qualified deterrence” 
have been seen in various countries in different periods of time. "Qualified deterrence," 
understandably, is a much more reliable and predictable means for ensuring the defensive 
capabilities of a nation, in spite of all of the stipulations and paradoxes of the various models 
of such deterrence considered above. This level of deterrence is assumed to provide for a 
reasonable level of strategic stability in spite of any tension in international relations and even 
during times of crisis between states. And it also may create the material base for nuclear 
weapons limitation and reduction agreements as valuable specific tools for ensuring mutual 
security, transparency, and greater trust between nations. 
The classic version of "qualified deterrence," which is mutual and decreases the 
probability of nuclear war and armed conflict in general to a minimum, is the strategic 
relations between the USSR/Russia and the US beginning in the late 1960s and extending 
through to around 2010 or 2012. After this, because of the reasons listed above, Russian 
deterrence will be predictably transformed into a "minimal," and then, perhaps, "existential" 
deterrence, at least with respect to strategic relations with the US. That is, of course, if the RF 
nuclear forces development program is not fundamentally corrected in the near future and no 
new arms control agreements are reached. 
Until the mid-1960s, the British and French nuclear forces, in themselves, could 
render only "existential" deterrence against the USSR, while from the mid-1980s and on to 
the mid-1990s they were capable of "minimal" “qualified deterrence.” The Soviet and 
Russian SNF during this whole time had the overwhelming capability of launching a 
disarming strike against these European countries. Only the alliance with the US and its 
nuclear guarantees under NATO allowed Britain and France to experiment freely with their 
nuclear forces and concepts, using them for the goals of prestige and as factors in relations 
with allies, without having any real fear for their own security. For the next 10 to 15 years, 
while Russian SNF are decreasing and the potential of English and French weapons is 
increasing, the latter two will attain parity in their capacities for "qualified deterrence” with 
Russia. 
After creating nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s, China had the potential for only 
"existential" deterrence against the USSR, and no deterrence at all against the US until the 
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early 1970s. By the 1990s, the PRC had acquired the capability of a "minimal" deterrence 
against the USSR/RF and "existential" deterrence against the US. Based on the rates of 
production and modernization of the Chinese SNF, over the next 10 to 15 years, the PRC 
might acquire the capability of a robust "qualified" deterrence against Russia (together with  
superiority in conventional forces in the Far East) and "minimal” and “qualified" deterrence 
with respect to the US.  
Israel, having obtained its NW at the beginning of the 1980s, had by the end of the 
decade gained the capability of "qualified" deterrence against the neighboring Arab countries 
that lacked such weapons, and "existential" deterrence against the USSR.  
Over the next few years, India and Pakistan will have the classic version of mutual 
"existential" deterrence, which is exceedingly unstable and dangerous with respect to the 
outbreak of nuclear war in a severe regional conflict. At present, according to available 
information both states lack efficient command-control systems (in particular, negative 
control systems to prevent an unauthorized missile launch) and keep their missiles separate 
from their nuclear warheads. Under these circumstances, such a regime is better than if they 
had fully coupled nuclear forces, which would be a recipe for disaster: both missile forces are 
vulnerable to a disarming strike, both nations are lacking early warning or reconnaissance 
systems, missile flight times are extremely short (5 to 10 minutes) and official military 
doctrines allow for a first nuclear strike (equivocally for India and and unequivocally for 
Pakistan).  
After entering the “nuclear club” the two states have up to now shown greater 
political cautiousness in crisis and agreed on notification of missile launches and some 
confidence building measures. Their mutual nuclear deterrence, however, remains extremely 
fragile since both parties lack the capability to make sure that the other side keeps missiles 
and warheads decoupled. If some future crisis escalates to an armed conflict, both nations 
would rush to couple missiles and warheads after which there would be a strong incentive for 
India to implement a preventive conventional or nuclear-conventional counterforce strike, 
while for Pakistan there would be an irresistible motive for pre-emption through the “use-it-
or-loose-it” theory. 
In the early missile era, both the United States and the USSR (similar to India and 
Pakistan), kept their first generation ICBMs decoupled from warheads, but after a few years, 
with technical improvements, they abandoned this practice and deployed missiles with 
warheads permanently in the nose cones. Most probably India and Pakistan will follow this 
trend. In this case there may be a more stable deterrence on the peninsula if both nations, 
beside coupling their missiles and warheads, simultaneously acquire more effective 
command-control systems (including permissive-action-links – PAL) and reconnaissance 
capabilities (air or space-based), as well as survivable missile basing modes (hardened silos, 
ground-mobile or sea-based forces). Otherwise, their nuclear balance will become highly 
unstable. Taking this into consideration, the United States and Russia might render technical 
assistance in some of these areas in exchange for the two nations entering bilateral arms 
control talks and joining various nuclear arms control regimes.  
A still better alternative would be to have India and Pakistan reach an agreement to 
keep missiles and warheads separate, and to agree on reliable verification provisions for this 
agreement.  For this, US-Russian sponsorship might be an effective tool as well. India and 
Pakistan could even serve as a test model of one of the methods of implementing a possible 
future US-Russian de-alerting and deactivation regime.    
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Besides the Indo-Pakistani nuclear balance, India will in the near future have 
"existential" deterrence with respect to China, which will maintain its significant nuclear 
supremacy over India until it gains a “qualified” deterrence in 5 to 10 years. Islamabad will 
soon gain, if it has not already acquired, "existential" deterrence with respect to Russia 
(technically covering a large part of its Siberian territory), in spite of the clear nuclear 
superiority of Moscow.  
If the DPRK and Iran are allowed to create their own NW in the foreseeable future, 
then the maximum that they would be able to gain is "existential" deterrence against the US, 
which might serve as the strongest factor in provoking a use of force by the American side, 
going so far as a pre-emptive air and missile attack with high-precision conventional weapons 
and even nuclear strikes. This likelihood could grow even more given the deployment of an 
ABM system in the US, depending on the actual capabilities of its improved follow-on 
components. 
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Figure 5. Bilateral Deterrence Relationships  
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On the whole, it must be concluded that, in spite of the perceptions broadly accepted 
after the end of the Cold War on the stabilizing role of nuclear weapons, relations based on a 
"qualified" mutual deterrence are a rare phenomenon indeed. From Figure 5, it is clear that 
relations between countries possessing NW may not be based on deterrence in a number of 
situations: 
• First, when the nuclear weapons of the two sides are deployed out of range of each 
other's territories or important foreign targets (Britain and France, on the one side, and 
the PRC, India, and Pakistan on the other); 
• Second, when targets may be within range of each other's weapons, but the states are 
military and political allies (US, Britain, France); 
• Third, when the countries are within each other's range, and do not have formal 
alliance relations, yet still do not have nuclear deterrence relations because the NW of 
the two sides are obviously directed at some other third power (India and Russia, 
Pakistan and China, Israel and France); 
• Fourth, when one power has significant superiority in offensive and/or defensive 
weapons, deterrence might be predominantly unilateral and unstable (US against 
PRC, DPRK, or Iran, as well as potentially between the US and RF);  
• Fifth, when states’ nuclear weapons are vulnerable and there is a lack of reliable 
command-control systems and early warning systems, deterrence may be quite fragile 
and mutually dangerous (India—Pakistan, Israel—Iran, DPRK—Japan, South Korea, 
Taiwan, provided that the last five states “go nuclear”). 
From the above analysis it follows that the state of a stable mutual nuclear deterrence 
relation is and has been the exception rather than the rule. Hence there is no reason 
whatsoever to hope that in the future, nuclear relationships between and among new NWS, 
and even between some traditional nuclear powers would remain a solid guarantee against 
actual nuclear war, as it has been in the past sixty years. Moreover, even when considering 
past experiences, the role of nuclear deterrence is not an absolute truth. 
2.4. What Prevented a Nuclear War? 
Yet another crucial question on this subject is the following: was nuclear deterrence a 
real factor in preventing total war in past years? If, God forbid, such a war had actually 
occurred, then the answer to this question would be quite definitely negative, if there were 
anyone left to answer it. Fortunately, war was successfully avoided, but for that very reason 
the answer must be purely hypothetical. Considering the strict bipolarity and acute 
confrontation in international relations from the late 1940s to the beginning of the 1970s 
(which historically always preceded great wars), it is quite possible that if the major opposing 
sides, otherwise evenly matched, had not had nuclear weapons, a third world war would have 
in fact happened. According to this line of reasoning, it is possible that the existence of NW 
exerted a constant and unseen influence, playing the role of an inherent deterrent factor, 
independently of the military and technical specifics of the ever-changing nuclear weapons 
balance between the opposing sides. 
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At the same time, it must be remembered that the nuclear arms race in and of itself 
became an important factor in causing tensions between the opposing sides and that it gave 
rise to periodic crises in relations, for example, the crisis arising from the deployment of 
American medium-range missiles in Europe in 1983. What exactly prevailed in the sense of 
greater or lesser probability of war will forever remain a topic of hypothetical speculation. 
The only example of a direct effect of mutual deterrence would be in a situation when 
the nuclear and conventional forces have been placed on high alert in anticipation of war, but 
the powers then stepped back from the brink under the fear of nuclear catastrophe. This kind 
of classical episode happened only once — in October 1962 during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
It is true that at that time the deterrence emanating from the USSR was more "existential" 
than “qualified,” since it had only several operational ICBMs, which were completely 
vulnerable on open launch pads. US leadership knew this, but was not absolutely certain due 
to the low effectiveness of the reconnaissance systems of that time. Besides, the USSR had a 
number of long range bombers and many medium range missiles and bombers, which could 
devastate US allies and forward based forces. Hence, some kind of mutual nuclear deterrence 
did exist even though in an asymmetric form. 
Only one factor prevents this instance from being firm confirmation of the positive 
role of nuclear deterrence. This is the fact that the crisis of 1962 was predominantly caused 
by the very dynamics of nuclear deterrence. Moscow decided to deploy medium range 
missiles in Cuba in order to close the growing gap with the American SNF and forward-based 
nuclear forces. And the sharp acceleration in US ICBM and SLBM programs was 
implemented in response to the bluff by the USSR leadership regarding their ability to "crank 
missiles out like sausages."  
So it turns out that nuclear deterrence presents yet another paradox: it worked best for 
preventing a war, the risk of which was caused by the evolution of the nuclear deterrence 
itself (the cure saved the patient from the illness caused by the cure itself). 
2.5. Nuclear Deterrence and Terrorism 
Nuclear deterrence cannot be used against transnational organized terrorism, even 
when such organizations have acquired a nuclear weapon or an explosive device. Terrorists 
have no territories, industries, populations or regular armies that can be targeted for 
retaliation. In instances when they are given a base by a government, such as the Afghan 
Taliban gave to Al-Qaida, nuclear deterrence with respect to such a state would still find little 
application, since it would hardly be likely to exert a restraining influence on the terrorists, 
who are quite free in their activities and able to pass through borders quickly and secretly. It 
is possible that terrorists would even be interested in provoking a nuclear strike on one or the 
other host country in the name of political advancement of their cause.  
 
The struggle against catastrophic terrorism is related to deterrence only in the sense of 
deterring (through the threat of retribution, including nuclear) some countries from 
supporting terrorism by granting bases or providing other assistance. But it is difficult to 
imagine that any state would openly support terrorists possessing nuclear weapons. And a 
nuclear strike on any country, even a "rogue state," considering the secondary consequences 
and political shock in the rest of the world, is too strong an instrument to use without a fully 
obvious "corpus delicti." Quite revealing in this regard has been the reaction of the world 
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community to the poorly justified American operation in Iraq in 2003, using only 
conventional forces, and with minimal secondary losses and material damage. The breakup of 
the anti-terrorist coalition to a huge extent has inspired the resistance movement and 
international terrorism in Iraq and has drawn the US into a swamp of an open-ended 
occupation. 
This relates directly to the present American concept of developing "clean" nuclear 
mini-charges that penetrate deep underground to could destroy bunkers, warehouses, and 
other underground terrorist or "rogue state" targets. Even without mentioning the political 
consequences of such a use of NW, from a tactical and technical standpoint, the use of 
nuclear mini-charges elicits a great deal of doubt. In order to avoid nuclear contamination of 
the locale, a sub-kiloton charge must penetrate the earth to a depth of 150 to 200 meters, 
which is impossible. Penetration to a depth of 10 to 15 meters is the imaginable technical 
limit, especially in hard rock formations. Then, the “coupling effect” (of warhead with the 
surrounding matter) would provide about 10 times as great a shock wave effect than of an air 
or surface burst of the same yield. However, at such a depth, the collateral damage of a 
nuclear explosion for the area would be almost the same as with a surface burst – but with all 
the ensuing physical, military, and political consequences. 
Moreover, in order to destroy the target with a penetrating nuclear mini-charge, its 
exact location must be known with a precision of at least a few hundred meters. If that is 
already known, however, then contemporary non-nuclear high-precision warheads and high-
yield charges could destroy the target, especially if multiple use is an option. Repeated 
attacks would be possible since such underground sites are not “urgent” targets, which must 
be destroyed quickly and at once, like ICBM silos. If the target is an ICBM silo or 
underground tunnel for missile or aircraft, it may be easily destroyed by the existing 
counterforce hard-target killing nuclear warheads. Command bunkers or WMD storage 
places are not urgent targets and may be repeatedly attacked by conventional munitions. 
Also, conventional troops and special forces could be used, particularly if such an operation 
is conducted by coalition forces and on a legal basis (under UN mandate). 
As for the political aspects of the issue, an indirect showcase happened in the spring 
and summer of 2005, when the DPRK leadership, having violated the NPT,  withdrew from 
the treaty, and then declared its success in manufacturing a nuclear weapon.  The DPRK was 
suspected of preparing a nuclear underground test in a well known location. It would be hard 
to imagine a more clear and provocative case for the United States to demonstrate its will to 
carry out its counterproliferation strategy.  The US could have attacked and destroyed the 
nuclear test site and other key nuclear facilities of this classic “rogue state,” thereby thwarting 
North Korea’s nuclear weapon development program for many years, possibly forever.  
However instead of using military power, Washington used diplomacy to get the 
DPRK back to a six-party negotiating table. As “ideal” as the setting for the application of 
military power was, it turned out to be too risky and politically counterproductive to use even 
conventional precision-guided weapons, which might take out the dangerous facilities with 
high probability and low collateral damage. It is appropriate to assume that it would be still 
less thinkable to use a nuclear weapon, even one designed to reduce fallout, against a “rogue 
state” in a situation other than that of imminent threat of a nuclear attack against the United 
States. And in such a situation, a great variety of existing SNF and TNW systems would be 
available.  
 38
It is not surprising in this regard that the new American nuclear weapons program was 
received in Russia quite badly, in spite of its rather modest financing and early stage of 
development. The rumors that periodically circulate about Washington considering scenarios 
for a “preventative surgical strike” against Russian NW (in the case where Moscow's control 
over them has been lost) were combined with the mini-charge program.  Thus, it was logical 
to make conclusions about their possible use to disarm the RF with minimal secondary 
damage in order not elicit a retaliatory strike against the US with the surviving missiles. 
Although the new earth-penetrating warhead program appears to be blocked at the 
moment, due to Congressional opposition, it may well reappear in the next budgets of the 
Republican Administration.  
For the most part, the struggle with nuclear terrorism consists of active special 
operations, destruction of material and financial infrastructures, protection of nuclear 
warheads and materials storage facilities, and above all, a tightening of the nuclear non-
proliferation regime. The key role here is played by cooperation between the great powers 
and regional participating countries in antiterrorist actions and measures to strengthen NPT 
regimes, to which US application of a nuclear threat, not to mention the actual use of NW, 
would be a true disservice.  
Thus, as the discussion above has shown, the essence of the phenomenon of nuclear 
deterrence and its role in international security over the past half-century has been 
exceedingly ambiguous and contradictory. Perhaps nuclear weapons have been a factor in 
preventing a third world war, or perhaps the human race has just been very lucky. If that's the 
case, then it is very good that history has no subjunctive mood. But the evolution of nuclear 
deterrence in the foreseeable future, following the end of the Cold War, against a backdrop of 
an expanded geography for regional and local, domestic and transnational conflicts, in 
parallel with the proliferation of WMD and means for their delivery, is a matter of great 
uncertainty.  
 
The new, so-called "pragmatic" approach of the US and, subsequently, Russia and 
probably other nuclear powers, evaluates the advantages of nuclear deterrence, the political 
and military applicability of NW, and the processes of nuclear weapons limitation and 
reduction, and, as a consequence, dismantles certain regimes.  It is often justified by the 
changing international security environment. However, as the authors of this study believe, 
such policy is a faulty response to new challenges and, even worse, it creates threats to 
international security in and of itself.  
Thus, another paradox of nuclear deterrence is that it may remain relatively effective 
in performing its task against the threats that are no longer relevant (aggression by the US, 
NATO, Russia, China against each other), but it is not able to deter the threats of the present 
and future.  One threat in particular is transnational terrorism, which flourishes in the 
environment of local conflicts in rogue and failed states.  Transnational terrorist groups could 
potentially be armed with WMD. 
The dialectics of nuclear deterrence and proliferation are in agreement with Hegel's 
classic law. In the beginning, nuclear deterrence (as a policy of the indirect use of nuclear 
weapons for political aims) gave rise to proliferation because more and more countries strove 
to take advantage of the fruits of deterrence to achieve their interests. As the circle of 
countries possessing nuclear weapons grew, however, deterrence became ever more 
ambiguous, unstable and contradictory. This was explained as being a result of both its 
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expanding multilateral nature and the internal paradoxes inherent in deterrence, including its 
ambiguity with respect to the possibility of a first use of nuclear weapons, the dubious 
rationality of a number of its fundamental assumptions, and the ephemeral nature of the 
control over its use by the political leadership. 
The final stage of proliferation is when non-state actors (terrorist organizations) gain 
access to NW, which will completely and finally end deterrence as a doctrine of the indirect 
use of NW to protect national security. The terrorists need NW not for deterrence, but for 
direct use and blackmail of various countries, or of the entire civilized world. In turn, nuclear 
deterrence on the part of governments is helpless against terrorists. 
The dialectics of nuclear deterrence and proliferation have been reflected in the 
processes of arms reductions and disarmament as well. Born out of the fear of nuclear war, 
the desire of the leading powers to stabilize mutual deterrence created a basis for NW 
limitation and reduction agreements. At an early stage in this process (after the Partial Test-
Ban Treaty of 1963), the end of nuclear proliferation began to be viewed as a mandatory 
condition for progress in nuclear disarmament. After the NPT was signed in 1968, the powers 
moved well along the path of partial nuclear disarmament (ABM Treaty, SALT I and SALT 
II, IRBM/ICBM Treaty, START I, II, and III, CTBT, permanent extension of NPT and its 
Protocol of 1997, etc.).  
Arms control did not stop proliferation, though it possibly slowed its progress. It was, 
however, of great importance for ending the Cold War and the massive central nuclear arms 
race. At the end of the 1990s, proliferation accelerated for reasons that were not connected to 
nuclear disarmament. This made proliferation the central concern of the great powers, 
foremost the US and the RF, which was absolutely justifiable. What was not justifiable at all 
was abandoning altogether further efforts by these states to reduce and limit their NW, 
instead of making central nuclear arms control the key subsidiary to non-proliferation, and 
embarking on a new policy of profound revision of mutual nuclear deterrence.  
To defend against states that have newly acquired (or were suspected of the intention 
to acquire) nuclear weapons, and to fight the threat of nuclear terrorism, the US, with other 
leading powers following its lead, have initiated the development and perfection of defense 
systems, as well as the creation of a new generation of nuclear weapons to be used 
preemptively against terrorist bases and the "rogue nations" that give them refuge.  
Against the background of mutual nuclear deterrence as the continuing basis of great 
power strategic relations (exacerbated by Russian nuclear inferiority and US nuclear 
superiority complexes), this policy disrupts the foundations of stable mutual deterrence 
between the main powers.  It also leads to the disintegration of the arms limitation and 
disarmament infrastructure  (falling victim here were the already-mentioned CTBT, ABM 
Treaty, START II and START III, potentially INF/SNF, START I, and SORT).  
And in closing the circuit of nuclear dialectics, the collapse of these treaties will most 
likely destroy the NPT and undercut the basis of the main non-proliferation regimes and 
mechanisms. 
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3. Nuclear Programs of the Big Five4 
The real, rather than the declared, policy of Russia, as with any other nuclear state, 
depends on the actual condition of its nuclear weapons and armed forces in general, the 
approved programs of their development, and the existing plans of combat employment of the 
nuclear forces. Of these factors, the plans for combat employment are classified as are, for the 
most part, the programs of development of Russia’s nuclear forces.  
None of the Nuclear Club official member states makes public their plans for combat 
employment, except for some occasional excerpts from the US Single Integrated Operational 
Plan (SIOP), which have never been acknowledged officially. As for the programs of nuclear 
force development, however, only Russia (the Soviet Union) and China normally do not 
make them public, although the Russian special and popular press often reports factual data 
and offers analysis that fully conforms to the corresponding Western standards. As for the 
plans of combat employment and targeting of the Russian nuclear forces, the open press gives 
no information whatsoever, even in the non-committal form of private experts’ conclusions. 
No official data are available about tactical (operational-tactical) nuclear weapons, programs 
of their development and plans of use. This is why the present chapter mainly deals with the 
nuclear forces in the strategic context, describing the strategic nuclear forces, with the tactical 
component covered only in passing. 
3.1. Russian Federation 
The last official full presentation of the Russian nuclear policy was given in the 
Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation endorsed by President Vladimir Putin on April 
21, 2000. It notes that Russia maintains its status as a nuclear power, and proceeds from the 
need for a nuclear deterrent potential “assuring a preset damage on the aggressor in any 
conditions.”5
Following the lengthy discussions of the doctrine, in line with the previous Basic 
Provisions of the Military Doctrine (1993) and in contrast to the Soviet-declared no-first-use 
commitment, it was announced that “the Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear 
weapons in response to the use against the country and/or its allies of nuclear or any other 
types of weapons of massed destruction, as well as in response to a large-scale aggression 
involving the use of conventional weapons in the situations that are critical to the national 
security of the Russian Federation.”6
Such a statement has, in fact, brought the nuclear posture of Russia to the principles 
of nuclear strategy shared by the United States, Great Britain and France for many years. 
These countries have never denied that they can initiate first use of their nuclear weapons if 
                                                 
4 This chapter partly borrows from the research paper: Arbatov, A. and Dvorkin, V., ‘Nuclear deterrence and 
non-proliferation’. Carnegie Moscow Center. Moscow. 2005. 
 
5 Aktualnye zadachi razvitia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Urgent Tasks of the Armed Forces 
of the Russian Federation). October 2003. Moscow, p.37. 
 
6 Voyennaya Doktrina Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation). – Nezavisimaya  
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attacked by superior Soviet-led general-purpose forces of the Warsaw Pact. That is why, 
given the fact of a considerable weakening of the general-purpose forces of Russia, such a 
change in the use of nuclear forces should be acknowledged as meeting the generally 
accepted standards. It is not discussed here how reasonable this concept is as part of the 
Western strategy and whether such scenarios of a ‘large-scale’ war conform to the political 
relations between the Russian Federation and the West. 
The latest versions of the national nuclear strategy introduce more novelties. In 
particular, they assign a mission of “de-escalation of aggression … through a threat of 
launching or actual launching of strikes of a varying scale by using conventional and/or 
nuclear weapons.” Also noteworthy is the task of “dosed (selective, limited) combat use of 
some components of the Strategic Nuclear Forces,” as well as demonstration of the 
determination “through enhancing the level of their combat readiness, conduct of exercises 
and relocation of some components.”7
Thus, it is for the first time that Russia has officially declared that it can conduct a 
limited nuclear war, involving the use of the Strategic Nuclear Forces, and listed the 
measures used to enhance their readiness, such as deployment of nuclear-powered ballistic 
missile submarines to sea, dispersion of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles along their 
patrol routes, and the flight of heavy bombers to alternate aerodromes, as demonstrations of 
power in case of a crisis. Here, again, attempts are apparently made to copy American 
strategic innovations of the 1970s and 80s, although Russia declares the intention of using in 
such a particular way the weapons that are expected to be less fit in terms of both their 
number and qualitative characteristics in the foreseeable future.  
Theoretically, when used against the United States and its allies, such measures can 
lead to a nuclear conflict, with the United States retaining a sufficient capability of launching 
a disarming attack — a topic to be dealt with in more detail below.  It is possible that such 
language is addressed to China, Pakistan, and new potential nuclear countries that can 
challenge Russia. If so, the question needs to be addressed separately. 
After all of the doubts, Russia has finally confirmed that its national nuclear policy is 
aimed at maintaining an approximate balance (parity or equality) with the United States in 
strategic nuclear forces. There is, however, no consensus on the issue. Some hold the view 
that the Russian SNF should be maintained at a sufficient level comparable to that of Great 
Britain and France. In terms of classic deterrence, it would most likely be sufficient after the 
end of Cold War, and should Russia start building SNF from scratch, such a position would 
be quite reasonable. But since there is an actual parity between the Russian and US nuclear 
forces and the existing agreements can contribute to its maintenance at a considerably lower 
level, acceptable in terms of resources, there is no point in Russia’s rejecting it unilaterally. 
The past few years have seen significant changes in the program of development of 
Russia’s nuclear forces as a result of changing the system of treaty-related strategic relations 
with the United States, as well as some arbitrary top-level decisions lacking a well-
substantiated political, operational-strategic, and military-economic rationale. 
As is known, the previous program of the SNF modernization was developed in 1998 
by a commission of experts headed by N.N. Laverov, Vice-President of the Russian Academy 
of Sciences, with START II provisions in view. It was approved by President B. Yeltsin. In 
                                                 
7 Aktualnye zadachi razvitia Vooruzhennykh Sil Rossiyskoi Federatsii (Urgent Tasks of the Armed Forces 
of the Russian Federation). October 2003. Moscow, p. 42. 
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line with some financial restrictions, it planned to keep from 2007 onwards a total of 1,500 
warheads, including over 400 single-warhead fixed and ground-mobile ICBMs. By then, the 
parties had already signed the draft START III framework agreement of 1997 and had initial 
consultations on the issue. It was supposed that the treaty would at least remove limitations 
on development, testing and deployment of mobile ICBMs with MIRV warheads, since their 
performance characteristics did not differ in terms of strategic stability from those of the 
submarine-launched ballistic missiles for which prohibition on MIRV had never been 
considered before. If this were the case, it would be logical to maintain the traditional 
structure of Soviet/Russian SNF, in which the ground component accounted for about 60-70 
percent of the warheads. 
Unfortunately, it was the last substantiated decision to develop Russian strategic 
nuclear programs and the national nuclear policy. Already in 2000, the head of the General 
Staff of the Russian Armed Forces persuaded the national leadership to redistribute the funds 
in favor of the General Purpose Forces and revise the approved program of the SNF, which 
led to a sharp cut in the land-based ICBM force and badly affected the rate of procurement 
and deployment of new Topol-M missiles (SS-27). In particular, it was proposed that by 2003 
the number of warheads on ICBMs should be reduced down to around 150.8
This was and remains a grave strategic blunder for a number of reasons. On the one 
hand, cost savings resulting from reducing the SNF ground component were insignificant as 
compared to funding the development of the General Purpose Forces. On the other hand, such 
a decision remained geared to the expectations of entry into force of the START II Treaty, 
which was in conflict with the real political situation. It is widely believed in Russia that this 
arbitrary and unilateral curtailment of the most effective leg of its SNF made it much easier 
for the United States to take the ultimate decision of abandoning the ABM Treaty, START II 
and framework START III. 
The Moscow 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty specified future limits on 
Russia’s warheads with no other conditions. In a sense the terms are quite acceptable, since 
replacing START II with the new agreement has removed a number of treaty-related 
limitations on the maintenance and development of the SNF. First, it allows the RF to 
prolong for some time the service life of heavy ICBMS which otherwise would have to be 
discarded by 2007 under the START II. Second, Russia can now equip Topol-M missiles 
with MIRVs. In this case, Russia can easily maintain the forces up to the limit of 2,200 
warheads, unless it dismantles, ahead of schedule, their basing infrastructure or stops the 
previously authorized program of producing Topol-M missiles. Fitting them with MIRV 
would not only relatively increase the total number of warheads in the SNF, but would also 
cut costs of production of the missiles themselves, for much fewer missiles would be needed 
for the same warhead level than if they were fitted with single warheads.  
The status of Russia’s SNF is as classified as possible under the transparency 
provisions of START I, and the country is second only to China in terms of secrecy. In 2005, 
the Russian strategic nuclear triad numbered 815 delivery vehicles and 3,479 warheads. In 
particular, there were 545 ICBMs and 1955 warheads in the Strategic Missile Forces (85 SS-
18 heavy missiles, 129 SS-19, 291 SS-25 and 40 SS-27 ICBMs).  Sea-based forces consisted 
of 12 nuclear submarines carrying 192 launchers and 672 warheads (6 Delta-3, 6 Delta-4 
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SSBNs and 1 Typhoon boat waiting for new Bulava type missiles).9 In the air component 
there were 78 heavy bombers (34 Tu-95MS-6, 30 Tu-95MS-16 and 14 Tu-160) carrying 852 
air-launched cruise missiles.  
As a result of the wrong decisions taken in 2000-2001, the long-term SNF program 
does not include a key indicator of strategic stability and robustness of nuclear deterrence, —
i.e.,survivability of the nuclear forces, including the command and control system, in a 
hypothetical nuclear and non-nuclear war. In late 2004 and early 2005 various representatives 
of the Defense Ministry reported from time to time that in the long term, the Strategic Missile 
Forces was planning to get a few divisions of mobile Topol-M missiles. Unless, however, the 
authorities announce that the initial decisions on drastically slowing down the program are to 
be revised, it can be assumed that the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces would have to rely 
more heavily on silo-based ICBMs and on the concept of first-strike or launch-on-warning. 
With Topol (SS-25) missiles being withdrawn due to their ending service life, with heavy 
bombers being less and less combat capable and extremely vulnerable at few airfields, with 
Typhoon and then 667 BDRM (Delta-4) SSBNs going out of service by 2015, and with very 
few new 955 class (Borey–Yuri Dolgoruki) submarines being commissioned (and still fewer 
at sea at any given time), above 90 percent of Russian SNF may become vulnerable to just 
200 to 300 nuclear warheads, which is what two to three Trident submarines carry on board. 
Moreover, for the first time in history, Russian SNF may become vulnerable to non-US 
nuclear weapons states’ forces.   
At the same time the United States, by just maintaining its forces at START I or even  
SORT levels, will be inadvertently gaining an overwhelming and increasing capability of a 
disarming counterforce attack against the Russian Federation. This growing instability of the 
Russian-American strategic balance against the background of their continuing relations of 
mutual nuclear deterrence would not only be dangerous in a possible crisis situation, but will 
hamper deeper cooperation between the two powers in the field of international security, 
especially where joint military actions (such as counterproliferation) or joint military-
technological programs (for instance, joint missile launch warning systems or BMD systems) 
are involved. 
On the issue of the limitation and reduction of nuclear weapons, Russia presently 
holds a more traditional position than the United States, especially against that of the current 
Republican administration. After ratifying the START II Treaty in 2000, Moscow advocated 
for the conclusion of a START III Treaty and for an agreement on delineation of strategic and 
tactical anti-missile defenses. It also opposed the United States withdrawal from the ABM 
Treaty or proposals on its revision. It also advocated much deeper strategic nuclear reductions 
under the 2002 Moscow SORT (down to 1,500 or even 1,000 warheads) without treating the 
operationally deployed weapons and warheads in storage as separate categories. Moscow 
ratified the Comprehensive (Nuclear) Test Ban Treaty in 2000 and supports its entry into 
force as soon as possible. 
3.2. United States of America 
The nuclear policy of the United States has been essentially outlined in the Nuclear 
Posture Review and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. 
                                                 
9 Here SS-N-18 SLBMs on Delta III SSBNs are counted as having 3 warheads each and 5 remaining Ty-
phoon boats are discounted altogether since their missiles have been removed from launchers due to obsolesce. 
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The quadrennial review of the new nuclear doctrine sent to the Congress at the end of 
2001 shifted reliance in planning the United States strategic forces from the Cold War threat-
based approaches to new principles based on the so-called concept of “possibility of 
possibilities.” 
Judging from the language, the new nuclear policy differs from Presidential Directive 
60 signed by President Clinton in November 1997. The latter focused on deterring the use of 
nuclear weapons and ruled out a Reagan-era recommendation that the US Armed Forces 
should be ready to wage a prolonged nuclear war and win it. The new policy also reiterated 
the provision set forth in the Nuclear Posture Review (1994) that the basic targets of the 
United States nuclear weapons are the opponents’ nuclear arms and associated infrastructure, 
rather than cities and industrial centers. 
One of the conceptual premises of the new nuclear policy is that the Cold War 
approach towards deterrence is no longer appropriate, above all in the relations with Russia 
which were formerly built around mutual deterrence through a threat of assured destruction. 
This provision might be interpreted as refuting an allegation that Pentagon has no strategic 
plans of using nuclear weapons against Russia, China and some other states (SIOP). Defense 
Minister Sergei Ivanov’s comment on the point was, however, quite skeptical: “As a head of 
the military agency I am well aware that the Ministry of Defense should foresee any scenario, 
including the worst cases. No planning is a surprise for me.”10 On the other hand, are there 
any more tangible indicators of a real nuclear policy, other than the operational plans, lists of 
targets and strategy of developing the nuclear forces and weapons, than the fluctuating and 
politically motivated rhetoric? 
The new version of the national nuclear posture elaborates for the first time a concept 
of the follow-up stage in the military foundation of the United States national security — a 
transition to a new triad. Unlike the old triad, involving ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, 
the new triad comprises an offensive component, including non-nuclear strategic options; 
active and passive defense components, including the anti-ballistic missile defense; a 
developed defense industrial infrastructure, and up-to-date command and control assets, to 
which the above components as well as the old-type nuclear triad are linked. Apparently, the 
new concept formulates a long-term objective — to reduce the United States dependence on 
the nuclear weapons and enhance the capabilities of containing new threats in the 
environment of proliferating WMD. At the same time, since a threat of escalation is no longer 
treated as critical, as it was in the Cold War era, the new strategy boldly wipes out the 
borderline between the use of nuclear weapons and that of conventional weapons against 
potential adversaries. 
Thus, it is postulated that the offensive nuclear forces alone cannot deter aggression in 
the 21st century, as demonstrated by September 11, 2001 events. At the same time, active and 
passive defenses are also far from being perfect, but while allowing no limited attacks or 
reducing their efficiency, the defenses will be able to develop some new capabilities for 
active operations in settlement of critical situations, containment of threats and conduct of 
military operations. 
The established parameters of the strategic nuclear component for a mid- to long-term 
period (2020 onwards) confirm the continuity and stability of the nuclear policy in terms of 
the structure and composition of the old triad. Presently (as of 2005), the United States has in 
its SNF 1225 delivery vehicles and 5960 warheads. In the land-based leg there are 550 
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 45
ICBMs and 1700 warheads (500 Minuteman-3 and 50 Peacekeeper MX missiles).  In sea-
based forces there are 18 submarines with 432 missiles and 3168 warheads (including 144 
Trident-1 and 288 Trident-2 SLBMs). The air leg consists of 81 B-1, 20 B-2 and 142 B-52 
bombers – altogether 243 airplanes and 1098 warheads.   
Apparently, the forces planned for 2012 comprise 14 strategic submarines 
(“boomers”) carrying Trident-2 type SLBMs, 500 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, 76 B-52H and 20 B-
2 heavy bombers. Minuteman-3 upgrade programs are currently under way, which means that 
they will be in use at least as long as 2020. The US Navy made a decision to extend the 
service life of SSBNs carrying Trident-2 missiles for another 42 to 44-year period. SLBM 
modernization is also planned so that their service lives match those of SSBNs. The timing of 
SSBN and SLBM introduction permits the US Navy to maintain the capability of the planned 
sea-based component for as long as 2040. 
The US Air Force is now upgrading strategic bombers, which implies that their 
current complement may technically be maintained through 2035 to 2045. The research and 
development of the next generation of heavy bombers is expected to start at the end of the 
next decade. 
More evidence to the effect that the United States is consistently carrying out its 
traditional nuclear policy is invariably steady funding, beginning from 1996 FY onward, of 
effective programs of modernization and extension of service lives of basic types of ICBMs, 
SLBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and nuclear bombs, as well as modernization of the 
warheads.  
In accordance with the current United States approach, the nuclear stockpile falls into 
four categories. The first two categories make up the so-called “active” arsenal. The first one 
includes warheads assigned to active delivery systems, and the second to those retrieved from 
the delivery vehicles, but kept ready for redeployment. This category also comprises the W78 
and W88 nuclear warheads retrieved from Minuteman-3 and Trident-2 missiles respectively, 
as well as the W87 warheads from Peacekeeper MX missiles to be disassembled. The third 
and fourth categories form an “inactive” stockpile. The third category includes inactive 
reserve warheads that are not ready for deployment, but can be used to replace the warheads 
belonging to the active stockpile. It is considered that redeployment of the warheads would 
require months. The fourth category is the retired warheads awaiting dismantlement. 
According to Defense Secretary D. Rumsfield, the reason for non-destruction of some 
warheads removed from service is “their retention in case there arise some problems relating 
to the safety and reliability of our stored arsenal. Since we have no more operating production 
lines, it would be simply unreasonable for the United States to discard all these warheads and 
put them out of the reserve.”11
In the goals for reduction set forth in the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, it was 
stated that each party should determine the number of warheads left each year based on the 
results of their own periodic, full assessments of military-political and technological 
situations in the context of national security. One of such three or four intermediate 
landmarks in this area for the United States will be the end of 2007 when the limit of 3,800 
operationally deployed warheads is expected to be achieved. 
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In December 2003, US President Bush signed the FY2004 National Budget Act and 
approved the proposal made by the Republican majority of the United States Congress to 
cancel the 1993 act called “Ban on Research and Development of Low-Yield Nuclear 
Weapons,” with regard to conceptual research of low-yield nuclear weapons. The president’s 
act also authorized initial funding in FY 2004 for research to develop new penetration-type 
modifications of operational nuclear weapons (the existing B61 or B83 nuclear bombs) 
designed to hit hardened underground targets.  
In February 2003, Bush sent to Congress a letter to cover the administration-built FY 
2004 budget request for defense needs of the Department of Defense and the Department of 
Energy, and specified the following four initiatives relating to nuclear weapons: 
• To repeal the Congressionally imposed ban on research and development of low-
yield nuclear weapons (under five kilotons); 
• To allocate six million dollars for the Advanced Concepts Initiative so that the 
United States could begin research on weapon systems and, in particular, low-yield 
earth-penetrating nuclear weapons; 
• To allocate 15 million dollars for continued work on developing a robust nuclear 
earth penetrator (RNEP program) derived from existing types of nuclear bombs and 
used to hit hard and deeply buried targets (HDBT); 
• To allocate 25 million dollars for continued work toward an18 month readiness 
posture for the Nevada Test Site in case of a need to resuming nuclear tests.  The 
president issued a decree to this effect, overriding the 36 month period set for this 
purpose shortly after the Cold War ended. 
The above initiatives provoked heated discussion, although in a very closed 
community of politicians and experts. Those in favor of the initiatives maintained that the 
first three initiatives added up to deterrence and thereby reduced the risk of war. As a result, 
they could lead to new types of nuclear weapons that would allow the United States to hit key 
targets in hostile countries without negatively affecting the environment, population, or 
friendly and allied contingents. In March 2000, Sandia Laboratory Director P. Robinson said, 
“The yield of the nuclear weapons retained since the Cold War era is too great against the 
deterrence requirements typical of the multipolar world where proliferation processes are on 
the increase.”12
The problems of producing a low-yield nuclear penetrator; delivering it to a preset 
depth of a hard target; and developing the latest systems of intelligence communications and 
target designation are extremely challenging. The penetrating weapon cannot break through 
the obstacle deep enough that the nuclear burst could be contained. In any case, it will result 
in radioactive contamination. As demonstrated by calculations, a one-kiloton ground-
penetrating nuclear warhead used on urbanized terrain brings about a lethal dose of 
radioactive contamination over an area of a few squared kilometers, thereby killing thousands 
of noncombatants. Outside the urban terrain, the contamination effect will depend on the 
direction of the wind, but it can hardly be expected that in selecting a location of the 
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underground installation to be attacked, the enemy would take into account the American 
idea of enhanced selectivity of a nuclear attack. 
Democratic senators E. Kennedy and D. Feinstein, the most active opponents of the 
current administration’s initiatives, assert that the United States is adopting “a new and 
dangerous plan of developing and making the next-generation nuclear weapons. How can we 
request Iran or Northern Korea to abandon their nuclear programs, if we have started to 
develop, manufacture and test our own new nuclear weapons?” And further, “The new 
initiatives of the Bush Administration pursued in the area of nuclear weapons … threaten to 
blow up the entire architecture of verification over the nuclear weapons, which we took pains 
to set up over the past fifty years. We are well aware of the threats that we face in the 
contemporary world. It would be incorrect to add another one, treating the nuclear weapons 
as simply one more type of weapons in our arsenal.”13
There is no consensus among high-ranking US military officers as to whether it is 
necessary or not to use nuclear weapons to destroy deeply buried targets. For instance, 
Admiral J. Ellis, commander of the United States Strategic Command, told during the hearing 
of the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services that the US should reduce its 
dependence on nuclear weapons and use precision-guided conventional weapons instead to 
hit deeply buried hard targets. On May 20, 2003, Defense Secretary D. Rumsfield officially 
confirmed in congressional hearings that the United States intends only to study the 
capabilities of the new weapon, but “not develop, adopt it for use or employ.”14
On the whole, it is believed that the decisions on conducting research of low-yield 
penetrating charges, which are intended to support the view that the existing nuclear 
stockpiles are poorly suited to the new threats because of their excessive yield and 
insufficient accuracy and to revive the allegedly obsolete R&D and industrial nuclear 
infrastructure, give grounds to suspect US policy of reducing the threshold for use of nuclear 
weapons and being in conflict with the nonproliferation policy. 
In this context, it was surprising that in November 2004, the United States Congress 
passed a resolution, initiated by Republican D. Hobson, to exclude from a bill on 
expenditures for the next fiscal year the funds designed to research the low-yield penetrating 
charges. There is, however, no guarantee that the Pentagon will not force Congress into 
reversing the resolution and funding the program. If so, as was the case with US withdrawal 
from the 1972 ABM Treaty, and the commenced deployment of the strategic ABM defense, 
the development of a new type of nuclear warhead will also be seen by the Russian strategic 
community as designed to threaten Russia itself.15 In particular, since the rationale of using 
such systems against terrorists and rogue countries is unconvincing because there are 
alternative weapons and techniques for those purposes, one might think that these weapons 
could be used to launch highly selective nuclear strikes against the Russian hardened 
command centers, as well as the ICBM silos which could accommodate the bulk of Russia’s 
nuclear forces in the future.  
                                                 
13 The Washington Post, 04.05.2003. 
 
14 Arbatov, A. and Dvorkin, V., ‘Nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation’. Carnegie Moscow Center. Mos-
cow. 2005, p. 34. 
 
15 Rossiyskie strategicheskie rakety perekhvatyat nad Plesetskom (Russian strategic missiles intercepted over 
Plesetsk). Nezavisimoye voennoe obozrenie. No 40, October 22, 2004. 
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Such projection is absolutely inevitable, given the fact that in spite of all declarative 
statements made by politicians, the relations of mutual nuclear deterrence still exist between 
the United States and Russia in strategic, operational, and technical terms, with the imbalance 
between the parties growing stronger. Whatever the American politicians and the military tell 
their Russian counterparts about a certain “possibility of possibilities” and impertinence of 
Cold War mutual deterrence under the new conditions, Russian specialists are well aware that 
Washington’s reluctance to reduce the below the limit of 2,200 warheads (plus approximately 
1,500 warheads in the reserve) cannot be explained by any strategic objectives other than 
retention of nuclear deterrence against Russia. The grounds for sharing such a point of view 
are that such a large number of potential targets for the United States  are absent elsewhere in 
the world and, besides, there are sufficient US highly mobile tactical nuclear weapons for any 
hypothetical local scenarios, rogue states, and terrorists. 
There can be no other explanation for the continued US structural policy of the 
strategic triad, with the new triad added, which does not fit into the limit of 1000-1500 
warheads, other than continuation of the nuclear deterrence strategy applied to Russia. The 
same is true of the United States plans to re-equip the Minuteman-3 missiles with the W87 
warheads retrieved from Peacekeeper ICBMs, as well as to continue to retain aboard Trident-
2 SLBMs the W88 warheads which are designed exclusively for fast, short-warning kill of 
hardened targets, such as silo-based ICBM launchers, underground command centers, and 
mobile ICBMs dispersed throughout an area of routine deployment. Only Russia possesses 
weapons of this kind in sufficiently great numbers. 
References to an indeterminate future sound like slim excuses. In any case, the United 
States missile and nuclear complex surpasses the rest of the world many times in terms of the 
rate and scale of a possible build-up of nuclear weapons in an emergency. 
The above aspects of the real military policy of the United States seem to be 
especially suspicious given its efforts to dismantle the regime of nuclear arms control through 
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, its reluctance to make a new large-scale treaty on 
strategic forces reductions, its refusal to ratify the CTBT, the lessening of interest in the 
treaty on cut-off of production of fissile materials for military purposes, its skepticism about 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA, and its unilateral shift, instead, to a policy of 
“selective” nonproliferation and counterproliferation. 
Thus, counter to Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the long-term nuclear 
policy of the United States does not seriously consider any prospect of nuclear disarmament 
in either military or legal aspects. What is much worse, while reducing the redundant nuclear 
weapons of the Cold War era, the United States displays no interest in either the material 
transformation of the relations of nuclear deterrence with Russia, or a deepening of the 
agreed-upon measures of reductions and limitations of nuclear forces. Since previously seen 
interest was primarily due to an apprehension of the Soviet strategic capabilities, the present 
indifferent attitude of Washington to the issue cannot but be explained by the decision of 
Moscow to curtail its own strategic potential, and, above all, its ground-based component.  
Nevertheless, the United States position cannot be justified, for after the Cold War 
ended, it was the powerful United States with a huge nuclear and conventional military 
“margin of safety” that could have started to radically rebuild its strategic relations with the 
Russian Federation, with due regard to the new risks and security challenges. This would also 
have influenced the policy of China and other current and potential nuclear states. 
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3.3. Great Britain 
In pursuing its defense policy, London plans on retaining its nuclear weapons, namely 
the sea-based strategic nuclear forces, as a basis for national nuclear deterrence not only of 
traditional opponents, but also of some new nuclear-weapon and threshold states. 
The British nuclear forces are based around four modern, nuclear-powered 
submarines of an indigenous design, which have become operational in the past 10 years. The 
first boat, designated Vanguard, went to sea in December 1994; the second, Victorious, in 
December 1995; the third, Vigilant, in autumn 1998; and the fourth, Vengeance, in February 
2001. Each submarine carries 16 ballistic missile launchers. The SSBNs are based in Clyde, 
Scotland, 32 kilometers from Glasgow.16
Historically, Britain’s nuclear policy has been linked at many levels to that of the 
United States. London traditionally placed its stake on very close cooperation with the United 
States, starting as long ago as WWII, and is still relying on the US missile early warning 
system. The British missiles are integrated into the United States system of nuclear 
operational planning (SIOP). In October 2003, the United States SSBNs carrying Trident-2 
started to be refitted with a new missile retargeting system in accordance with the Nuclear 
Posture Review, the latest United States doctrine of strategic nuclear planning. This will 
probably affect British strategic force targeting and operational planning as well.  
Three-stage solid-propellant SLBMs of Trident-2 type are leased from the United 
States and, prior to commissioning, were loaded into submarines at Kings Bay Nuclear 
Submarine Base in Georgia. Each missile is fitted with a reentry vehicle housing up to eight 
individually targeted warheads and ABM penetration aids. If the latter are removed, the 
number of warheads can be increased to 14. The missile is accurate and delivers warheads to 
targets as far as 7,400 km (the range of a single warhead Trident-2 missile is up to 12,000 
km). The circular error probable is estimated to be 120 meters, which seems to be somewhat 
exaggerated. 
With 58 SLBMs carrying eight re-entry vehicles each, the number of warheads aboard 
four submarines could total 464. In July 1998, however, London declared that it did not 
intend to have more than 200 operationally deployed warheads, thereby cutting its maximum 
operationally deployed stockpile by half. The Cabinet announced that it planned to keep only 
one SSBN carrying 48 warheads on alert status. Therefore, each submarine carries 12 to 16 
missiles and 40 warheads on average.  
The thermonuclear warheads of home assembly have a design and safety system 
similar to the American W76 warheads with a variable range of yields (1, 10, or 100 
kilotons). The warhead is placed into an RV of the same or similar design as the US Mk-4 
RVs. In supporting nuclear stockpiles and dealing with Trident missiles, the United 
Kingdom’s AWE Laboratory carries out close technical cooperation with the United States 
nuclear laboratories. 
Great Britain plans to use its nuclear weapons in two modes: (1) when all the combat-
ready submarines are expected to launch a pre-emptive attack, most likely jointly with the 
United States, and (2) when an on-duty (at sea) groups of one or two submarines 
                                                 
16 Kristensen, Hans M., Kyle Shannon N. Yadernye sily v mirovom masshtabe (Worldwide Nuclear Forces). 
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independently launches a retaliatory attack while cruising in the patrol area in the 
northeastern Atlantic. Until recently, according to the SIOP plan, up to 90 percent of the 
British nuclear weapons were targeted primarily at opponents’ military and economic targets. 
After Trident-2 SLBMs were adopted for use with the Royal Navy, the British could, for the 
first time, effectively hit strategic, hardened, fixed installations like Russian ICBM silos and 
command bunkers.17
While following the United States’ policy of deliberate ambiguity, the Labor 
Government said that it did not rule out the first use of nuclear weapons to deter threats of use 
of biological or chemical weapons.18 According to the Foreign Office, Britain, like the United 
States, is ready to reconsider the existing instruments of countering the WMD proliferation. 
On March 20, 2002, the defense minister said, “Britain is ready to use the nuclear weapons to 
defend friendly forces against the WMD.” 
The Defense White Paper 2003, called “Delivering Security in a Changing World,”19 
crossed all t's and dotted all i's: the minimal nuclear deterrence by means of Trident missiles 
will remain to be an essential element of Britain’s security until 2028. Given a high risk of 
WMD proliferation, it asserted, the existing nuclear weapons should be retained. 
Still, in terms of its policy of nuclear weapon sufficiency, its attitude to the 
disarmament treaties, including the NPT, its constructive approach towards the IAEA 
guarantees at British facilities, and its strict position on export control, Great Britain should 
serve a useful example for the other nuclear powers.  This would be particularly true if some 
proposals of the anti-nuclear opposition were at some time to become a part of the official 
policy. The relatively constrained nuclear policy pursued by Britain, as compared to the other 
states in the nuclear club, can be regarded largely as a result of the continuous pressure on the 
part of the anti-nuclear movement in Great Britain. No other NWS, whether official by NPT 
terms or de-facto, presently has any serious opposition to government nuclear policy.  
3.4. France 
Nuclear deterrence continues to play a key role in the French defense strategy. 
Retention of maximum freedom of choice in the deployment and use of nuclear weapons is 
one of the fundamental provisions of the French nuclear doctrine. The 1994 Defense White 
Paper, the document that is still in effect, says that in some cases France does not rule out 
implementing pre-emptive nuclear strikes. However, unlike in the past years, it seems that no 
strikes are currently planned against opponent’s cities.20
                                                 
17 Ponomarev, S.A. Evolyutsia voyennoy doktriny: NATO posle okonchania kholodnoy voiny (Evolution of 
NATO military doctrine after the Cold War). Strategicheskaya stabilnost. 2000. No 2, pp. 9 –23. 
 
18 Butler N., Chamberlain N. UK nuclear collaboration with the United States // BASIC report. – March 
2004. – №85. http://www.basicint.org/pubs/BReports/br85-fin.pdf (visited on December 30, 2004). 
 
19 Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper 2003. 
http://www.mod.uk/publications/whitepaper2003/index.html (visited on December 30, 2004). 
 
20 Faure G. Projet de loi de finances pour 2004, adopté par l'Assemblée Nationale – Tome IV: Défense – Nu-
cléaire, espace et services communs.  2003. 
 
 51
French military doctrine is based around the intimidation and containment strategy, 
according to which strategic nuclear forces are an essential element of the national armed 
forces. The air-based nuclear forces are regarded as a means of the ‘last warning’ sent to an 
adversary about France’s readiness to launch a nuclear attack. 
The likely adversaries to be targeted by the French nuclear weapons are potential 
nuclear powers, which “are capable of using their nuclear weapons against France.” Another 
important novelty is the official recognition to the effect that the French nuclear component 
can be integrated into the European Security and Defense Policy.21
According to Paris, nuclear deterrence is the best response to a likely failure of the 
non-proliferation policy. France’s president says that French nuclear forces could cause an 
unacceptable amount of damage in any state that threatens France’s vital national interests in 
any case, from wherever the threat emanates and whatever nature it may have.22
The French commonly suppose that nuclear deterrence should be maintained by sea 
(they prefer to call it ocean-based) and air-based strategic nuclear forces. The ocean-based 
strategic nuclear forces are responsible for continuity of the deterrence and, if necessary, for 
inflicting pre-planned damage on the major enemy. The force includes two Redoutable-class 
SSBNs (S-613 Indomptable and S-615 Inflexible) and two Triomphant-class SSBNs (S-615 
Triomphant and S-617 Téméraire). Each submarine has 16 launchers designed to fire ICBMs 
of M48 type (Redoutable) and M45 (the remaining submarines). The solid-propellant missiles 
are fitted with up to six multiple warheads and a set of penetration aids. 
Only one submarine is on alert (two in the case of an emergency), two are stationed at 
the base, and one is in repair. The estimated operationally deployed ammunition of the force 
carried aboard four missile-firing submarines is 48 SLBMs (16 M4B plus 32 M45) and 288 
warheads (96 TN71 and 192 TN75). The reserve warheads account for 10 percent of their 
estimated number, for example 317 weapons with an aggregate yield of (107 х 0.15) + (211 х 
0.1) = 37.15 megatons. After a 5 to 6 year period of operation, the submarine is laid up for a 
year-long repair of the hull and after 10 to 12 years, for a two-year overhaul. It cruises for a 
maximum of 73 to 90 days at a time. 
Modernization plans are made for as far into the future as 2015. In November 2004, 
France commissioned a third new SSBN, S-618 Le Vigilant, armed with M45 missiles to 
replace the Indomitable submarine. The aggregate estimated potential yield, including a 
reserve of 29 warheads, is 31.7 megatons. 
In 2008, the last SSBN of the old Inflexible-class will be decommissioned. The 
introduction of a new SSBN, S-619 Terrible, which was originally planned for 2008, has 
been shifted to July 2010. The delay is due to the development of a new M51 SLBM that is 
expected to equip all Triomphant-class submarines. As a result, within almost three years 
(2008 to 10), the French force will consist of three missile-capable ships. After 2010, it will 
include four Triomphant-class SSBNs fitted with M45 and M51 missiles. 
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Air-based strategic nuclear forces supplement the sea-based component. A variety of 
ABM penetration aids add to the deterrence, and adaptive flexibility to meet emerging threats 
gives the national leaders new instruments of response. High maneuverability of the aircraft 
makes them demonstrative and deployable worldwide. In addition, the aircraft are dual 
capable, which results in fewer costs to procure and maintain the Air Force aircraft. 
All airborne delivery vehicles are organized into two units of ground and sea-basing. 
Reporting directly to the strategic air force headquarters are three squadrons of ground-based 
combat aircraft, a tanker squadron, a reconnaissance aircraft squadron and the Training 
Center. Nuclear missions are assigned to 60 Мirage-2000N fighter-bombers. When refueled 
in the air, the aircraft can fly as far as 2,750 km. 
Ship-based aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons are the 24 Super Etendard 
fighter-bombers (2 squadrons) with a range of 650 km. There is only one nuclear propulsion 
aircraft carrier, the Charles de Gaulle, that was commissioned in 2000. Another carrier 
(diesel-powered) designed by the French is to be built at British shipyards and is expected to 
be commissioned by 2015 when the Charles de Gaulle ship is laid up for a total overhaul. 
Starting in 2007, the existing aircraft will be replaced with new multipurpose Rafale 
fighter-bombers of ground (one squadron of 20 aircraft in 2006) and sea-basing (two 
squadrons in 2015 to 2017), ASMP-A missiles (in 2007 to 11) with a range of 500 km and 
target accuracy up to 10 meters, and a new, 300-kiloton TNA charge (from 2007 on). There is 
information about plans to make as many as 47 charges of this type. As a result, the number 
of nuclear weapons will go down from 60 to 47 by 2017. At the same time, the focus will be 
shifted from ground-based to carrier-based aircraft. There will be 20 aircraft in the ground-
based component, instead of the existing 45 aircraft. Each of the two squadrons of carrier-
borne aircraft will be based at its home ship, which will help increase the number of aircraft 
from 24 to 40. 
France has developed nuclear weapons for penetration of opponents’ BMD defense 
based on the use of antimissiles carrying nuclear warheads. France’s efforts to have specific 
warheads and BMD penetration tactics as part of its future nuclear stockpile show that it is 
ready for a potential change in the military-political situation, specifically in Russia, that has 
a limited BMD defense employing antimissiles with nuclear warheads. Since there are no 
other states within SLBM range that may have BMD in the future, this clearly indicates that 
France is planning to maintain nuclear deterrence primarily against the RF for the foreseeable 
future despite the end of Cold War, American nuclear commitments, and the unprecedented 
security that has blessed Europe for the last 15 years — at least as far as traditional threats are 
concerned. 
In June 2001, French President J. Chirac said that the national forces stationed outside 
the country should be protected from tactical missiles. Currently, France, together with Italy, 
is developing, within the framework of the EUROSAM project, a theater air defense system 
designed to intercept short-range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and aircraft. In addition, at 
the summit of NATO leaders held in Prague in November 2002, Paris confirmed participation 
in the R&D program aimed at developing a European air defense system. 
In order to implement the program of re-equipping nuclear forces, France has a well-
developed industry, skilled personnel and a consensus of all political parties and population. 
In case the world military-political situation is destabilized, the French program and 
installations used to develop the nuclear weapons can be brought back to life in a short time, 
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including the full-scale nuclear tests.23  In the foreseeable future, Paris seeks to pursue an 
active nuclear policy and to maintain the leading role of nuclear weapons in its national 
military doctrine. 
3.5. People’s Republic of China (PRC) 
The nuclear policy of the PRC, which has undertaken a no-first-use commitment, is 
expressed in its concept of “a limited retaliatory nuclear attack.” This means that the country 
plans to build retaliation nuclear forces of a limited structure that can make a potential enemy 
abandon the use of nuclear weapons against the PRC through the threat of reciprocal attack. 
Such an approach places no import on achieving nuclear parity with developed countries, and 
looks quite rational in terms of material and financial resources. 
The present Chinese SNF have a low state of readiness, and, unless additional and 
apparently conspicuous steps are taken, the SNF cannot be prepared to launch a surprise first 
nuclear strike. This matches the PRC’s no-first-use concept, at least for technical reasons. 
Moreover, the PRC does not have the capacity to launch even a partially disarming strike 
against any NWS except India, which is usually associated with the first-use strategy.  At the 
same time, if Chinese SNF were brought to a higher status of readiness in case of a crisis, the 
PRC would have no other alternative but a first-strike or preemptive attack because of their 
low survivability, vulnerable command and control system, and weak warning system — a 
course of action which would be suicidal if employed against Russia or the United States. It 
is precisely for this reason that the Chinese SNF have an unstable character, which pushes 
them to a first strike and provokes a hostile preemptive attack in case of a crisis, despite the 
PRC’s declared rejection of the first-strike option.  
The paradox of China’s nuclear posture is that in a day-to-day de-alerted state, its 
SNF are not capable of launching either a first or a second retaliatory strike against the 
United States or Russia. In a hypothetical crisis situation, if its forces were brought to high 
alert status, Beijing would be able to deliver only a first or preemptive strike, suicidal as that 
would be. Available weapons, command-control systems, early warning systems, and the 
military balance with potential opponents, reinforce this logic. Similarly, official declarations, 
motivated by ideological or political considerations, cannot change this state of affairs. It is 
all the more so in a country where public discussion or independent assessment of strategic 
matters is virtually zero (in this sense, the difference between Russia and China is probably as 
big as the corresponding difference between the US and Russia).  
There is no reason to consider China’s top military leaders stupid or unprofessional 
and unable to comprehend the obvious non-ideological strategic logic of its SNF employment 
option — especially in a country famous for thousands of years of strategic thinking. In this 
sense, China’s nuclear non-first-use pledge is politically reasonable in avoiding the 
provocation of other great powers, but at the same time is totally empty of strategic 
substance. Since China’s generals must understand their first-strike predicament, as well as 
its suicidal consequences, there are serious reasons to expect a major modernization program 
of China’s SNF as soon as technical and financial conditions are right. It would be aimed at 
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achieving a robust second strike capability against any opponent and possibly a counterforce 
capability if the opportunity presents itself.  
In a sense, China’s current strategic posture and capabilities are quite similar to those 
of the Soviet Union in the early 1960s. But at that time, the Cold War was in full swing 
(reaching its culmination in the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962), and the strategic 
forces of the United States were also much weaker in both relative and absolute terms than 
the current forces of either country today. Hence, Moscow’s official declarations emphasized 
“the peace-loving Soviet foreign policy” at the same time that its military doctrine allowed 
for the possibility of Soviet first nuclear strike “if the imperialists unleash a new world war.” 
It was apparently assumed that an armed conflict would start in Europe and that Soviet 
strategic forces would be brought to top readiness and launched after NATO tactical nuclear 
forces were used. The Cuban Missile Crisis was totally different from the accepted strategic 
contingency planning and caught all sides by surprise, making them improvise and taking 
them to the brink of a nuclear catastrophe.  
One lessons of that crisis for Moscow, besides the desirability of lowering tensions 
with Washington and agreeing on some disarmament steps, was the urgent necessity of a 
robust nuclear deterrent capability and parity with the US. This led to a crash missile build-
ups of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s in the determination to keep up with US force 
development. 
It is hard to imagine that Chinese leaders discount the possibilities of acute crisis with 
other great powers (around Taiwan or other issues), in which case Beijing would find itself in 
the situation of  Moscow in October 1962. Conducting more and more assertive foreign 
policy and aiming at a global political role, China’s pragmatic rulers would be light-headed to 
count only on its growing economic power and artful diplomacy. At the same time, they are 
wise and cautious enough to avoid frightening or provoking other nations or making rushed 
decisions or bombastic declarations regarding their nuclear force development and 
deployment.         
China’s strategic nuclear forces are variously estimated to include ground, air, and sea 
components, and to total 252 delivery vehicles and 300 to 400 nuclear warheads. Their base 
is the Strategic Missile Forces, which are equipped with 120 ground-based ballistic missile 
launchers. The Strategic Air Force numbers 120 obsolete H-6 (Tu-16) aircraft; their 
production was terminated in 1994. The sea-based component is a single nuclear-propulsion 
Xia class submarine carrying 12 launchers for Julang–1 missiles which was launched in 1981 
and sometimes is described as experimental. The sub-strategic nuclear forces total 150 
delivery vehicles, including 30 Jian-5 tactical fighters, artillery projectiles and 120 short-
range rockets. 
At present, China’s SNF are incomparably inferior to the Russian and US forces both 
in quantitative and qualitative terms. They also lag behind the British and French forces in a 
qualitative sense. Their range is restricted to the Asia-Pacific region, except for 20 Dong 
Feng-5A ICBMs with a range of 13,000 km. The latter can reach the territory of the United 
States and the European part of Russia. The in-service ground-based missiles are fitted with a 
single RV and placed in fixed sites, such as silos and tunnels. They burn liquid fuel and take a 
lot of time to prepare for a launch. There is information that the nuclear RVs are stored 
separately from missiles of an old type to prevent an unauthorized launch. 
China has started to deploy its first ground-mobile solid-propellant medium-range 
missile DF-21A. It is expected that within the next 10 to 15 years, the country will improve 
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its nuclear arsenal qualitatively along the following lines: development of solid-propellant 
ground-mobile Dong Feng DF-31 (with a range of 8,000 km) and DF-41 missiles (with 
ranges of 11, 000 to 12,000 km), as well as new-generation Project 094 SSBNs, presumably 
equipped with 16 launchers for a Julang-2 missile (range of 8,000 km), a modernized 
derivative of the DF-31 missile. The new weapons should replace obsolete missiles DF-3A 
(range of 2,800 km), DF-4 (range of 5,500 km), DF-5A (range of 13,000 km) and Julang-1 
(range of 1,700 km). Early in 2002, series production of the DF-31 missile started at a secret 
plant in the province of Sichuan. Its operational deployment has presumably begun already. 
In 10 to 15 years, the Chinese arsenal might total 100 to 150 ground-based ICBMs, 
featuring high readiness, technical reliability and survivability, as well as three or four 
SSBNs. In 1981, China launched three earth satellites into orbit by means of a single missile, 
which demonstrates the ability of the Chinese military industrial complex to fit ICBMs with 
multiple, rather than single, RVs and BMD penetration aids.  
Given the complete secrecy of the Chinese NW program, many foreign experts 
involuntarily find themselves dependent on Beijing’s allaying declarations, which are similar 
to those made by Soviet leaders in the early 1980s — the most intense years of the arms race. 
Besides, China’s plans are compared with the past, rather than the future programs of other 
great powers. It is concluded from here that “China’s participation in the nuclear race is most 
unlikely,” and, given the fact that China currently pays great attention to economic 
construction and the solutions to growing socio-economic problems, “the scale and character 
of the military development in China will, in the near future, be consistent with the principle 
of defensive sufficiency, which implies development of limited size nuclear deterrent 
forces.”24 
Some America experts consider Chinese nuclear levels to be quite low, and the pace 
of modernization to be quite slow, which might imply a deliberate choice in favor of 
existential, rather than full-scale and versatile nuclear deterrent capability.25 This assessment 
has merits and is confirmed by some factual data, although China keeps all information 
regarding its forces and programs in total secrecy, much like the USSR in the 1960s before its 
crash build-up. However, even if the possibility of a similar Chinese massive force 
deployment in the foreseeable future looks unlikely, the authors of this study do not agree 
with the other extreme — a fully complacent view of Beijing’s intentions and plans.   
A сloser analysis reveals, for instance, that the planned “moderate” programs of the 
Chinese are larger than those of any other great power. Even if China deployed only 100 to 
150 ICBMs within the next 10 to 15 years, it would mean a rate of around 10 missiles per 
year, apart from the sea-based systems. It is also quite probable that the mere extrapolation of 
the current rates of military development is a mistake. Possibly the PRC, taking into 
consideration the mistakes and excessive expenditures made by the Soviet Union and the 
United States during the Cold War era, has simply decided to skip a few stages of major 
deployment of intermediate generation systems and is now waiting until an efficient land-
mobile MIRVed ICBM system is developed, comparable to Russian Topol-M (SS-27) 
missiles, before proceeding to their mass production. Beijing may make the reasonable 
decision to terminate development of its sea-based force — purely prestigious systems that 
cannot be used effectively to deter Russia and are too vulnerable to the US-Japanese 
                                                 
24 Arbatov, A. and Dvorkin, V., ‘Nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation’. Carnegie Moscow Center.- 
Moscow Moscow. 2005, pp. 48-54. 
 
25 Lewis, J.  Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. May/June, 2005.  
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antisubmarine defense to be used as a weapon against the United States. (Incidentally China 
may learn from Russia’s current mistakes in pursuing sea-based strategic force 
modernization). Then, having saved a lot of money, 10 to 15 years from now China would be 
able to acquire 200 to 300 mobile and silo-based ICBMs of the same type. If fitted with 
MIRVs, they would be capable of delivering 500 to 900 nuclear warheads along all azimuths. 
Thus, progressing from a “low start,” China may in the foreseeable future be able to 
seize the ripe opportunity to outrun all great powers except the United States in the leading-
edge SNF systems and become the number two nuclear “superpower,” taking the niche of the 
former USSR.  
This fully agrees with the general framework of China’s current plans of national 
development, playing a much bigger role in the world, resolving the Taiwan and Tibet 
problems, and “shifting the strategic borders beyond the national territory.” It is by 2019 that 
Chinese leaders plan to secure for China the status of “first-rate great world power,” and, 
according to the information on a 1993 secret doctrine of the Communist Party of China, to 
overrun “three norths within the four seas,” the three norths being Russia, NATO and the 
United States. The fourth sea, in addition to the Yellow Sea, East-China Sea, and the South-
China Sea, is the Sea of Japan, to which access is to be gained through the Tumangan River. 
This doctrine may be interpreted as matching or outrunning Russia and the West in economic 
and military power on a global scale, while acquiring a secure perimeter and military 
dominance over the western Pacific rim of China, directly overhanging Japan, Taiwan, the 
Philippines, Indochina, and Indonesia. 
There is an informed opinion in the United States which is quite complacent towards 
China’s prospects of economic, political, and military (including nuclear force) development 
during the next 10 to 15 years. It is based on the concept of China’s fast economic and 
gradual political modernization and its integration into the world (foremost Western) 
economic, political, and security system along the models of Japan and South Korea after 
1945. This benign view has its merits and should be taken into serious account. 
 However, a different scenario is also possible, which is shared by the authors of this 
paper, if only as a hedge against unexpected dangerous developments. One of recent 
reflections of this school of thought was presented in a Washington Post article by R. Kagan, 
a researcher from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.26  In particular, Kagan claims 
that an illusion of being able to manage and integrate a rising power characterized the 
European attitude towards Germany after its unification under Bismarck in 1870, as well as 
US policy towards Japan during Meiji modernization after 1868. Both miscalculations 
eventually led to world wars in the 20th century. The author of the article casts doubt on the 
illusion that contemporary proponents of a policy of “managing China” among politicians 
and experts are more wise and skillful than their predecessors of the 19th and 20th centuries. 
According to Kagan, the idea that China may be integrated into the East Asian 
security structures and the “liberal world order” overlooks the possibility that China does not 
intend to be integrated into a system which it did not participate in creating, which runs 
contrary to its traditional values and ambitions, and with which China associates heavy 
historic grievances. Likewise, the condescending Western assessment that China is only 
striving towards economic growth and would not sacrifice economic ties with the West 
(including Japan) for political and military gains may be an underestimation  Perhaps China’s 
desire to become rich does not come from wanting to enter the world economic system, but 
                                                 
26 R.Kagan, “The Illusion of ‘Managing China’,” The Washington Post, May 15, 2005. 
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like Japan of the 20th century, from wanting to change it and adjust it to China’s own 
interests and rules. The symptoms of such inclinations are clear to those who are ready to see 
them: the rise of China’s nationalism and self-assertiveness, and its growing assuredness in 
its economic and military power.  
Besides, if domestic policies are any indication of the true values and possibilities of 
using power pressure and violence abroad, then many politicians and experts in the West 
seem to be too eager to close their eyes to the revelations of such policies in China (like the 
Tiananmen massacre of 1989, the bloody repression in Tibet ever since, and the suppression 
of any democratic developments outside of the Communist Party elite). Incidentally, such 
factors are not lost on the West with respect to Russia’s domestic policies: the war in 
Chechnya, curtailment of democratic norms and institutions, the Khodorkovskiy trial, and so 
on. These generate growing suspicions and conservatism in Western relations with Moscow, 
despite infinite foreign policy concessions by President Putin (a few examples are the ABM 
Treaty, SORT, the war in Iraq, NATO and EU expansion, and elections in Georgia and 
Ukraine).   
Indeed, in China there is no rush or crash build-up, but rather a stable and consistent 
defense modernization across the board of the whole spectrum of conventional and nuclear 
forces and weapons systems.  Meanwhile, these modernizations are covered by a dense cloud 
of official peaceful and defensive rhetoric, appealing to foreign strategic logical constructions 
and the desire for self-deception. One example is a recent dialogue between one of the 
authors of this study and a well-versed Chinese general, who claimed that China did not 
possess tactical nuclear weapons, since in any war, China allegedly would only defend its 
territory and would not use such weapons at home. The fact that NATO and the Warsaw Pact 
claimed the same defensive doctrines during the Cold War, but deployed thousands of tactical 
nuclear weapons, did not make any impression.         
As for Chinese strategic nuclear forces, if they are not limited by agreements with the 
United States or with the United States and Russia together, the military plans and foreign 
policy of China will be backed up by powerful missile-nuclear potential. In addition to the 
high rate of the country’s economic growth, another factor which is expected to substantially 
influence the direction of China’s course is the balance of forces among Russia, the United 
States, China, and the rest of the Asia-Pacific region. 
The long-term prospects of relations between the first two great neighbors cause 
significant, although concealed, concern in Moscow. It is quite possible that in 10 to 15 years, 
relations between Russia and China may reach a low point in their traditional cycle at exactly 
the same time that China enjoys maximum military superiority across the eastern Russian 
border, and in the world as well (in certain respects). In particular, given the above-
mentioned intensive variant of developing its strategic forces, China would, for the first time, 
be able not only to launch a massive nuclear attack on the European part of Russia, but also 
to acquire considerable potential for a counterforce strike against Russian SNF. As a result, 
this could reduce Russia’s capability of relying on tactical nuclear weapons in seeking to 
make up for the relative weakness of the general-purpose forces in the East, even for purely 
defensive missions. 
As for relations with another great nuclear power, China is concerned about the 
United States’ plans to set up a theater antimissile defense in Northeast Asia, as well as the 
prospects of the US providing support to Taiwan in this field. As long as the United States 
maintains large naval forces and support bases around the perimeter of the Asia-Pacific 
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region, the security of their interests in the region is guaranteed, considering also the military 
contributions made by Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. Even a supposed fast build-up of 
China’s SNF would affect the United States to a far smaller degree than Russia, although the 
novelty of such a vulnerable situation would certainly be felt acutely in Washington. If the 
United States BMD defense does not meet the expectations of its advocates, then with an 
expected potential of a retaliatory strike against the United States, China would rule out US 
use of the “nuclear option” in operations against China, even if the latter posed a real threat to 
United States interests, troops, and allies in the Asia-Pacific region. 
4. Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control After the Cold War 
 As described above, there is still a mutual nuclear deterrence relationship between the 
United States and Russia, despite their declared advance towards a “strategic partnership” in 
the face of the new threats and challenges. Such a situation is senseless in terms of the 
national security of both powers, because, in contrast to the decades of the Cold War, it is 
absurd to anticipate any armed conflict, to say nothing of a deliberate nuclear war, between 
the two countries. Yet mutual deterrence remains in organizational and technical terms as a 
burdensome heritage left from a lengthy period of nuclear arms race, global rivalry, and 
perpetuates the existence of huge nuclear stockpiles.  
4.1. Self-Generating Dynamics of the Nuclear Equation  
The 2002 SORT  has in no way influenced the state and dynamics of mutual 
deterrence, which first of all should be obvious from the continued existence of strategic 
nuclear weapons in the available numbers and in their permanent combat-ready status. They 
have not been designed and deployed for any other condition than that. Besides, it is precisely 
in this condition that nuclear weapons are continuously monitored in terms of their technical 
state and are most properly maintained in terms of nuclear safety.  
Second, the parties involved are sure to have plans for the use of their combat-ready 
SNF, including first-strike, launch-on-warning, and retaliatory attacks against specific targets. 
The number of preplanned targets is approximately of the same order of magnitude as that of 
the warheads. Given the present number of warheads available to the US and the RF, as well 
as the numbers of weapons to be reduced by 2012 pursuant to the SORT, there is no doubt 
that most of the targets of each of the two strategic forces are in the territory of the other 
country, because the majority of the targets are the other state’s strategic forces and other 
military forces’ sites and deployment areas.  
At least during the next 10 to 15 years, there will be no place in the whole world, 
besides US and Russian territories, where sufficient numbers of targets worth attacking with 
SNF could be found to accommodate thousands of warheads on long-range missiles and 
bombers. The non-targeting commitment of the mid-1990s is being implemented, but is 
totally unverifiable, is rapidly and unnoticeably reversible, and thus is not a serious factor of 
nuclear postures or war planning. In short, the very numbers of strategic weapons, maintained 
by the US and the RF presently, as well as planned throughout next 10 to 15 years, inevitably 
and greatly contribute to reinforcing mutual nuclear deterrence. 
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Third, it usually takes more than a decade to develop any strategic system, from 
elaboration of a concept and weapon design specifications to full deployment. Then, the 
strategic system stays in service for one or two years, or sometimes for many decades. At the 
same time, experience suggests that at any historical stage, political relations between two 
countries that are not bound together by formal military alliance, joint defense arrangements 
and systems, and common enemies may sharply change within a few months or weeks. In 
this sense, strategic planning by necessity is largely detached from current political relations 
as long as it is not legally constrained by international agreements on future levels, structure, 
deployment, combat readiness, and forms of employment of forces.  
Another important factor contributing to the organizational and technical resilience of 
the mutual nuclear deterrence situation is the gigantic nuclear infrastructure that has been 
developed in the United States and Russia over the past few decades, and that is continuing to 
develop. This nuclear infrastructure cannot be isolated from the on-going scientific progress 
and technological development. This is due not only to the recognized need for preserving 
nuclear deterrence. Theoretically, in terms of classic deterrence, the parties might decide to 
refrain from introducing new types of nuclear arms, but development of new technologies, 
information and command systems and the need for enhancing nuclear safety and replacing 
fuel, guidance, navigation, and control systems constantly lead to upgrading the weapons. 
Also, the nuclear laboratories and research centers would degenerate and deteriorate, unless 
engaged in upgrading and improving weapon systems and employment concepts. 
Last but not the least, the strategic nuclear balance is not hanging in a vacuum — it is 
affected by nuclear and missile proliferation, development of strategic defense systems, 
tactical nuclear weapons, changes in conventional arms and forces, and the emergence of new 
enemies and threats. As was mentioned above, even when genuinely reacting to these 
“external” factors, the central nuclear balance cannot but affect, often in a destabilizing way, 
the strategic relationship between the leading powers, at least as long as their relationship is 
based on mutual nuclear deterrence.     
This is why there is no such a thing as just “maintaining” nuclear capabilities — 
maintenance is accompanied by a constant search for new technologies and force 
employment concepts. These lead to alterations in weapon systems, command-control 
capabilities, strategic concepts and operational plans, which then affect force levels and 
structure due to resource availability. The changes impinge on the bilateral and multilateral 
nuclear balance and its stability quite apart from the evolution of political relationship 
between states. 
Foreign and domestic political considerations may influence the nuclear balance 
superficially (and with long lead time) through allocation of more or less funding, and 
sometimes in the US (but up to now never in the USSR/Russia), via direct decisions on 
weapon systems, operational plans, or targeting concepts. The only way to do this is through 
arms control treaties, which directly affect force levels and structure, and indirectly affect 
their employment strategy.    
4.2. Is Arms Control Relevant Anymore? 
The above-mentioned quasi-autonomous dynamics of mutual nuclear deterrence 
became more pronounced in the late 1990s, and intensified further during the current decade 
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as the START II and START III framework agreements have become deadlocked in Russian 
and US domestic and international controversies. It has been all the more so because the 
United States and Russian political quarters have been paying less and less attention to these 
issues in the new post-Cold War military-political environment, compared to in the past when 
these matters  used to occupy the central place in the relations between the two nuclear 
superpowers. 
Attempts to change radically the nature of strategic relations between Moscow and 
Washington simply by “assuming away” the implications of their technical and intellectual 
foundations did not work during the 1990s, and have been even less effective afterwards. In 
the year 2000, initial information came from sources close to the team of US presidential 
nominee George Bush that the future administration intended to reject any strategic offensive 
arms treaty on the grounds that the era of confrontation was over and the two countries were 
moving  towards strategic partnership. Each country was supposed to independently shape its 
own nuclear policy and program of nuclear force development, proceeding from its own 
conceptions of national security. 
In Russia, this information was perceived with suspicion and displeasure. It was 
concluded that Washington, being aware of the critical condition of the Russian defense 
complex and its inability to sustain nuclear forces not only at the level of START I, but also 
the START II Treaty, had decided to decisively tip the strategic nuclear balance between 
Russia and the United States.  In this way, the US would become the only nuclear superpower 
that would be beyond the reach for any other country of the world. 
At the same time, the process of agreeing upon a new format of the strategic relations 
between the two countries was hampered by a lack of clear logic in Russia’s nuclear policy, 
implemented in the SNF development program. Actually, why should there be any pragmatic 
motive for Washington to talk seriously with Russia about strategic arms if Moscow time and 
again issued statements to the effect that it could not and needed not maintain nuclear parity 
with the United States? If the parties had switched places, Russia would probably have done 
the same; it would have lost interest in seriously negotiated trade-offs and solutions. An 
alternative approach would have required a much higher level of statesmanship in both 
capitals, than was, and is, available. 
Still, one of the serious flaws in the new American position was the risk of falling into 
a legal vacuum. Certainly, it would be too much to agree on a new comprehensive treaty, like 
the START I, under the fully changed conditions, but a radical shift to a complete lack of 
nuclear arms control regime would have brought about many unpredictable consequences, 
especially after the United States withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty. Recognition of this 
reality on the US side, and Russia’s interest in having some arms control framework against 
the background of a new spirit of cooperation in the aftermath of the tragedy of “9-11,” 
ultimately led the parties to sign the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions in May 2002.  
The basic feature of the new treaty was that it fully accommodated the previously 
approved US and Russian plans of development of SNF based on their own assumptions of 
the military requirements and economic constraints. Thus, in contrast to START I and 
START II, neither of the countries was obliged to make concessions and look for 
compromises that could make them adjust their plans of SNF development. Issues under 
discussion were only procedures and techniques for weapons reductions, counting rules, and 
an associated problem of the so-called reconstitution potential. 
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The Treaty was later criticized for including no verification measures. This is not 
quite justified, since the START I-defined systems of verification and confidence-building 
measures would be in effect until 2009 when the duration time of START I Treaty is over. 
Ideally, the provisions of the verification and confidence-building measures would be 
prolonged after 2009. Moreover, as currently assumed, the verification system pursuant to the 
START I Treaty provisions in many ways reflects the mutual mistrust of the Cold War 
period, including a number of redundant types of monitoring.  It might be simplified without 
reducing the actual level of transparency. Using START I, the parties would have 
comprehensive information about each other’s forces and programs. But without warhead 
counting rules and procedures for weapon dismantling as applied to the provisions of the 
SORT, this information cannot be used for verification of implementation of the new treaty. 
Possibly in view of a deeply flawed Russian strategic program of 2000 to 2001, its 
weak Russian diplomacy, and against the background of the conservative political beliefs of 
the Republican administration after the elections of 2000, SORT was the best achievable 
option. Still, the fact that the new treaty doesn’t limit any party is hardly an advantage — at 
least as long as the two states continue planning deployment and employment of their forces 
largely against each other, rather than to oppose other threats separately or jointly. Profound 
changes in their political relations may slow down nuclear modernization programs, and 
encourage unilateral reductions of excessive force levels — but in and of themselves, they 
cannot change the nature of their strategic relationship. Such a change requires a sustained 
and deeply thought through effort on both sides with respect to military programs and 
negotiated agreements. The goal of this effort is to transform the nature of strategic relations 
so that it is in line with new political relations. Otherwise, the old military relations would 
come into growing contradiction with political cooperation and may hamper or even undercut 
it altogether.  
To do away with mutual nuclear deterrence, it is not enough just to stop being 
enemies. If the states retain considerable nuclear forces within range of each other, it is 
necessary to become full-scale military allies to achieve this goal. In this sense, the end of 
Cold War in no way removed the need for new arms control agreements, but provided an 
opportunity for much more radical solutions with greater degrees of transparency and 
predictability, and with simpler and cheaper verification regimes. The new stage of arms 
control should have a new goal: rather than limiting weapon numbers and stabilizing nuclear 
deterrence, the new goal should be to change profoundly the very basis of the strategic 
relationship, liberating the maintenance of the national security of the two powers from 
reliance on the capability to inflict nuclear devastation on each other. 
Up to now, this opportunity has been largely missed in US-Russian relations after the 
signing of START II and START III framework treaties. The Moscow 2002 SORT has not 
tangibly improved the situation and looks more like lip service to nuclear disarmament than a 
genuine new stage of strategic arms control (it is surely a coincidence that in Russian the 
abbreviation SOR means “trash”). 
4.3. Global Partnership and Nuclear Deadlock 
The program of Global Partnership against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, which had its beginnings at the G-8 summit in Kananaskis in June, 2002, may be 
seen as a successfully continuing program for the elimination of WMD and nuclear materials, 
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and the increased security of storage in Russia and some other countries. The United States 
and its allies (European countries and Japan) have committed themselves to providing Russia 
and other post-Soviet states with 20 billion dollars during next ten years for this purpose.  
During the preceding decade, impressive progress was made in this field, foremost 
through the well-known Nunn-Lugar CTR program, which had about 6 billion dollars in 
funding. Aside from the elimination of strategic offensive weapons along the guidelines of 
START I, security has been enhanced in the storage and transportation of nuclear materials 
and warheads — financial support has been given to 40,000 scientists and specialists in 
nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile weapons with the goal of retraining them; a large 
plutonium storage facility was built in Russia; a number of strategic nuclear submarines were 
safely dismantled, and so on. Additionally,  200 tons of weapons-grade uranium have been 
utilized through the HEU-LEU project and burned in US commercial nuclear power stations.  
This was really a qualitatively new type of relationship, implying cooperation in 
eliminating WMD and associated equipment, transcending traditional frameworks of arms 
control and disarmament, enhancing strategic stability at reduced levels of nuclear balance, 
encouraging confidence-building, and creating transparency. In a sense, this new type of 
cooperation was perceived as analagous to a married couple jointly cleaning the room of 
broken dishes upon making peace after a violent family quarrel. Such cooperation implied 
openness with regards to the most sensitive military-technical systems, various cooperative 
industrial projects, activities on each other’s territories, mutual adaptation of parts of legal 
systems, and massive financial transactions within the domain of defense and internal 
security. In the beginning, it was highly asymmetric by necessity.  Russia and other post-
Soviet states were in a phase of deep transition and reform after the collapse of the Soviet 
Empire and were severely short of financial and technical resources.  These countries needed 
foreign aid, and were unable to provide it to other countries.  The Russian public and political 
elite, however believed in the early and mid 1990s that such a situation was temporary and 
that in the future, Russia would be able and entitled to a much more equal partnership with 
the West.  
Besides profoundly transforming the political and strategic relations of nuclear 
powers, the program was obviously very important for environmental safety and the clean-up 
of contaminated areas.  Many enterprises, whole branches of defense industries, and science 
centers were converted from manufacturing weapons to their elimination and disposal. Last 
but certainly not least, securing storage and transportation, as well as providing for the safe 
elimination of weapons and weapon-grade materials, were essential for nonproliferation of 
WMD and for preventing terrorists from gaining access to such weapons and materials.    
Despite the great success of the CTR program in the 1990s, some major problems 
remain unresolved. About half of the nuclear weapons-grade material in Russia is still not 
under sufficiently reliable protection, and the safety and protection equipment of many 
centralized nuclear weapons storage places are still in need of modernization. Many dozens 
of strategic and attack nuclear submarines, withdrawn from service in the Northern and 
Pacific fleets, still await dismantling and remain “floating Chernobyls.”  Large land areas 
need nuclear decontamination and rehabilitation, and “nuclear cities” have not found a model 
of efficient economic conversion.  
The Global Partnership program allows the entire set of cooperative endeavors in the 
non-proliferation field to be greatly expanded and sped up over the next decade. To facilitate 
this process, Russia has decided to enhance its financial contributions to the Global 
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Partnership projects. In 2003 and 2004, 300 million dollars were allocated to it in each year’s 
budgets. Specific projects were developed, which were proposed to all foreign partners. 
Unfortunately, the total amount of declared funding up to the present day within the Global 
Partnership (now embracing 22 countries) has not reached the 20 billion dollar level 
established in Kananaskis. There is a significant disparity between the funds that were 
promised and that were actually received by Russia for the projects. Russian experts point to 
the need to perfect the mechanisms for spending money in Russia and in the donor countries. 
It would also be beneficial to increase the role of audits, to evaluate the effectiveness of 
money spent, to use independent expertise, and to enlist Russian business to fund socially 
oriented projects within the framework of the Global Partnership. It is also noted that Russia 
must demonstrate an ability to perform its own tasks by itself under the Global Partnership, 
increasing its contribution to the funding of the projects of WMD non-proliferation and 
fighting international terrorism.  
The lack of funding is not the only obstacle to the increasing level of international 
cooperation. Other key problems include questions of secrecy, bureaucracy, political 
restrictions and other discrepancies between the US and Russia. Moscow concentrated its 
efforts on settling questions of taxation, foreign access to secret nuclear sites, transparency, 
and liability for damage. Some of these problems were resolved in the agreement on 
multilateral nuclear and ecological programs in the Russian Federation (MNEPR), signed on 
May 21, 2003 and ratified by the Russian parliament later in that year.  
But even the MNEPR is not addressing the main, fundamental problem of cooperation 
in this area. This problem was hidden behind legal, financial, and technical details during the 
1990s and the early part of the current decade. It came out into the open only in March 2005 
before the US-Russian summit in Bratislava. It was vividly reflected in the heated discussion 
in the Russian State Duma and mass media of the alleged “secret agreement” between 
Washington and Moscow on allowing for the establishment of American control over 
Russian “nuclear sites and forces.”27 Simultaneously, the case of E. Adamov, former Russian 
minister of atomic energy (from 1997 to 2001), poured more fuel into the fire.  Adamov was 
arrested in Switzerland at the request of the US for presumably stealing US financial aid 
provided through Nunn-Lugar program in mid-1990s. It was widely assumed in Russia that 
the US request for the extradition of Adamov to the United States was motivated by the 
desire to “milk” him for the most delicate secrets of Russian nuclear weapons design.28   
In the United States, the Adamov case stirred up opposition in Congress and the mass 
media against providing Russia with ever-increasing volume of financial aid for elimination 
of nuclear and chemical weapons. Behind simple accusations of misuse of money, there was 
a more sophisticated and serious argument against helping Russia. Moscow openly declared 
its nuclear forces to be the mainstay of its security, foremost through nuclear deterrence of 
the United States, including new strategic missiles purchased from Ukraine, produced by 
Russia or developed for the purpose of overcoming a potential American BMD system.  The 
logical question for the United States, then, regards the wisdom of helping Russia deal with 
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its old WMD, thereby alleviating its financial burden and facilitating allocation of larger 
financial resources for new weapons against the US.29
On the other hand, Russia must continue with modernization of its SNF to keep at the 
SORT ceilings (1700 to 2200 warheads), since maintaining some strategic balance is 
considered essential for national security.  This is all the more so, since the United States 
refused to go for lower numbers and demonstrated clear reluctance to having a new full-scale 
arms reduction treaty in place of START I and START II/III. Huge projected US offensive 
counterforce weapons (carried by Trident-2 SLBMs and Minuteman-3 ICBMs with powerful 
W-87 warheads refitted from dismantled Peacekeeper MX missiles) in combination with a 
strategic ballistic missile defense system is commonly perceived as a technical (if not 
strategic) threat to Russian nuclear deterrence capability. Being obliged to accept aid from the 
West through CTR in the past and Global Partnership in the future, Russia is at the same time 
not willing to lose its deterrence and concede to the US clear-cut nuclear superiority, which 
Washington had failed to retain during several decades and four big rounds of the massive 
Cold War nuclear arms race (1950s to the 1980s). 
The above dichotomy of simultaneous nuclear confrontation and nuclear cooperation 
was for some time unavoidable, and did not cause any serious concern in the 1990s. 
Consciously or subconsciously, there were hopes for removing this contradiction by 
enhancing cooperation while downgrading confrontation, and finally doing away with 
confrontation, bringing strategic nuclear relationship in line with a political and economic 
partnership with the prospect of eventual full-scale alliance. It did not, however, work out 
like this. Mutual nuclear deterrence survived and now is being projected for the foreseeable 
future, due to US reluctance and Russian inability to seriously and consistently address the 
problems of deterrence. Instead the problems were just moved to the background of the 
relationship and of the current official rhetoric of both countries.  This left the military and 
defense industrial institutions to operate unilaterally with very little control by the political 
leadership or public of either country. 
These problems in some senses became worse through the neglect shown by state 
leaders, although this is not so obvious in the day to day political relationship between the 
two nations. These problems resurface repeatedly and persist in spoiling cooperation in other 
areas, in particular in the complex issues covered by CTR and Global Partnership. The more 
ambitious the cooperative projects, the more tangible the detrimental impact of nuclear 
deterrence, which has come into the open through recent episodes with US “access to nuclear 
sites” and the “Adamov case,” as well as growing criticism in the United States of Russia’s 
nuclear practices.  
It is the strong belief of the authors of this study, that from now on, Global 
Partnership will be encountering not the technical, but growing systemic obstacles of the 
continued dichotomy of the nuclear relationship of Russia and the West. To promote 
cooperative nuclear (and chemical) weapon elimination projects, the United States and Russia 
should profoundly change their present “ostrich” attitude to nuclear deterrence. The main task 
here would be to elaborate and make serious steps to further reduce and stabilize the nuclear 
balance, and eventually, by a combination of unilateral measures and bi- and multilateral 
agreements, to transform it into cooperative mode in line with the concepts of cooperation of 
the CTR and Global partnership.   
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4.4. Unlocking the Trap of Nuclear Deterrence  
Attempts to change the principles of Cold War era mutual nuclear deterrence between 
the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia) go back to the mid-1980s. However, all these 
efforts to transform the principles might be considered failures. The same is also true of the 
frequent proposals to assume that the post-Cold War nuclear deterrence is to be considered 
not as deterrence against deliberate aggression, but rather as deterrence “against a return to 
confrontation and the arms race.” Whatever considerations may be proposed by politicians 
and scholars, the material basis of nuclear deterrence exists in weapons hardware and 
operational planning which implies its own logic of development, deployment, and 
employment of nuclear forces.   
It is hard to understand what role nuclear deterrence between the United States and 
Russia actually plays as an instrument of their military security against the background of 
their developing relations of partnership and cooperation (even in most sensitive areas, such 
as nuclear weapons safety and dismantlement).  It is absolutely absurd to assume the 
possibility of an exchange of even single nuclear warhead attacks, to say nothing of massive 
nuclear strikes. Nevertheless, the deterrence can still be maintained virtually indefinitely for 
the above reasons unless a set of consistent, well-thought-through and goal-oriented measures 
is taken. 
 The remaining situation of mutual nuclear deterrence between the two powers is 
subject to sharp criticism from various sides. It is in striking conflict not only with the 
proclaimed idea of a partnership, but also with that of international security, non-
proliferation, and counterproliferation policies. Whatever huge efforts are mounted at the top 
political level to break away from the Cold War, the situation of mutual nuclear deterrence as 
materialized in the military stockpiles can theoretically lead at any point to an entire set of the 
confrontation-type relations between the two powers. 
Measures of a phased retreat from the mutual nuclear deterrence stance have been 
developed for a long time. Among other things, they include the mid-1990s agreements on 
non-targeting of strategic missiles against each other’s territories, procedures for lowering the 
missiles’ alert status and changing submarine and bomber patrol patterns, and so on. These 
remain either symbolic or hard-to-implement measures because of the existing high 
quantitative levels and some qualitative characteristics of the SNF of the two powers, as well 
as the deep-rooted plans of their combat employment which in material terms, invariably 
doom them to oppose each other. 
To overcome this “syndrome,” Moscow and Washington should, as an immediate 
objective, turn the Moscow 2002 SORT “agreement on intentions” into a full-scale arms 
reduction treaty. They should agree upon the stages in the weapons reductions pursuant to the 
SORT and on the warhead counting rule. They should settle issues of removing the secondary 
limitations of the START I Treaty that make Russia and the US allocate extra funds. They 
should start discussing verification of the stored warheads and their disposal (with due regard 
for the existing experience of liquidation of warhead bodies under the Intermediate Range 
and Shorter Range Missile Treaty), and hold consultations on further enhancing the 
transparency of the strategic nuclear weapons and their operational deployment. Beyond 
these measures, the duration term of START I should be extended until 2012, so as not to 
leave an arms control and verification gap between 2009 (when START I is to end), and 
SORT (which should be implemented by 2012). If the legal and substantive points of SORT 
are fixed soon, START I extension would be needed for the sake of transparency. Finally, the 
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duration of SORT should be extended until 2015 to avoid having the treaty expire 
simultaneously with the final implementation of SNF reductions under SORT.   
All this would not, in and of itself, change the nature of US-Russian strategic 
relations, but it would profoundly stabilize them and thus provide the necessary starting 
point, framework, and momentum for further steps, which would deal directly with the 
fundamentals of mutual nuclear deterrence. 
Some may object that this would represent a return to classic Cold War arms control, 
allegedly irrelevant in the new environment. This criticism doesn’t hold water. The 
experience of the last decade has shown that abandoning any serious arms control effort as an 
anachronism of the Cold War does not remove the problems of continuous mutual nuclear 
deterrence, but rather leaves them uncontrolled and free to impose their self-generated effects 
and complications on the military and eventually political relationships between states. In the 
absence of a full-scale SORT, the US and Russia will have to live under the still more 
outdated START I Treaty. Real SORT is needed to make up for the lost time and provide the 
legal bridge to a different arms control, which corresponds better with new military and 
political relations between the two leading nuclear powers.   
At the next stage, it might be appropriate to conclude another SORT (SORT II), 
which could, for instance, provide for the reduction by 2017 of the operationally deployed 
warheads down to the limit of around 1,000 to 1,200 warheads, provided the parties agree 
upon the appropriate definitions, counting rules, and verification.  
This level is not just another lower ceiling for the same mutual deterrence potential. It 
is of special significance, because it is seemingly the lowest limit which the two powers could 
set on their SNF while leaving out of the account the nuclear forces of the three other nuclear 
weapon states of the Big Five, as well as ignoring the counterforce potential of long-range 
precision-guided conventional weapons and BMD/AAD defensive systems.  
It is even more important that somewhere near this limit, the SNF of the two biggest 
powers cease to be targeted predominantly against each other’s forces and urban-industrial 
sites. Taking into account the part of SNF which is not routinely operationally deployed, not 
on patrol or at high alert status, or is in overhaul or retrofit procedures — the combat ready 
forces would then be apportioned in much more balanced ways to target each other’s 
territories, other nuclear weapon states or rouge states, conventional and other targets in other 
countries. Technology for quick retargeting would help to assign SNF not simply to multiple 
attack options against each other, but multiple war scenarios against various sets of 
opponents. In some of those scenarios, US and Russian forces might stay neutral to each 
other or even act like allied forces. The nuclear balance would then be turning from 
predominantly bilateral to increasingly multilateral, which would start the process of 
unlocking US and Russian SNF from their traditional mutual nuclear deterrence dynamics 
and predicament. Besides, such reduction would most probably make the two sides shift from 
triads to dyads, thus doing away with one of the most absurd legacies of Cold War: the 
“nuclear overkill” mentality.  
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5. Transforming the US-Russian Deterrence Relationship 
Reductions beyond 1000 warheads do not seem attractive unless combined with 
stringent stability measures, which have always been controversial in view of the different 
geostrategic situations, force structures, and operational concepts of the sides. At very low 
levels these differences would become much more conspicuous and harder to resolve. 
Besides, just further linear reductions — down to 700, 500, or 300 warheads — would 
involve numerous external issues (taking account of TNW, third nuclear states, defensive 
systems, conventional forces and systems, and so on). Also, if implemented within the 
traditional mutual deterrence paradigm, it could destabilize strategic balance by making 
forces more vulnerable and increasing the effect of counterforce strikes. Even if not, the 
inexorable logic of most efficient targeting of smaller forces would put the highest price tag 
on hittingthe small number of vulnerable C3I facilities (decapitation strikes).  This would be 
still more destabilizing. And last but not least, within a mutual deterrence model, getting 
down to very low weapons numbers would revive the dilemma of making nuclear war less 
unthinkable, and deterrence less credible. 
There is a frequent argument that the very process of reducing NW down to a few 
hundred or dozen warheads would imply such an improvement of political relations between 
the parties that the above deficiencies and concerns would become irrelevant. This might be 
so, but it is not self-evident and there is no hard proof of such an assumption. And since there 
may be various factors outside the strategic balance that worsen political relations, the 
optimistic assumption should not be taken for granted. The authors of this paper believe that 
improvements of political relations between or among nuclear powers should not be relied 
upon to make up for the deficiencies in their strategic relationship. Rather, political ties 
should be fortified by the appropriate changes in strategic relations in specific ways and 
forms pertinent to this subject matter.      
Reducing US and Russian operationally deployed forces to around 1000 warheads 
would avoid these negative consequences, and at the same time, open the door to genuinely 
new steps for revising the US-Russian mutual deterrence paradigm. Those may start with a 
mutual US-Russian ban on launch-on-warning operational concepts,  followed with 
qualitatively new arms control agreements on de-alerting strategic offensive forces by 
technical measures and changes in their operational deployment practices. 
5.1. Verifiable Ban on Launch-On-Warning Concepts 
Although nuclear deterrence does not require the concept of launch-on-warning 
attacks that has been adopted by both the United States and USSR/Russia, this concept 
certainly implies deterrence in its most dangerous and politically least controlled form. In 
order to take a decision on the launch of missiles on the basis of information from early-
warning systems, the national leaders have only a few minutes at their disposal — therefore, 
there is always a risk of a miscalculation or technical malfunction, leading to accidental or 
inadvertent nuclear war.  
Moreover, the continued practice of planning launch-on-warning attacks once again 
underlines that the unchanged principles of nuclear deterrence are in outrageous conflict with 
the partnership relations between Russia and the United States. It refers precisely to their 
bilateral mutual deterrence paradigm, since only Russia and the United States have their own 
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missile early-warning systems and missiles capable of launch-on-warning strikes. This 
concept has nothing to do with China’s nuclear forces, for its forces are not expected to have 
a noticeable counterforce capability in the near future. Even in the case of a hypothetical 
Chinese missile strike, there is no urgent incentive to launch a counterattack. The same is true 
of Russia’s LOW operation in response to British or French hypothetical nuclear strike, until 
their SLBM forces acquire counterforce capability and (or) deliver a strike in coordination 
with a massive US missile attack. Of course, there is always the problem of the vulnerability 
of US and Russian C3I systems to even a limited surprise nuclear strike, but it is generally 
believed that a large survivable part of strategic force command and control could be 
reconstituted sooner or later and devastating retaliation would be inflicted on the aggressor. 
 At first sight, the rejection of the LOW concepts might seem to be a purely 
declarative measure, with no verification provisions as a back-up. Yet, the rejection of 
launch-on-warning attack plans can be confirmed with sufficient reliability by verifiable 
technical means of lowering the alert status of any component of the nuclear triad, and 
especially the one intended primarily for missile launches based on information from warning 
systems. 
The authors of the present study and experts of the Academy of Military Sciences of 
the RF have jointly developed a draft “Executive Agreement between the Presidents of the 
Russian Federation and the United States of America on Urgent Measures to Exclude the 
Possibility of Strategic Missile Launches on False Alarm.”30  
According to this document, Russia and the United States would renounce plans to 
use strategic offensive forces in response only to information from their missile early warning 
systems. The form of the agreement is such that it should not be necessarily approved by 
legislative bodies of the United States and Russia and can come into force upon the date of 
signature. The Executive Agreement provides for agreed-upon verifiable procedures for 
lowering the alert status of missiles.  
Sometimes proposals are made by some experts to immediately start lowering the 
readiness status of the missiles that are expected to be reduced by 2012 down to the warhead 
levels (1700 to 2200) set forth by the SORT. In the view of the authors of the present study, 
this might destabilize the strategic balance because current modernization of the ground and 
sea-based components of Russian SNF is not close to being completed.  
In particular, by 2012 under the SORT, a predominant part of the currently deployed 
SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVed ICBMs, SS-25 ground-mobile missiles, and all but one Typhoon 
and six Delta-4 SSBNs , would be decommissioned. Taking them off alert right away would 
leave Russia with a very vulnerable force of a few dozen silo-based SS-27 and SS-19 ICBMs, 
100 to 150 SS-25 mobile missiles, and seven submarines with only one to two at sea from 
time to time. The number of warheads on alert missiles would go down much lower than the 
SORT ceilings require. Deployment of the main force of silo-based and mobile SS-27 
missiles, several SSBNs of a new class and a new SLBM system will take many years. 
During this time, the existing sea and land-based missiles at normal alert status will be 
providing for more force survivability, rough numerical parity, and greater stability of the 
strategic balance with the United States.  
                                                 
30 Arbatov, A. and Dvorkin, V., ‘Nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation’.- Carnegie Moscow Center.- 
Moscow.- 2005, p.60. 
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Since US forces are sufficiently modern and efficient, and are not dependent on a big 
modernization program to stay near the 1700 to 2200 SORT ceiling seven years from now, 
they do not face the same problem as Russia in the case of immediate large-scale de-alerting.  
 The abandonment of plans to launch missiles based on the information from early 
warning systems does not remove the role of these very systems. They would no longer be 
important for urgent retaliation by the two nuclear powers against each other, but would still 
remain essential as long as a delayed second strike response remains a mainstay of bilateral 
strategic stability (providing reliable information on the origin and scale of a hypothetical 
attack).  
Simultaneously and increasingly important will be their role oriented “outwards” of 
the bilateral nuclear balance.  The Executive Agreement assigns a special role to the 
Moscow-based Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) for the exchange of information derived 
from each party’s warning systems that is based on efficient operations of the parties’ early 
warning radars, early warning and reconnaissance satellites. They would play an increasing 
role as a means of monitoring proliferation of missiles and missile technologies, and warning 
of a hypothetical missile strike of a third party. Such early warning systems are sure to play 
still greater roles if the early warning systems of the two countries are eventually integrated.  
With this purpose in mind, the agreed-upon functions of the center should be 
expanded, in addition to the expansion of its information exchange process.  
Another point is of some importance. It is obvious that fully or partially reduced SNF 
alert status can best be maintained first and foremost under conditions of profound relaxation 
of political and military relations with expanding element of cooperation. If tensions escalate 
in Russian-American relations, the parties would most likely transfer their missiles back from 
a low readiness to a full alert status, which could add to the level of tension, since operational 
and technical preparations for a first and second strike are indistinguishable. Hence, a 
reduced alert status per se can be considered to be an additional factor of restraint from any 
escalation of political or military tension between the two nuclear superpowers. 
While the abandonment of LOW concepts may be verified in a highly reliable way by 
technical and operational de-alerting of SNF, before this happens, certain steps to substantiate 
such an agreement are necessary. One is an agreement to invite representatives of the other 
side to all large-scale SNF exercises to prove that LOW is not the task of training. Another, 
more far-reaching step is to agree to place permanent liaison officers at SNF command 
centers (at the US’s Offut, and at Russia’s Vlasikha) as well as at US NORAD and RF 
Missile-Space Defense command centers (analagous with Russian-NATO missions, but with 
the permanent on-duty presence of foreign officers at the sites).      
5.2. Verifiable De-Alerting of Strategic Forces31 
Organizational and technical measures to reduce the high-alert status of strategic 
forces may include the following: 
                                                 
31 This section borrows from the report: Dvorkin, V., ‘Development of administrative and technical methods 
to prevent launching of strategic missiles by mistake (accident) upon information of early warning systems and 
to prolong decision-making time on retaliatory action’. Strategic Nuclear Forces Center. Academy of Military 
Sciences.  Moscow. October 2004. 
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• Agreement on a set of measures that confirms the commitments of the parties to rule 
out the likelihood of using the SNF based on information from missile attack warning 
systems. 
• Agreement on the stages in the process aimed at consistent reduction in the technical 
readiness of SNF for launches of ballistic missiles of various basing modes.  
• Implementation of the organizational and technical measures that confirm the 
commitments of the parties to rule out the likelihood of employing the SNF on the 
information from missile attack warning systems. 
• Demonstration of reliability of the organizational and technical measures that confirm 
the commitments of the parties to rule out the likelihood of using the SNF on the 
information from missile attack warning systems, and define a minimal period needed 
to restore the SNF high readiness status. 
• Demonstration of feasibility of verifying the reliability of the organizational and 
technical measures. 
• Development of agreed-upon common and individual verifiable organizational and 
structural-technical measures confirming that missiles cannot be launched on warning 
from their missile warning systems. 
A major portion of the set of the organizational and technical measures aimed at 
lowering the combat readiness has already been studied by experts in the context of practical 
implementation of the START II Treaty, which provided for “deactivation” of the delivery 
vehicles subject to destruction under the aforementioned treaty. In doing so, they interpreted 
the term “deactivation” to mean that elements of the missile systems of each party should be 
put into a state that makes the missile launch impossible without putting them back into the 
initial state.  
Russian specialists have developed a number of alternative procedures for reducing 
and restoring the missile launch alert status, as well as systems of inspection and notification 
on a changed level of combat readiness that are considered to be acceptable for the Russian 
SNF. Most of them can also be applied to the US SNF, but they should be assessed in full 
detail and agreed upon by US specialists. 
The following methods of ICBM deactivation are feasible: 
• Removal of a re-entry vehicle (RV); 
• Dismantlement of an on-board power supply unit; 
• Dismantlement of gas generators which open the roof of a silo launcher; and 
• Mechanical dissection of a pneumohydraulic system of ICBM pre-launch operation 
and launching. 
The techniques of SLBM deactivation should be applied only to the SSBNs deployed 
at their bases. Peculiar features of the SLBM deactivation are due to some individual 
operational and technical differences in missile launches in Russia and the United States. It is 
believed that unlike US SLBMs, Russian missiles can be launched from surfaced submarines 
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at their bases. That is why in principle they might escape an attack through launch-on-
warning if the bases are attacked by an opponent’s ICBMs or SLBMs. 
The following techniques of reducing SLBM readiness for an immediate launch can 
be considered: 
• Obstruction of the opening of a SLBM launcher hatch through a welding operation; 
• Removal of re-entry vehicles from SLBMs; and 
• Retrieval of SLBM from SSBN launcher and its placement in base storage. 
In terms of economy, preference should be given to the measures of reducing 
readiness that can be implemented at the least cost and are at the same time verifiable at a 
level of reliability that is found acceptable by the other party. 
5.3. Deactivation Techniques 
RV removal. In deactivating a missile through removal of a re-entry vehicle, 
continuing combat duty and monitoring of the missile state can be carried out only through 
installation of the RV electronic substitutes (imitation devices). Removed re-entry vehicles 
should be packed, moved to, and stored inside special containers at storage facilities located 
at ICBM bases or at centralized depots. 
It takes at least 20 to 30 hours to put a RV-free missile back on high alert in the case 
of a fixed ICBM (re-emplacement of an RV) and over 30 hours in the case of a mobile 
ICBM. Once a RV is stored at a centralized storage facility, the replacement time is much 
longer (days or weeks), since special transportation vehicles are used to take the warheads to 
an ICBM base. 
The actions to downgrade missile high alert status through separation of a re-entry 
vehicle of a fixed ICBM include opening the silo protective roof, removing a missile nose-
cone, separation of an RV, moving the RV to a storage site, emplacing an RV mock-up and 
closing the silo roof. To restore the high alert status of a fixed ICBM, it is necessary to move 
the RV from a storage facility to a silo, open the silo protective roof (five to seven hours), 
remove an RV mock-up (up to three hours), install the RV (up to three hours), install the 
nose-cone, close the silo protective roof, and carry out electronic tests (10 to 15 hours).  
In reducing the missile readiness through separation of a re-entry vehicle of a rail-
mobile ICBM, it is necessary to move an ICBM-carrying rail mobile launcher to a 
maintenance facility of the ICBM base, open the roof of the rail-mobile missile launcher 
(RMML) car, hoist an ICBM container, remove the nose-cone, separate the RV, move the RV 
to the maintenance facility of the missile base for its subsequent storage there, install an RV 
mock-up, put the container with the missile down, and close the roof of the RMML railcar. 
The procedure for restoring the high readiness of a rail-mobile ICBM consists of 
moving the rail mobile launcher together with a missile to a maintenance facility at an ICBM 
base, moving the RV from a storage facility to a rail mobile launcher, opening the roof of an 
RMML railcar and hoisting of the container with an ICBM (up to 10 hours), separation of the 
RV mock-up (up to five hours), re-installation of the RV (five to six hours), installation of the 
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nose-cone, putting the container with the missile down into the RMML railcar, closing the 
roof of the railcar, and electronic tests (up to 20 hours).  
To lower high alert status of a road-mobile ICBM through RV separation and restore 
it again, it is necessary to move the road mobile launcher and a missile to a maintenance 
facility at an ICBM base, separate the RV, move the RV to a maintenance facility at the 
missile base for storage, and install an RV mock-up. The procedure for restoring the 
readiness of an ICBM in a road-mobile launcher (RML) includes moving the RML together 
with a missile to a maintenance facility at the ICBM base, moving the RV from a storage 
facility to the road-mobile launcher, dismantling the RV mock-up (up to five hours), coupling 
the RV (up to five hours), and electronic tests (up to 10 hours). 
Dismantling of an onboard power supply unit (OPSU). The OPSU is used only during 
the initial operations, and while in flight. That is why dismantlement of the unit does not 
affect the technical state of a missile when stored and remotely tested. Outside verification is 
exercised in the process of RV separation. When an OPSU is dismantled, it is necessary to 
separate an RV and place appropriate end caps. It takes around 30 to 50 hours to restore the 
high readiness status of a single fixed missile, and more than 50 hours in the case of a mobile 
ICBM. 
Reduction of the fixed missile readiness through the dismantlement of an OPSU 
includes a number of procedures, such as opening of the protective roof of the silo missile 
launcher, separation of an RV, dismantling the OPSU, installation of an OPSU mock-up, 
installation of the RV, and closing the roof of the launcher. 
In order to restore its readiness, it is necessary to open the roof of the silo-based 
launcher (five to seven hours), separate the RV (three to five hours), dismantle the OPSU 
mock-up and install an OPSU (at least two to three hours), install the RV (up to three hours), 
close the roof of the silo-based launcher, and carry out electronic tests (10 to 15 hours). 
Measures used to lower the readiness level of a rail-mobile ICBM through 
dismantling an OPSU and its restoration include the following steps: moving the rail mobile 
launcher together with a missile to a maintenance facility at an ICBM base, opening the roof 
of a RMML railcar, hoisting of the container with an ICBM, separating the RV, dismantling 
the OPSU, installation of an OPSU mock-up, installation of the RV, putting the container 
with a missile into the railcar, and closing the roof of the launcher railcar. 
The procedure for restoring the high alert status of an RMML-based missile includes 
the following: moving the rail mobile launcher together with a missile to a maintenance 
facility at an ICBM base, opening the roof of a RMML railcar and hoisting the container with 
an ICBM (up to 10 hours), separation of the RV (up to five hours), dismantling the OPSU 
mock-up and re-installation of an OPSU (two to three hours), re-installation of the RV (five 
to six hours), putting down the container holding the ICBM, closing the railcar roof, and 
electric tests (up to 30 hours). 
Measures used to reduce the readiness of a land-based mobile ICBM through 
dismantling an OPSU include the following operations: transportation of the road-mobile 
launcher together with a missile to a maintenance facility at an ICBM base, separation of the 
RV, dismantling of the OPSU, installation of an OPSU mock-up and re-installation of the 
RV. In order to restore the readiness of an ICBM in the RML, it is necessary to move the 
launcher together with a missile to a maintenance facility at an ICBM base, separate the RV 
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(up to five hours), dismantle the OPSU mock-up and re-install an OPSU (two to three hours) 
and re-install the RV (up to five hours). 
Dismantling of gas generators used to lift the protective roof. Implementation of the 
deactivation method requires that some additional methods of verification be worked out and 
that the inspection procedure be revised, so that the inspection team is allowed wider access 
to the facility to be inspected. It takes 10 to 20 hours to restore the readiness of a single 
ICBM. 
To reduce the fixed ICBM alert status through dismantling of gas generators used to 
lift the protective roof, it is necessary to carry out the following operations: entering the silo 
launcher, opening the launcher protective roof, dismantling the gas generator, moving the gas 
generator to a maintenance facility for storage at an ICBM base, and closing the protective 
roof of the launcher. 
To restore the alert status of the ICBM it is necessary to bring the gas generator back 
from the storage facility to the silo launcher, reduce its combat readiness, enter the launcher 
and open the protective roof of the launcher (up to five hours), re-install the gas generator 
(one hour), close the protective roof of the launcher, and carry out electric tests (five to 10 
hours). 
Mechanical dissection of a pneumohydraulic system of missile pre-launch activity and 
launching as an ICBM deactivation method. An ICBM can be deactivated through 
dismantling pipelines (junctions) of the pneumohydraulic system of the missile pre-launch 
operation and launching. 
As with the previous deactivation methods, it requires that some additional methods 
of verification be worked out and that the procedure for inspections be revised, so that the 
inspection team is allowed a wider access to the installation. 
It takes 20 to 30 hours to restore the readiness of a single ICBM. 
Blocking the opening of a SLBM launcher hatch by means of welding as a technique 
of SLBM deactivation. Blocking the opening of a SLBM launcher hatch by means of welding 
requires that welding operations be conducted in each SLBM launcher, so that its hatch 
cannot be opened without restoration works. It takes around two hours to restore the original 
combat-ready status of the launcher. This means that it will take at least 25 hours to restore 
each SSBN depending on the number of SLBM launchers and number of welding operations 
to be carried out. It is noteworthy that the launchers themselves might be either empty or 
accommodate deployed SLBMs, together with an RV or without it. Therefore, the time it 
takes to activate an SLBM can vary widely.  
Deactivation of a SLBM through removal of RVs.  Removal of RVs of SLBMs at 
submarines in bases as a method of reducing missile readiness requires storage facilities be 
available for removed RVs. It does not, however, demand that additional funds be allocated 
to keep SLBMs operational.  
It takes at least three hours to replace RVs in SLBMs.  Accordingly, it will take 48 to 
72 hours to replace RVs in all SLBMs depending on the number of SLBM launchers aboard 
the SBNN. 
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In these time calculations, it was assumed that all RVs of SLBMs were located at an 
SSBN base. The time required to take them to the SSBN base when stationed elsewhere was 
not taken in account. 
Deactivation of SLBMs through their removal from SSBN launchers. Such a 
technique of lowering the alert status of missiles and their subsequent placement in storage 
facilities is the lengthiest in terms of the time necessary to bring them back to the required 
level of readiness. However, the United States has adopted the practice of keeping some 
SLBMs in loading tubes, which allows them to load into SSBN launchers within a very short 
time.  It takes just two to four hours to load one tube-housed SLBM into a launcher, with the 
time necessary for loading all the launchers of Ohio-class SSBN totaling 48 to 96 hours. It 
goes without saying that a SSBN can be loaded to the full only if all the SLBMs scheduled to 
be installed in launchers are pre-placed in loading tubes. 
The technology of placing SLBMs into loading canisters is very labor-intensive and 
time consuming. It normally includes testing each separate stage of a missile, including fuel 
quality; monitoring stages assembled in a missile; monitoring working efficiency of the 
missile, including the guidance unit and RV; and loading a missile into a canister at a vertical 
assembly shop. All the procedures together might take around 100 hours for each missile.  
Even if operations to prepare an SLBM for canister loading run parallel to one 
another, it would take a lot of time to load SLBMs into all SSBN launchers, given the limited 
number of personnel authorized to conduct such work. One proposal is to limit personnel, but 
this way does not seem very promising due to verification problems. It might be easier to 
limit the number of canisters at each base.  
In the case of a full deactivation of the launcher of an SSBN and disassembly of all 
SLBMs into stages, it would take around 30 days to bring to readiness a single SSBN, given a 
sufficient amount of canisters. 
The aforementioned methods allow for complete monitoring of the technical state of 
nuclear safety at alert status, remote electrical tests, scheduled maintenance and technical 
repairs. Missile launches cannot be conducted unless restoration operations are carried out 
because the countdown graph is blocked automatically. 
 Reduction of bomber readiness. The air leg of the nuclear triad is not usually 
associated with the launch-on-warning concept. In case of crises, bombers may be put on 15-
minute alert or ordered to take off in anticipation of attack and to stay on air patrol for many 
hours. 
If, however, de-alerting is applied in a more general mode, bombers should also be 
subject to such measures. The greatest asymmetry between the US and Russia is in the air 
component, and Moscow would not agree to leave it out. This is all the more so because 
reconstitution time to return missiles back to high alert status, as was shown above, may 
require many hours or days, and this time is in many cases shorter than the bomber flight time 
between the US and RF. 
The simplest and most easily verifiable procedure for de-alerting bombers was 
invented in START I with respect to converting nuclear capable bombers for non-nuclear 
missions. It consists of placing bomber nuclear weapons (ALCMs and gravity bombs) in 
storage facilities not closer than 100 km from a bomber deployment base and prohibiting 
mixed basing of nuclear capable and converted bombers.  
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This method looks best for de-alerting bombers in the context of general readiness 
reduction. One additional measure may be recommended: prohibiting mixed basing of de-
alerted heavy bombers with medium-range bombers and dual-purpose tactical strike aircraft. 
This would remove the need to store nuclear weapons of medium and tactical strike aircraft at 
the bases of de-alerted heavy bombers, thus compromising their de-alerting, since some 
weapons may be used by heavy bombers, or medium and tactical airplanes. 
In contrast to missiles, bombers may fly to other airfields where nuclear weapons are 
stored and may be quickly armed to be put on high alert or take-off for a nuclear strike. If this 
possibility is taken seriously, more complicated and expensive technical measures may be 
required to de-alert bombers by removing their ability to quickly take off or to carry nuclear 
weapons. Here, the procedures elaborated under START I for  converting heavy bombers for 
non-nuclear missions (with functionally related observable differences incorporated) might 
be most appropriate. Another possibility could be to put permanent inspectors of one country 
and the other country’s heavy bombers airbases. 
5.4. Inspection Procedures for Different Techniques of Deactivation  
Verification of the removal of RVs. Procedures for inspecting RVs of deployed 
ICBMs are described in the START I Inspection Protocol. Section 6, Article XI of the treaty 
specifies a quota of 10 inspections per year. These procedures have been conducted more 
than once in practice and do not need any clarification. 
Verifying the dismantling of the on-board power supply unit. In deactivating the 
ICBM through dismantling an on-board power supply unit, the fact of deactivation can be 
confirmed during the quota inspections conducted in conformance with Paragraph 6, Article 
XI of the START Treaty (10 inspections per year). Procedures for conducting inspections 
should be worked out in practice during their early exhibition and be agreed upon by the 
parties. During the early exhibition of ICBM deactivation, the following measures may be 
proposed: 
• Carry out inspection procedures with respect to the RVs of deployed ICBMs for silo 
launchers, rail mobile launchers, and road mobile launchers up to the moment when 
the RV is separated, and an ICBM and a launcher are prepared for visual examination 
(see Annex 3, Inspection Protocol); 
• After two inspectors have made certain within one minute that the RV has been 
separated, prepare the on-board power supply unit for a display, with some 
components of silo launchers, rail mobile launchers, road mobile launchers, and their 
ICBMs camouflaged; 
• Exhibit to the inspection teams for 15 minutes, from a place indicated by the in-
country escort, the upper part of the self-contained dispensing mechanism (SDM) 
with an OPSU and have it photographed by the escort members using the 
photographic equipment of the inspected party; 
• Dismantle the OPSU from the ICBM; and 
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• Demonstrate to the inspection team for 15 minutes, from a place indicated by the in-
country escort, that there is no OPSU aboard the ICBM and shoot a photograph of the 
upper part of the SDM less the OPSU. 
While a silo launcher, rail mobile launcher, or road mobile launcher, and their ICBMs 
are being prepared for demonstration, the inspection team is in a place or places that have 
been indicated by the escort, at a distance not more than 50 meters from the silo launcher, rail 
mobile launcher, or road mobile launcher, where they can visually and continuously observe 
the rail mobile launchers (the upper part of the silo launchers).  
Procedures for RV inspections. During the post-inspection procedures, it is necessary 
to draw up and sign an inspection report that records the fact of ICBM deactivation and 
includes photographs of the ICBM with an OPSU applied, and without it applied. The 
procedure of the follow-up inspections can be as follows: 
• Inspectors arrive at a silo launcher, rail mobile launcher, or RML that they have 
designated; 
• Inspectors compare the geographical coordinates of the silo launcher; 
• From a place that has been indicated by the inspected party, inspectors watch as the 
protective roof of a silo launcher (the roof of a rail mobile launcher) is opened and the 
RV is separated; 
• Inspectors confirm that the RV has been separated in full; 
• Once the ICBM is ready for exhibition, the inspection team examines visually the 
upper part of the SDM for 1.5 minutes, and confirms through comparison with the 
photographs taken during the early exhibition that there is no OPSU there. 
The above method of ICBM deactivation allows the inspecting party to monitor 
restoration of the missile readiness by its national technical means of verification. 
Verifying the dismantlement of a gas generator used to lift the protective roof (PR).  
In deactivating an ICBM through dismantlement of the PR lift gas generator, the fact that the 
missile cannot be launched can be confirmed during quota inspections conducted pursuant to 
Paragraph 6, Article XI of the START Treaty (10 inspections a year). Procedures for 
conducting inspections should be tried out during early exhibitions and agreed upon by the 
parties. 
During the early exhibition of measures to make sure that the ICBM cannot be 
launched, we propose the following: 
• Exhibit to the inspection team for 15 minutes, from a place indicated by the in-
country escort, where the gas generator is located and have it photographed by escort 
members using the photographic equipment of the inspected party; 
• Dismantle the gas generator; and 
• Demonstrate to the inspection team for 15 minutes, from a place indicated by the in-
country escort, that there is no gas generator there, and have the place of the 
installment photographed. 
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While the launcher is being prepared for an exhibition, the inspection team is in the 
place or places indicated by the escort.  
During the post-inspection procedures, it is necessary to draw up and sign an 
inspection report confirming that the ICBM cannot be launched and including the annexed 
photographs. 
The procedure of the follow-up inspections might be as follows: 
• Inspectors arrive at the launcher that they have pointed out; 
• They check the geographical coordinates of the silo launcher; 
• They observe opening of the launcher protective roof from the place indicated by the 
inspected party; and 
• The inspection team examines visually the upper part of the silo launcher for 15 
minutes and makes sure through comparing it with the photographs taken during the 
early exhibition that there is no gas generator there. 
Verifying the mechanical dissection of the pneumohydraulic system of ICBM pre-
launch operation and launching. In deactivating the ICBM through mechanical dissection of 
the pneumohydraulic system of the pre-launch operation and launching, the fact that the 
missile cannot be launched might be confirmed during the quota inspections that are 
conducted pursuant to Paragraph 6, Article XI of the START Treaty (10 inspections a year). 
Procedures for conducting inspections should be tried out during an early exhibition and 
agreed upon by the two parties. 
According to this method, inspectors should be allowed access to the apparatus 
section of the silo launcher and inside the launcher space as deep as about 6 meters and 
informed about the procedure of launcher operation during a launch of the missile. In 
addition, restoration of the silo launcher and ICBM readiness can be implemented covertly, 
without opening the launcher protective roof. This rules out the use of the national technical 
means of verification. 
Verifying SLBM deactivation. The above variants of SLBM deactivation can be 
verified during inspections carried out under the START I Treaty in line with verification of 
the updated data, such as blocking the opening of the SLBM launcher hatch by means of 
welding and removing SLBMs from SSBN launchers, as well as blocking the opening of a 
SLBM launcher hatch by means of welding and removal of RVs from the deployed SLBMs 
during inspections of the warheads on SLBMs. It is noteworthy that no additional measures 
of verification are to be agreed upon. 
Demonstration of the organizational and technical measures under way. The party that 
chooses a particular technique of reducing the missile alert status may, as a way of enhancing 
credibility, conduct a demonstration of the operations used to restore the missile readiness, 
with chronological parameters of the restoration procedures fixed, and the number of items of 
the used special equipment listed. If the measures taken are not convincing enough, the above 
demonstration is obligatory. Since the special equipment is normally located at facilities in 
support of the ICBM bases, its verification can be carried out during inspections on verifying 
updated data pursuant to START I Treaty. Information from national space systems offers 
additional assurance in implementing specific measures of lowering the alert status. 
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Information exchange. For the above options of reducing the readiness status, the 
information exchange implies that the following types of basic notifications should be 
provided: 
• Notifications concerning plans to carry out specific procedures for lowering the 
missile readiness, with  the first one provided no later than three  months before the 
demonstration procedures; 
• A notification concerning the date and place of exhibitions to be conducted, including 
a description of the procedures aimed at lowering the readiness level; and 
• Notifications concerning the numbers of strategic offensive weapons and which 
measures aimed at lowering the alert status have been implemented as applied to each 
ICBM base or SLBM, with information about specific types of measures for the given 
base (no less than once every three months). As soon as the inspection team arrives at 
an inspected facility, inspectors are given a diagram indicating the specifics of the 
measures taken. 
5.5. Possible Phases of Reducing Readiness Level  
Pursuant to the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, each party determines for itself 
the structure of the forces subject to reductions. It is expedient to agree upon the phases of the 
strategic offensive reductions to be implemented under the treaty, and, on this basis, to work 
out measures aimed at reducing readiness of the strategic nuclear forces that are to be reduced 
at each of the phases. 
Further measures intended to reduce the readiness level may be as follows: within a 
reasonable amount of time before the beginning of each phase, the parties exchange 
information concerning the composition of the forces to be reduced at a given phase. During 
the first three months, starting from the beginning of the new phase of reductions, the parties 
implement deactivation of all strategic delivery vehicles subject to reductions at this phase 
through any of the agreed-upon techniques providing for a lengthy restoration of readiness, 
and at the last phase — only through removal of re-entry vehicles. 
As a result, less than two years before the expiration date of the SORT, the parties can 
reach the treaty-defined limits.  During the remaining period, the parties can take an 
inventory of their nuclear arsenals and count the number of their deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads and those in the reserve. 
Thereafter, the parties might reach agreement that no later than December 31, 2012, 
each party would have no more than 500 nuclear warheads on the deployed ICBMs and 
SLBMs at high alert state (phase I). The next step (phase II) would be to go down to 200 
warheads on alert by December 31, 2015. In the next few years the number of warheads that 
are ready for short-notice launches can be reduced down to 100 to 150 warheads, and 
eventually down to around 60 to 80 for each party. This limit, however, will largely depend 
on the scale and characteristics of the BMD defense, and still more on the profile of 
cooperative BMD projects, as well as on the state of nuclear stockpiles of other countries.  
The main problems, if the concept of de-alerting is accepted by the United States and 
Russia, would be to elaborate technical ways to ensure approximate equality between the two 
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powers (1) as to the force numbers left on high alert at each stage and (2) as to equality in 
reconstitution time of each party’s SNF.  Yet another serious problem (3) is to make sure that 
in the course of de-alerting the first strike, counterforce capability is being downgraded more 
than second strike, retaliatory capability.  
It should be taken into consideration, however, that each of the three legs of strategic 
triads can perform all three principle missions: first strike, launch-on-warning, and second 
strike — but with different levels of efficiency. Silo-based ICBMs are the best in conducting 
first strike and LOW, but poor in a second strike (US ICBMs may become relatively more 
efficient for a second strike in the future in view of the degradation of Russia’s counterforce 
capability through the withdrawal of SS-24, SS-18 and SS-19 missiles). Mobile ICBMs are 
the best in second strike and LOW when in their protective shelters or at field launch 
positions, but not so good in a first strike (in a decade all remaining Russian systems will be 
single-warhead or carry just a few warheads). US Trident-2 SLBMs are no good for LOW, 
but quite effective in a first strike and perfect for a second strike missions. Russian present 
and projected SLBMs on Delta-4 and new “Dolgorukiy” classs SSBNs will be quite limited 
in a first strike and LOW missions, while moderately good for a second strike. Heavy 
bombers are no good either in a first strike (because of long flight time) or in a second strike 
(due to vulnerability at the airfields), but rather (and only) efficient for LOW if put at a high 
take-off readiness or on air patrol. It is true that in the case of a false alarm, bombers, unlike 
missiles, may be recalled. However, this theoretical possibility may not work in a real crisis 
and, what’s more, massive take-off of strategic bombers may be perceived by the other side 
as the beginning of a nuclear war, and trigger the launch of its missiles (this threat may be 
exacerbated by the degradation of Russia’s air defense system).  
Hence, it is possible to suggest in a general way that the first candidates for 
deactivation should be silo-based ICBMs. Primary systems might be MIRVed ICBMs, but 
single-warhead silo-based missiles should be included too, in particular US Minuteman-3 
with counterforce W-87 warheads refitted from Peacekeeper missiles, since they would 
present a large “silo-busting” capability against Russian 250 fixed ICBMs. Also, since land-
based missiles constitute a much greater proportion of Russian SNF by warhead number, 
their large-scale deactivation should be accompanied by severe reduction of the portion of 
SSBNs on sea-patrol and by deactivation of all or most SLBMs at bases (to prevent the quick 
increase of submarines on sea patrol or launching SLBMs from bases, which has been an 
accepted practice of the USSR/RF, and might be adopted in future by the US). Bombers 
should be the next priority for de-alerting, as a weapon totally dependent on LOW and highly 
provocative in such a mission. Finally, mobile single-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs with low 
counterforce capability should be the last to join the deactivation procedure. 
One additional consideration is of great importance. De-alerting strategic missiles as a 
way of abandoning launch-on-warning, as important as it is, should be implemented only as 
the first step in transformation of mutual nuclear deterrence relations. This is because even 
without LOW concepts and LOW-suitable weapons, mutual nuclear deterrence may stay 
forever on the foundation of mutual delayed second-strike capabilities. Compared to Cold 
War years and the present situation, this would be a much more stable relationship — it was 
the goal of arms control from the 1970s to the 1990s. Still, it would retain nuclear 
confrontation as its base with all corresponding strategic, economic, and political 
implications, controversies, and the potential for destabilization. Second-strike SNF postures 
would imply fully alert weapons, even though less capable of counterforce missions or of 
LOW.  Hence, further SNF reduction plus deep de-alerting should be viewed as an instrument 
of much more profound relaxation and transformation of mutual deterrence — eventually 
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moving away from mutual locked-up second-strike relationship as well, actually leaving the 
US and the RF with minimal alert SNF force with multiple targeting plans and variable target 
lists across all azimuths as “a hedge against any uncertainty.”  
Accordingly, partial verifiable downloading of MIRVed strategic missiles (removing 
some of the warheads in the nose cones) would be an accepted stabilizing way of reducing 
SNF levels (as is envisioned under START I and apparently under SORT). This method with 
appropriate counting rules and verification could be used to reduce SNF down to proposed 
1000 to 1200 warhead ceiling.  However, de-alerting should at some point start on a parallel 
track, and it must deal with warheads, delivery vehicles, and launchers as a whole. For 
instance, it should not be possible for Russia to reach the level of 500 alert warheads by 
preserving 200 SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs downgraded to one warhead each, plus 300 single 
warhead SS-25 and SS-27 missiles, while de-alerting all SLBMs and aircraft. Likewise, the 
US, it should be prohibited from reaching the 500 limit by keeping all 14 Trident SSBNs with 
336 missiles downgraded to one warhead each, plus 164 Minuteman-3 ICBMs, while de-
alerting 336 Minuteman-3 missiles and bombers.   
Perhaps, ideally, the last remaining US 200 warheads on alert would all be on two 
Trident submarines at sea (each SLBM downgraded to four warheads) or on one Trident at 
sea and 100 Minuteman-3 ICBMs (alternatively — at 50 ICBMs and four B-2 bombers). For 
Russia such a force could comprise one “Dolgorukiy” or Delta-4 class SSBN at sea, 30 SS-27 
“Topol-M” in silos, and 100 mobile missiles of this type (an alternative posture could be a  
mix of 200 silo-based and ground-mobile SS-27 ICBMs, with all SLBMs de-alerted and one 
to two  SSBNs with verifiable mock-up or de-activated missiles operated for training 
purposes). 
Since sea-based forces cannot be deactivated and de-alerted while on sea patrol, 
relatively deep de-alerting of SNF (for example down to 500 combat ready warheads) would 
lead to radical reduction of the number of US Trident SSBNs at sea; from the present eight to 
10 down to four to five “boomers,” and at a later phase, down to one to two boats. This would 
be a stabilizing change due to Trident-2 missiles counterforce and counter-command-control 
strike capability. This may also induce abandoning the traditional “two-crew” operational 
concept, even if some SSBNs would go to sea for exercises without SLBMs or with mock-up 
or deactivated missiles. Russia (and in future other NWS) will not be affected so much, since 
it will not maintain more than one or two boats at sea anyway. Its practice of maintaining 
some of its SLBM force combat ready in bases would, however, have to be stopped as well. 
Reduction of SSBNs patrol rate in addition might be fixed by an agreement or through the 
regular exchange of data.  
Ground-mobile missiles will present problems only for Russia (and in the future, 
possibly for China). As with SLBMs, there is not much sense in deploying mobile ICBMs “in 
the field” if they are deactivated. On the other hand, in their light shelters (“Krona”) they are 
capable only of a first or launch-on-warning strike in a combat-ready state (although their 
counterforce capability without MIRVs is quite limited). Hence, unlike US SSBNs, at the 
first phase of de-alerting, a reduction of the number of Russian mobile ICBMs on patrol 
would be destabilizing and justifiable only by verification considerations. All declared 
deactivated missiles should be permanently in their shelters (having no first or LOW strike 
capability), which may also be formalized by an agreement.   
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Calculating and equating reconstitution time for the two sides is a complex, but 
solvable problem. Below, an example is provided for ICBMs as an illustration at the present 
Russian SNF levels (detailed descriptions of the technical assumptions of the modeling are 
provided in Appendix 1). 
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  Figure 6. Reconstitution time of de-alerting ICBMs (present Russian force level) 
As follows from the above model, depending on the methods of de-alerting and the 
number of missiles remaining on full alert, the reconstitution time with three shifts of support 
personnel (without weekends) is from 225 to 470 days. With two shifts, the reconstitution 
time is about 30 percent longer.   
Further  SNF reductions would make reconstitution time shorter due to the lower 
overall ICBM number. In Figure 7, the model demonstrates reconstitution time dependence 
on the residual alert warheads number and de-activation methods for an SNF level of about 
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Figure 7. Reconstitution time for de-alerted ICBMs (Russian SNF in 2012 under SORT level)  
 
Still further reduction of SNF, as proposed in the present study: down to 1000 to 1200 
warheads under SORT II by the year 2017 would logically imply even shorter reconstitution 
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Figure 8. Reconstitution time for ICBMs (Russian SNF in 2017 under proposed 
SORT II level) 
This does not mean that SNF reductions should not be implemented in order to make 
de-alerting less reversible. Present SNF numbers are just too high, which would make de-
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alerting at the existing levels too expensive, long, and technically complicated, and hence, 
politically more controversial. De-alerting from SORT levels (1700 to 2200 warheads) would 
be much simpler in all respects, while reconstitution time would still be quite long. This 
would be also conducive to further SNF reductions down to 1000 to 1200 warheads, just by 
way of dismantling part of the de-alerted portion of strategic forces. Shorter ICBM alert 
reconstitution time should be made up for by de-alerting a major part of SLBMs and heavy 
bombers (or conversion of the latter to non-nuclear missions).  
Most importantly, by that time, as suggested in the present study, SNF reduction/de-
alerting should be supplemented by integration of early-warning and command-control 
systems, and later,by development of joint BMD systems. This would make transformation of 
mutual nuclear deterrence practically irreversible. 
Survivability of command-control and early-warning systems adds another 
complicated dimension to the task of moving away from launch-on-warning. Insuring its 
performance for a second strike would demand a set of special arrangements, limitations, and 
commitments on both sides: for example non-interference with early warning satellites and 
banning high orbit ASAT systems, banning deployment of SSBNs and SSNs with cruise 
missiles on sea patrol closer than 2,000 to 3,000 km from each other’s territories, and so on.  
Accomplishing all of this would be a formidable challenge indeed. Different force 
structures, deployment practices, and employment plans imply different deactivation 
techniques which may affect in asymmetric ways major parts of the SNF of each side. 
Besides, these very techniques vary in implementation costs and time, as well as in the 
resulting reconstitution time, cost, and visibility.  
In the view of this study’s authors, with sufficient goodwill, such obstacles may be 
overcome after the end of Cold War at no greater effort than the effort required to reach 
SALT II and START I during the Cold War. True, both nations would eventually retain a few 
hundred or several dozen nuclear warheads, which might be targeted at each other and at 
third NWS. Still, the magnitude of de-alerting and deactivation and the scale of the regime of 
transparency, monitoring, and limitation of operational policies, would profoundly transform 
the mutual deterrence relationship into some new type of strategic interaction. Cooperative 
endeavors in early warning and defensive systems would then finish the job. 
The number of strategic nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs that are ready for an 
immediate launch as of the end of each phase Country 
Dec 31, 2005 Dec 31, 2007 Dec 31, 2010 Dec 31, 2012 Dec 31, 2015 
Russia 2800 1500 500 – 1000 200 – 500 0 – 200 
USA 2800 1500 500 – 1000 200 – 500 0 – 200 
 Table 1. Phases of reducing combat readiness of strategic nuclear forces32
 
In implementing phased de-alerting of SNF, the US and Russia would eventually 
encounter the problem of third nuclear weapons states and tactical nuclear forces. At 
sufficiently low levels of forces remaining in combat readiness and with long reconstitution 
time of the rest of the forces, the two powers may become concerned, if only theoretically, 
                                                 
32 The proposed numbers of nuclear warheads that are ready for launch are tentative 
and should be agreed by the Parties. It is probable that their number can be brought to naught 
by common agreement. 
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about possibility of a surprise attack of other nuclear states and in case of Russia, about a 
strike of US forward-based tactical nuclear weapons.  
This problem can be addressed by an agreement with Britain, France, and China on 
the expansion of de-alerting procedure to their forces. For instance, equal ceilings may be set 
for the combat ready forces of all five nuclear weapon states at a level of zero to 200 
warheads. Incidentally, this solution would bypass the touchy question of equality between 
the two bigger and three smaller nuclear forces. The US and RF would retain their superiority 
in view of their large de-alerted forces, while the other three powers would enjoy a long -
sought  legalized equality with the big two in combat ready forces. Other NWS would legally 
be free to expand de-alerted forces too, which they would hardly do for practical reasons, 
except for China, which would probably eventually build larger overall SNF (including 
medium range missiles, which the two leading powers destroyed through the INF-SNF Treaty 
of 1987). However, de-alerting procedures would make it a less important problem. Of 
course, such an agreement would be easier to achieve in an overall context of confidence-
building measures, which are addressed in the next section. 
With respect to TNW, de-alerting would not be applicable, since these weapons are 
delivered by dual-purpose systems. Hence, the solution may be an agreement to relocate all 
TNW to central storage places, including withdrawal of US weapons to the continental 
United States. Such an agreement would not be difficult to verify through transparency 
measures and, if need be, permanent monitoring of the central storage places. Presently, 
Russia keeps TNW only at air and naval bases, ready for employment, and routinely deploys 
them on attack submarines and surface ships at sea. All other TNW types are at central 
storage places anyway. 
Since Russia is planning to rely heavily on TNW in view of the weakness of its 
conventional forces facing NATO and China, such a deal on tactical weapons would still 
affect Russia more than other NWS. Implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe (CFE) Adaptation Treaty by all member-states would help alleviate Moscow’s 
concerns in the west. (Presently only Russia and Belarussia have ratified it.) An even greater 
positive effect could be achieved by going for a new CFE agreement, further reducing (at 
least by 50 percent) conventional weapon systems national and territorial allocations under 
the CFE Adaptation. Integrating NATO-Russian Air Defense systems and creating a joint 
interoperable rapid reaction force for peace-enforcing, peace-keeping, antiterrorist, and other 
new missions in Europe and elsewhere, would go a long way to removing the need for 
deployed TNW to make up for allegedly inadequate Russian conventional forces capabilities. 
The option of keeping TNW in central storage places instead of eliminating them would 
probably be more acceptable for Moscow as a hedge against a worst case contingency in 
Europe or in the East. Besides, the withdrawal of US TNW from Europe would be a strong 
incentive for Russia, and a great symbol of NATO abandoning its traditional nature as a 
military alliance against Russia.  
De-alerting would indirectly lead to curtailment of the modernization programs of 
both SNF and TNW, since the deployment of new systems in large numbers to be kept 
mostly at a de-alerted state would hardly make much practical sense. Quite probably, with a 
very limited modernization rate and an expanding de-alerted portion of the forces, the 
numbers of US and RF SNF would gradually decline in a “natural” way without the need for 
further arms reduction treaties beyond the above-proposed 1000 warhead ceiling of SORT II. 
Obsolete weapons would be withdrawn without substitute at the discretion of each side.  
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The sheer numbers in the reductions of overall force levels and of the de-alerted 
portion of SNF may not convey the sense a qualitative change. The magnitude of the 
transformation of the US-Russian strategic relationship within the realm of offensive strategic 
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Figure 9. US and Russian SNF reduction and de-alerting     
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6. Doing Away with Nuclear Deterrence  
Further reduction and balanced deactivation of US and Russian SNF would go far 
beyond the task of stabilization of the nuclear balance on the principle of mutual assured 
second strike retaliation, which was the core of strategic arms control in the 1970s through 
the 1990s (ABM Treaty, SALT I/II, INF Treaty, and START I/II/III). Besides the deep 
relaxation of the military tensions of the US-Russian strategic balance (embodied in the 
abandonment of LOW operational concepts and the comprehensive transparency of forces, 
postures and programs), deactivation would affect operational policies of deployment and 
employment of SNF, thus putting the US and RF in a state in which they would not be able to 
conduct massive and coordinated nuclear strikes against each other.  
Such a state would also tangibly limit their nuclear options against third NWS or even 
non-nuclear opponents (all the more so if TNW are also subject to de-alerting). It goes 
without saying that deep deactivation would imply profound revision of operational 
deployment policies, severely reducing SSBN patrol rates, mobile ICBM routine dispersal 
practices, heavy bombers’ basing infrastructure and flight exercises. Changing these new 
features of the maintenance of SNF without proper notification and explanation of reasons, 
would be equated to preparation for an act of aggression, and thus strongly deterred. 
Nonetheless, even the most radical methods of de-alerting through deactivation, as 
much as they would move the two parties away from a combat-ready mutual deterrence 
relationship, would not do away with it completely. The reason is that such steps would 
remain reversible — even if with long lead time and huge expenditures of economic and 
organizational resources. 
To make the changes irreversible, additional measures would be needed outside the 
realm of offensive nuclear forces. These other aspects are early warning and defensive 
systems. Gradual integration of such systems would finally and irreversibly do away with 
mutual nuclear deterrence, since nations having common early warning and missile and air 
defense systems technically cannot fight each other and have no reason, even theoretically, to 
deter each other.  
Initially, nuclear and missile proliferation created the perception of a major, common, 
new threat, and it seemed that there would be joint interest to cope with it between the United 
States, USSR/Russia, and eventually among all great powers. This gave birth to the NPT and 
its mechanisms, and to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). Dialectically, after 
the end of Cold War, the expanding cooperation among great powers in fighting against 
proliferation has raised the question of creating cooperative early warning and surveillance, 
as well as missile defense systems, which would require doing away with mutual nuclear 
deterrence. For reasons addressed above, though, the United States and Russia, as well as the 
other NWS, retained mutual nuclear deterrence as a basis of their national security strategies 
and as the primary mode of strategic relationships. As a result, the integration of early 
warning and defense systems, having barely started, gradually came to a dead end, 
undercutting (together with some other factors) the great powers’ cooperation on non-
proliferation. 
To facilitate the much needed great powers’ post-Cold War cooperation in fighting 
new security threats, an aggressive fresh start is required in integrating early warning and 
defense systems. Together with the above discussed measures of reducing and de-alerting 
 87
SNF, this would finally do away with mutual nuclear deterrence and open the door to a 
genuine joint strategy for meeting the new security challenges of the 21st century.  
6.1. Integrating Early Warning and Surveillance Systems 
The best quality information about the proliferation of missiles and missile 
technologies can be obtained through an integrated effort of Russian and US information and 
intelligence-gathering systems. As far as this mission is concerned, however, the policies of 
both former and present administrations of the United States and Russia can be characterized 
by a high degree of passivity and inconsistency. Apart from bureaucratic red tape and 
technical and political complexities, the major obstacle is not only the long-term 
incompatibility of such integration with the state of mutual nuclear deterrence between US 
and Russian SNF, but also the extreme lack of recognition of such incompatibility by 
politicians and the militaries of both nations. 
As far back as 1998, presidents Yeltsin and Clinton took an important decision in 
Moscow to set up a joint center for the exchange of data from early warning systems. On 
June 4, 2000, a respective memorandum was signed concerning the establishment of the Joint 
Data Exchange Center (JDEC). This document entered into force upon the date of signature 
and remains to be effective for a 10-year period, until July 4, 2010. 
The Center is designed not only to avoid inadvertent nuclear war in case of the 
parties’ accidental launch of missiles, but also to detect missile launches from the territories 
of any country and water areas of seas and oceans. This function is based on early warning 
and reconnaissance systems, and it allows for an objective verification of missile programs of 
other nations — above all in the unstable regions. 
The site of the Center has been chosen, and the table of organization, personnel 
functional duties, and a list of equipment have been determined. And still, the Center does not 
yet function. On the surface, the reasons are that the issues of taxes and damage liability have 
not been resolved. The problem of liability is a major part of joint US-Russian nuclear threat 
reduction and nonproliferation projects, but this is also an obstacle on the way towards 
launching the operation of the Center. Should there develop a mutual political will between 
the two parties, this obstacle can easily be overcome without setting a precedent for other 
programs, for with JDEC, associated possible damage is negligible, compared to elimination 
of nuclear and chemical weapons and materials. 
Operations of the center could furnish objective displays of information about the 
proliferation of missiles and missile technologies. Russian missile early warning radars 
(EWR) based near Moscow and in the South of the former USSR provide operational 
information about missile launches in regions of instability (North Africa, the Middle East, 
South Asia) that cannot be reached by the United States early warning radars. 
The basic agreed missions assigned to the JDEC are: 
• Providing information on announced and unannounced launches of ballistic missiles 
and space launch vehicles (SLV) detected by the Russian missile attack warning 
systems and the US ballistic missile early warning systems; 
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• Fast resolution in the Joint Commission of possible ambiguous situations associated 
with information from early warning systems; and 
 
• Preparation and servicing of a unified data base for a multilateral regime of exchange 
of notifications concerning launches of ballistic missiles and SLV. 
 
Information should be exchanged on the launches of Russian and US ballistic missiles 
and space launch vehicles detected by early warning systems, as well as on ballistic missile 
launches of third states that might pose a direct threat to Russia and the United States or 
might bring about an ambiguous situation and lead to its possible incorrect interpretation.  
Direct transmission of data on the missile launches detected by Russian and US 
missile early warning systems to the BMD systems is not provided for in the agreement. 
Information for JDEC should be provided in a processed form, if possible, in near-real time.  
The information should be exchanged in accordance with the following formats: 
• In detecting a missile launch: the time of launch, generic missile class, geographical 
area of the launch, geographical area of payload impact, estimated time of payload 
impact and launch azimuth; and 
• In detecting a launch of a space launch vehicle: time of the launch, a generic missile 
class, the geographical area of the launch, and launch azimuth. 
Accordingly, the reports of ballistic missile and SLV launch detection should contain 
the following parameters: 
• Launch time; 
• Launch location; 
• Generic missile type: ICBM, SLBM, intermediate-range ballistic missiles, medium-
range ballistic missiles, short-range ballistic missiles or SLV; 
• Launch azimuth; 
• Impact area; 
• Estimated time of payload impact; and 
• Indication of a single of multiple launch. 
The process of data exchange is to be implemented in the phases set forth below: 
Phase I. At an initial phase of JDEC operation, information shall be provided on 
detected launches of ICBMs and SLBMs belonging to either party and, with rare exceptions, 
for detected launches of space launch vehicles also belonging to either party, including such 
launches of ICBMs, SLBMs, and SLV that are launched from territories of third states and 
such launches of ICBMs, SLBMs, and SLV that take place on the territory of either party. 
Phase II. In this phase, it is assumed that Russia and the US shall provide the 
information on detected launches included in Phase I, as well as on detected launches of other 
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types of ballistic missiles belonging to either party with a range in excess of 1,500 kilometers 
or an apex altitude in excess of 500 kilometers. 
Phase III. At the end of this phase, the parties shall exchange information on detected 
missile launches specified for the above two phases, as well as on launches of ballistic 
missiles of third states with a ranges in excess of 500 kilometers or an apex altitudes in 
excess of 500 kilometers, if part of the flight trajectory of the ballistic missile as calculated by 
the launch azimuth would take place over, or the impact area of its payload is projected to be 
within, either party's territory. Russia and the US shall also provide information on detected 
launches of SLV of third states, if projection of the initial launch azimuth would intersect the 
territory of either party within the first half-orbit of launch. At its discretion, a party may 
provide information on other detected launches of SLV of third states, regardless of launch 
azimuth.  
 Each party shall provide information on launches of third states that it believes could 
create an ambiguous situation for the warning system of the other party and lead to possible 
misinterpretation by the other party. 
Upon successful demonstration of the operational capability and procedures 
associated with a current phase, the JDEC Heads shall jointly recommend to the Joint 
Commission the implementation of the next phase. Transition to the next phase shall be by 
direction of the Joint Commission. 
 During Phase II operations, the parties shall consider in the Joint Commission the 
possibility of and need for exchanging information on missiles that intercept objects not 
located on the earth's surface. 
In the future, Russia and the United States shall examine in the Joint Commission 
expanded data-sharing on detected launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles 
globally, taking into account changes of the strategic situation in the world and the 
development of a multilateral regime for the exchange of notifications of launches of ballistic 
missiles and space launch vehicles. 
According to the JDEC agreements, the launch information should be provided only 
in a processed form in accordance with an agreed standard. A higher level of operational 
exchange might be achieved through a maximum automation of processing of baseline 
information, completion of agreed forms of data transfer, and presentation of the information 
to the JDEC. Automating the process would allow the parties present such information in as 
near real time as possible. With this goal in mind, it could be required that agreed algorithms 
of processing of the baseline information should be developed and joint databases that 
contain identification images of assumed targets should be set up. This would allow the 
center to provide the automatically processed information in near real time and have it 
confirmed subsequently by on-duty operators at command posts of the parties’ warning 
systems. 
The JDEC functions could be further expanded through a higher level of operational 
data exchange that would be the first step on the way towards permanent presence of Russian 
and US representatives at early warning central command posts of various levels. 
Cooperation on the development of BMD systems, addressed below, would naturally imply 
expanding the JDEC functions and interlinked early warning systems towards providing data 
to anti-missile defenses.  
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Capitalizing on these endeavors, the next and extremely important step in doing away 
with nuclear deterrence would be the establishment of interlinks between SNF command-
control authorities at several levels. At first it would be appropriate to develop a mobile 
conference-communication terminal to keep the supreme leaders constantly in touch 
wherever they are (like “football cases” or “nuclear suitcases”). The  hotline, being 
stationary, is no longer enough in view of a possibility of a third country attack, accidental 
launch or nuclear terror act. 
Permanent direct communication links should also be established between top 
military authorities (ministers and secretaries of defense, the General Staff and Joint Chiefs of 
Staff) and between SNF commands (Vlasikha and Offut centers). This would be important in 
case top political leaders are inaccessible at the time of a crisis for some reason. Despite all 
the technical systems of political leaderships’ control over nuclear forces, which are 
sufficiently effective in peacetime, in a crisis situation (foremost in a nuclear crisis) Russian 
and US military top commanders still can find the way to authorize employment of NW even 
without political authorization if communication with presidents are lost. In such a situation, 
top Russian and US military leaders would greatly benefit from direct communication to 
avoid miscalculation. Subsequently, liaison officers of the other side might be permanently 
posted at these military offices (like the Russian-NATO model but with permanent presence 
duty). 
The JDEC could subsequently be used as a basis for establishing a multilateral regime 
of notifications and data exchange. With this end in view, after the technological 
infrastructure and special software is developed and some technical issues are elaborated on a 
bilateral US-Russian basis, Russia and the United States might prepare a joint appeal to the 
other countries offering to let them join the regime. 
A multilateral regime of missile launch notifications can be set up if all the concerned 
states participate on a voluntary basis. 
In transitioning to the multilateral regime, Russia and the United States might 
consider placing the notification database under the supervision of an international 
organization such as the United Nations. 
The electronic and communications architecture of the multilateral regime of missile 
launch notification may be based on Internet technologies, as well as equipment and software 
that offer rather wide access. In doing so, the parties should pay proper attention to 
information security, keeping in mind that information of this kind is of a confidential and 
sensitive character and should be properly protected. 
The International Joint Data Exchange Center (IJDEC) may be assigned the following 
tasks: 
• Implementation of an exchange of data on announced and unannounced launches of 
missiles detected by the parties’ warning systems; 
 
• Efficient resolution of ambiguous situations related to information from warning 
systems of the parties; 
 
 
• Maintenance of a unified database for notifications of missile launches; and 
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• Communication of missile and SDL launch notifications to participants in the 
multilateral notification regime. 
 
Involvement of other states in the notification exchange regime is expected to expand 
the information base and contribute to the prevention of failures of operation of missile early 
warning systems. 
The key principle underlying the establishment of a multilateral regime of 
notifications on missile launches is a stage-by-stage accession of other states. Inasmuch as 
such a multilateral system is designed against miscalculation or mistaken reaction to a third 
country missile launch, as well as provocative or accidental launches and to assist in 
monitoring missile proliferation, it does not imply political-military alliance among the 
parties. A major part of the technical resources would be provided by the United States and 
Russia, and later on possibly by the European Union, Japan, China and India. Other state-
parties would primarily be recipients of missile launch information and provide notification 
of their own missile launches.  
In the process of logical transition from mere exchange of information to technical 
integration of larger and larger portions of early warning systems and eventually to their joint 
development and deployment, US-Russian strategic relations cannot but be deeply affected 
and transform from mutual nuclear deterrence to a genuine strategic alliance (in the literal 
military meaning of the term “strategic”).  
6.2. Cooperative Development and Deployment of Defensive Systems33 
A crucial and final step in departing from the mutual nuclear deterrence would be the 
transition from the joint theater BMD computer exercises of Russian and US military 
specialists (which have been practiced for many years) to full-scale cooperation between 
Russia and the United States in developing and deploying BMD systems to intercept all types 
of ballistic missiles. This grand endeavor was conceived in the US-Russian May 2002 official 
document, “On the foundations of strategic relations between the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation.” Indeed, powers that deploy and maintain a joint BMD system 
cannot, by definition, be opponents who deter each other with nuclear weapons. They must 
be full-scale military allies and be even closer than NATO or Warsaw Pact allies during Cold 
War times. This implies a much greater degree of commonality of foreign and security 
interests and policies than exists now between the United Sates and Russia or, for this matter, 
even between the US and its European NATO allies (with the possible exception of Britain).   
Primarily because of the remaining mutual nuclear deterrence relations and growing 
political controversies, nothing serious has come up to now out of the BMD cooperation 
agreement of 2002. Nevertheless, taking into account new threats and challenges, this may be 
not a totally fantastic proposition over the long-term. The anti-missile system, which has been 
one of the major points of discord, mistrust, and hostility between Washington and Moscow 
in the past, might become a principle integrating and uniting factor in the future, 
fundamentally changing the political and military relationship of the two nations. 
                                                 
33 This section borrows from: Dvorkin, V., ‘On Russian, US and European Cooperation on the Development 
of Missile Defense. Yaderny Control (Nuclear Control) No. 4 (74). PIR Center. 2004. 
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At present, the parties, alternatively in Colorado Springs and in Moscow, train 
compatibility and coordination of operations of information and weapon systems, such as the 
Russian S-300 SAM and the US Patriot, in repelling attacks of tactical ballistic missiles. 
An analysis of the United States BMD systems presently under development shows 
that, although it is expected to take a rather long period to complete full-scale research and 
experimental development, the participation of Russian R&D organizations in these 
processes is, in fact, impossible. The technical reasons are that Russian sensor technologies, 
element bases, and homing systems would not be attractive to use for a non-nuclear intercept. 
It is already too late to make use of the leading-edge Russian experience and technologies of 
high-velocity booster stages of antimissiles, for the RF has already expended huge resources 
for implementing the developing designs. The lost opportunities can theoretically be 
discussed only as regards the booster stages of the GBI antimissile, for their development and 
tests are noticeably behind those of the kill vehicles interceptor proper, and, as is known, 
none of the launch vehicles have yet been tested even with a standard booster mockup. Even 
if a few years ago Russia had made such an offer, however, it would have been ignored by 
the Pentagon, for it would heave been absolutely impossible for the United States to allow the 
former adversary to take part in the development of the core of this strategic system. Even US 
allies would not have been welcome to participate. 
At the same time, the US-developed weapons to intercept ballistic missiles at the 
boost phase of their trajectory have many faults that impair their effectiveness, as was 
specified in the July 2003 report “Systems of Intercept at the Boost Phase of the Trajectory 
for the National ABM Defense,” by the working group of the American Physical Society.34 
According to the analysts, the missiles can be intercepted if the speed of an interceptor is 
more than that of the missile moving at a booster phase, and the distance between the 
interceptor and the attacked liquid-fueled missile in no more than 500 km (and 300 km for a 
solid-propellant missile). 
The mission is still more complicated in the case of an intercept of missiles launched 
from the hinterland of potential threat countries. In this respect, cooperation with Russia, 
whose research and design organizations have an approximate 10-year lead over the United 
States in technologies of high-speed interceptor missiles and solid-propellants, might be very 
efficient in developing a new generation of BMD weapons designed to kill all types of 
missiles at a boost phase. 
Yet, this is not the only promising opportunity of cooperation between Russia and the 
United States. Successful intercept of missiles across the full spectrum of ranges and phases 
of their flight largely depends on the capabilities of ground, space, and sea-based information 
systems. Russian phased array missile attack early warning radar stations in Ukraine, 
Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan can provide unique capabilities to track missile launches from 
the “belt of instability” extending from North Africa to the Middle East, the Persian Gulf and 
South Asia. Once agreements are reached on real, rather than declarative cooperation, their 
incorporation into the information-gathering framework of joint BMD systems seems to be 
quite realistic.  
If integrated, the capabilities of the US and Russian nuclear attack warning systems 
would grow in terms of their efficiency. According to B. Blair, president of the Washington-
based Center for Defense Information, the model of  defense against launches of missiles 
                                                 
34 ‘Systems of Intercept at the Boost Phase of the Trajectory for the National ABM Defense’, working group of 
the American Physical Society, July 2003. 
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from the Middle East showed that compared to the possibility of detecting missiles by means 
of US warning systems only, a joint US-Russian system would have 20 to 70 percent higher 
effectiveness.35
A much deeper cooperation can be achieved through the deployment of a joint Space 
Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS). Spacecraft of the system weighing around 650 kg 
each and carrying infrared and visible light sensors are supposed to be launched into a 
circular orbit with a height of 1,350-1,400 km and inclination of 60-70 degrees.  Converted-
type heavy missiles developed under the joint Russian-Ukrainian “Dnieper” project would be 
used as space launch vehicles.  
The vehicle with a launch weight of around 210 tons is a derivative of Russian SS-18 
(RS-20 or RT-36) heavy ICBM. The first and second stages of the missile are the same as 
those of the SS-18 missile and have not been modified. The third booster stage is a modified 
bus vehicle. The missile has the world’s highest power performance characteristics. Some 
vehicles of the type converted from SS-18 ICBMs, which have been phased out because of 
the expiration of their service life, have been successfully used in commercial projects for 
launches of foreign spacecraft and have proved highly reliable. A vehicle carrying a booster 
stage and re-startable engines is capable of placing into 1,400 km orbit of a required 
inclination two spacecraft of the STSS system in one launch. This would allow for a low-cost 
deployment of a constellation of low-orbit spacecraft for information support of a global 
BMD system. 
Eventually through the expansion of the joint BMD with land, sea, air, and space-
based detection, tracking and intercept systems, the two nations could make a great 
contribution to the regime of missile non-proliferation. Provided that MTCR sooner or later is 
based on a treaty or convention, and that it envisions obligatory notification of all missile 
launches, such a defense system would be able to enforce this obligation by intercepting all 
missiles launched without notification. 
Further reduction and de-alerting of SNF should at some point be supplemented by 
the integration of early warning systems and eventually of BMD systems. The second and the 
third avenues of cooperation, initially aimed at countering missile proliferation or missile 
strike by a third party, would gradually envelope the major portion of the technical assets of 
the two nations, making a war between them operationally and technically impossible, and 
bringing them to a close strategic nuclear alliance.   
Besides technical and strategic problems, this raises the touchy issue of third parties. 
The joint US-Russian project could not leave out the two countries’ close and true allies. 
American NATO allies, Japan, and South Korea (or a unified Korea by that time), would 
naturally be entitled to participation and protection. Israel would certainly like to join and 
could also contribute quite a lot technically (since it has been already cooperating with the 
US in BMD development for some time). Russian post-Soviet partners would not be a 
problem either, if they are politically acceptable to the West (for example regimes in 
Belarussia or Uzbekistan). 
The real problem would emerge regarding nations with ballistic missiles and (or) 
nuclear weapons, like China, India, Pakistan, Iran, North Korea (if still a rogue/failing state), 
Egypt, Libya, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Taiwan, Yemen, and Vietnam. If not party to a collective 
anti-missile regime, China, India, and Pakistan would certainly perceive a multilateral and 
                                                 
35 US and Russia nukes: still on cold war, hair-trigger alert// Christian Science Monitor, 6 May 2004. 
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multilayered BMD system as designed to negate their nuclear deterrence and to undercut 
their security by making them vulnerable and unable to retaliate to a nuclear or conventional 
attack by the “members of the club.” Russia is putting a high value on its political, economic, 
and military relations (arms transfers) with some of the outsiders — China, India, Iran.  The 
United States, meanwhile, has the same attitude towards Pakistan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and 
Taiwan. 
It is possible to suggest. that a multilateral BMD regime should be open to third 
parties in its protective guarantees, (although not necessarily in its development, deployment, 
and operational command), under certain conditions.  They would need to do away with their 
deterrence posture through de-alerting, deactivation, arms reductions and limitations, and 
transparency. They would also need to join all regimes and mechanisms of the NPT, MTCR, 
JDEC, and future missile launch notification agreements. No doubt, doing away with nuclear 
deterrence, in particular if possessing relatively weak nuclear forces, would imply serious 
changes in their foreign and possibly domestic policies. However, it would be their choice — 
with the alternative being to staying out of the comprehensive framework of multilateral 
strategic cooperation.  
6.3. Multilateral Control and Stabilization of Nuclear Arms   
This section describes only one problem — the possible extension of US and Russian 
new strategic policies to other NWS. A detailed analysis of the problems involved, including 
the issue of European nuclear integration, trilateral nuclear balance in the Pacific, and 
regional non-proliferation options, is given in the project of the Carnegie Moscow Center 
(CMC), also run by the authors of this study.36  
 
The ideas occasionally put forward in the past and still in circulation of proliferating 
the current principles and negotiations on arms control developed between the United States 
and the Soviet Union/Russia to the strategic offensive arms of Great Britain, France, and 
China have always seemed to be rather slack and have never survived even initial scrutiny. 
During Cold War period, such proposals came first of all from Soviet state officials and 
military who quite reasonably assumed that in case of a global armed conflict, nuclear forces 
of the United States, Great Britain and France would operate under a single command and 
target the USSR — and thus should be taken into account under the ceilings and limits of 
nuclear arms treaties. Alternatively, the intention was to get additional concessions from the 
US to make up for the larger combined forces of the West. 
The United States, Britain and France never accepted this argument. The main reason 
given by the British and French was that their nuclear forces were their independent 
deterrent, not an adjunct to US SNF. They also claimed that Britain and France could not join 
the talks before their nuclear forces became comparable to those of the Soviet Union/Russia 
and the United States. The last argument was, and is, put forward by China as well. 
At present, if addressing the issue in a practical way, any attempt to mechanically 
include third NWS into strategic arms talks and treaties would be counterproductive. As 
pointed out in the present study, the US and Russia can safely go down to about 1000 SNF 
                                                 




warheads without worrying about third NWS. However, reducing forces to lower levels or 
implementing deep de-alerting through deactivation (down to 500 or 200 combat ready 
warheads) would hardly be acceptable without limiting and putting under control the forces 
of the three smaller nuclear powers. This would be still more desirable if these nations were 
to eventually join multilateral early warning and anti-missile defense systems and regimes. 
Provided that the US and Russia can lead the way in elaborating a new type of post-
Cold War strategic arms control effort, as recommended in this study, it might be possible by 
the end of this decade, in connection with SORT II, to expand partial arms limitation 
provisions on the forces of Britain, France, and China. As described in more detail in the 
above-mentioned CMC study,37 Anglo-French SLBM warheads could be limited to an equal 
ceiling with Russian sea-based forces in the Northern Fleet (while in a few years there will be 
no SSBNs in Russian Pacific Fleet), and China might agree to equal ICBM ceilings with both 
the US and the RF.  
In the course of the deactivation and de-alerting of SNF, the United States and Russia 
might eventually involve third NWS in agreements on equal ceilings for the remaining 
combat-ready SNF warheads. As pointed out above, this would help to circumvent sensitive 
questions on the nuclear equality of the five nuclear powers. 
Meanwhile, it would seem more appropriate and easier in the near term to initially 
reach agreements with Great Britain, France, and probably China, on a number of provisions 
of verification and confidence building measures elaborated in START I. True, it would be 
unlikely for these countries to agree to make full use of the Treaty-defined system of 
verification and confidence building measures. First, these measures are unprecedented as 
regards the two nuclear powers, which have reached a high level of transparency.  Such a 
level of transparency is not characteristic of the relations even between the United States and 
its immediate allies. Second, many requirements of the Treaty-based verification and 
confidence building system are characteristic of the Cold War confrontation and currently 
seem redundant even as applied to US-Russian relations themselves. 
Because of this, it seems reasonable to consider the entire system of verification and 
confidence building measures in terms of whether or not some of the provisions may be 
acceptable for other nuclear powers. 
The START I verification system includes 16 types of inspections of baseline data 
relating to the numbers and technical characteristics of the weapons, new missiles, and 
launchers under test, challenge on-site inspections relating to possible violations of the 
Treaty, the number of warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, exhibitions of new 
weapons, and so on. 
The confidence building measures fall into 10 groups which embrace a total of 152 
types of notifications. The system of information exchange between Russia and the United 
States envisioned by the START I Treaty includes the following: 
• Regular (once every six months) exchange of data on strategic offensive arms and 
associated facilities for all the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of 
Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base; 
 
                                                 
37 Arbatov, A. and Dvorkin, V., ‘Nuclear deterrence and non-proliferation’. Carnegie Moscow Center.  
Moscow 2005. 
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• Broadcasting all the telemetric information obtained in the course of flight and 
training tests of missiles, provision of tapes that contain a recording of such telemetric 
information, as well as data associated with its analysis, pursuant to the Protocol on 
Telemetric Information; and 
 
• Provision of notifications that contain the current information on the strategic 
offensive arms and facilities relating to them. 
 
The goal of the Treaty-defined exhibitions is to allow the other party to confirm the 
declared technical characteristics of the strategic nuclear arms. 
Each party must conduct exhibitions to confirm: 
• Technical characteristics of each type and each variant of ICBM and SLBM; 
 
• Technical characteristics of all types of mobile ICBM launchers and variants of each 
type; 
 
• Technical characteristics of each type and each variant of existing heavy bombers and 
former heavy bombers; and 
 
• Technical characteristics of each type and each variant of nuclear air-launched cruise 
missiles. 
 
The information provided pursuant to the memorandum contains the following: 
• Quantitative data for the SNF also designating their locations at bases; 
• Technical characteristics of the SNF; 
• Site diagrams of the basing locations and their support facilities; and 
• Photographs of missiles, launchers, transporter-loaders, heavy bombers, and 
submarines. 
After each test, the party conducting the flight tests of missiles provides to the other 
party the following: 
• Tapes that contain recordings of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the 
flight test; 
• Tapes that contain recordings of all encapsulated telemetric information, if such tapes 
survive; and 
• A short description applied of each tape. 
Additionally, after each launch, the party conducting the flight tests of missiles shall 
provide to the other party data associated with the analysis (description of a format of the 
telemetry frame and techniques of encryption applied to the entire broadcast telemetric 
information, except for the information developed inside the warhead). 
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As far as the third NWS are concerned, all the above cooperative verification methods 
are certainly not possible, and neither are they needed. Of all inspection-based verification 
methods, it is possible to recommend at least two operations as universal ones: (1) on-site 
visits by foreign observers, rather than inspectors, of the exhibition of new missiles and 
launchers under test, and (2) a display of the number of warheads attributed to the deployed 
ICBMs and SLBMs. 
A list of possible confidence building measures is much wider and might include the 
following: 
• Regular (one or two times a year) exchange of data concerning the quantitative 
characteristics of nuclear arms and associated facilities; 
 
• Provision of notifications containing the current information on nuclear arms; 
 
• Advance notifications concerning test and training launches of missiles, coordinates 
of launch sites, and areas of re-entry vehicle impact; 
 
• Provision of information concerning the new types (classes) of nuclear arms; 
 
• Provision of notifications concerning phasing-in and phasing-out of nuclear arms; and 
  
• Provision of information concerning the dual-use delivery vehicles. 
 
To confirm the provided information, it might be possible to agree upon the facilities 
and sites for an exhibition of sample nuclear weapons. 
Thus, as a possible initial surrogate of multilateral nuclear arms control embracing the 
five great powers, it is possible to suggest an agreement or memorandum, in which the 
nuclear arms of Great Britain, France, and China are a subject of a system of nuclear weapon 
transparency and confidence building measures. 
A much more complicated problem would occur when trying to involve Israel, India, 
and Pakistan into an expanded multilateral verification system, although the reasons for that 
are different. 
As is known, Israel neither acknowledges nor denies the availability of nuclear 
weapons. The nuclear stockpiles of Israel are estimated to vary within a wide range of 50 to 
200 warheads. If this is so, the maximum that can be expected is that Tel Aviv would 
acknowledge its possession of nuclear weapons and make a non-build-up commitment. A 
much more difficult problem would be seeking the prospect of Israeli nuclear disarmament in 
exchange for US or NATO legal security guarantees. A precondition of such agreement 
would be a guaranteed and verifiable rejection of any military or dual-purpose nuclear 
programs by Iran and all other states of the “Large Middle East” (including dismantlement 
and prohibition of any uranium enrichment or plutonium reprocessing facilities). 
After India and Pakistan declared themselves to be nuclear states, some in the expert 
community thought that this would contribute to a higher level of stability in the region 
because of mutual nuclear deterrence. However, the relation between India and Pakistan can 
be interpreted as an extremely unstable mutual nuclear deterrence, and the instability is 
chiefly due to the composition and structure of their nuclear forces. The present estimate and 
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mid-term forecast (2010 to 2015) is that India might have around 100 warheads in its nuclear 
forces, whereas Pakistan has roughly half that number. The results of modeling show that 
India can theoretically launch a disarming attack through the use of nuclear and non-nuclear 
weapons which might reduce a Pakistani retaliatory strike potential to an acceptable 
minimum. Pakistan cannot launch a disarming attack effective enough to evade destruction of 
the country by Indian retaliation.  
Other reasons for the instability in South Asia, as pointed out above, are the imperfect 
or non-existent negative control, early warning, and reconnaissance systems, and the 
availability of missiles capable of carrying both nuclear and conventional warheads, which 
might provoke a nuclear conflict through the use of non-nuclear missiles. 
Under these circumstances, the Big Five and the United Nations can be expected to 
take certain precautions and start initiatives aimed at forming a multistage program of 
stabilizing the relations between India and Pakistan. These initiatives should contain 
measures of phased reduction of tension and confidence building, including those in regard to 
the nuclear programs, missile tests, some recommendations on such structuring of the nuclear 
forces that would ensure their survivability, and so on. In the end, this could lead to agreed 
limits on Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons. 
All of this does not mean that Israel, India and Pakistan should be directly included in 
the above system of multilateral nuclear arms control, or that they should be recognized as 
de-juro NPT-defined nuclear weapon states. These measures, along with the multilateral 
control within the Nuclear Five, would, however, contribute to strengthening the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, and global and regional stability. Besides, the above three nations should 
be integrated into the regime through the CTBT (which should be ratified by the US and 
China right away), the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the nuclear export control regimes of 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), an acceptance of the IAEA guarantees on declared peaceful 
nuclear sites, the IAEA 1997 Additional Protocol, and the missile technology control regime. 
It should be emphasized once more that the above joint US and Russian initiatives to 
move away from mutual nuclear deterrence could become a good demonstration of their 
commitment under NPT Article VI, and could serve as a powerful lever to impose much 
more stringent non-proliferation regimes on third NWS, non-NPT nuclear states and nuclear 
threshold states. 
7. Conclusion  
                                                                                                                                                                
Once nuclear weapons were invented and their horrific destructive power was demonstrated 
in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, the least harmful elaborated way of using them has been 
through the doctrine and strategy of nuclear deterrence. As is well known this implies the 
indirect use of such weapons by threatening their use in order to contain an enemy’s nuclear 
aggression or large-scale conventional attack.  
On the one hand, as long as nuclear weapons exist, their use cannot be fully 
eliminated, but it is better to keep this as a theoretical rather than a practical option through 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. 
On the other hand, having allegedly proved its utility for national security and foreign 
policy, nuclear deterrence could not but give birth to nuclear proliferation, since more and 
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more states developed an interest and technical-economic capacity to join the elite “nuclear 
club.”  
Thirteen countries (counting the DPRK) have acquired nuclear weapons since 1945.  
Four later relinquished them (South Africa, Belarussia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan). About a 
dozen more have pursued military nuclear programs in the past or are suspected of doing so 
now. A dialectic continuation of this process in an era of globalization and the information 
revolution eventually leads to sub-state entities, foremost terrorist organizations, gaining 
access to nuclear weapons, and using them to blackmail or destroy the contemporary civilized 
world.  
The technological revolution, with its development of low-yield and selective-effect 
nuclear munitions, dual purpose delivery vehicles, anti-missile defense systems and, space-
based and precision-guided conventional weapons, has resulted in the erosion of nuclear 
deterrence from the other end, blurring the “nuclear threshold.”  
As nuclear deterrence and its means become more multilateral, uneven in technical 
foundations, and eventually available to sub-state entities, nuclear deterrence will become 
more and more dubious.  It will serve as a potentially explosive foundation for the security 
and foreign policy of the great powers.  
In this sense, nuclear deterrence — as a strategy of avoiding nuclear war while 
possessing many nuclear arms — bears the seeds of its own eventual failure through the 
eruption of actual nuclear warfare, and the question is not “whether?,” but rather “when and 
how?”    
What is most amazing is that all of these dangerous political and technical 
transformations are happening (or are forecasted to happen) after the end of Cold War, which 
has been directly associated with nuclear deterrence and perceptions of the highest threat of 
actual nuclear war. The end of the Cold War, in a sense, played a bad joke on the anti-nuclear 
aspirations of mankind: no longer terrified by the prospect of the escalation of some conflicts 
to nuclear holocaust, the leading nuclear powers now emphasize actual nuclear warfare 
instead of deterrence.  They plan for preemptive nuclear strikes and combined operations of 
nuclear and conventional systems in both offensive and defensive missions. In response to 
this, or using this as a convenient pretext, some third NWS and “threshold” regimes treat 
nuclear weapons as the only means of deterring the great powers. And these aspirations open 
more channels for terrorists to gain access to nuclear explosives.  
New security challenges and problems of the 21st century are piling up: nuclear arms 
and other WMD and missile proliferation, international terrorism, ethnic and religious 
conflicts with trans-border repercussions, the subversive roles of “rogue” and “failed states,” 
the nuclear legacy of Cold War which has to be safely disposed of, and so on. 
There is no doubt that these problems can be addressed only on the basis of broad and 
genuine cooperation between the great powers and other economically and politically 
successful nations.  
It is, however, the firm belief of the authors of this study, that neither the United 
States and Russia, nor all five great powers together, will be able to effectively and 
consistently cooperate in the area of security as long as they retain and refine the thousands of 
nuclear weapons assigned for mutual destruction that are the material foundation of mutual 
nuclear deterrence.  
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It is now an established fact of life, demonstrated by the recent 15-year “natural 
experiment,” that without a well-conceived, long-term, and persistent joint effort that 
combines diplomacy, finances, technology, and politics in a new type of arms control 
endeavor, mutual nuclear deterrence will not take care of itself and fade away — even though 
political and ideological foundations of deterrence have become history together with the 
Cold War. 
As long as nuclear weapons exist, nuclear deterrence will remain a possibility and 
even the actual use of such weapons cannot be discounted. Only a full elimination of nuclear 
weapons, “final and complete nuclear disarmament,” might provide a guarantee against this 
eventuality. However, first of all, it is not at all clear what the strategic and technical meaning 
of the term “nuclear disarmament” is. Secondly, nuclear disarmament could have the 
unfortunate effects of making the world “safe” for large-scale conventional wars, or for the 
use of other WMD or new classes of weapons. Hence, the very threat of force and use of 
force, as one primary instrument of international relations for thousands of years, will have to 
be fully revised — leading to some kind of the world supra-national government (besides the 
creation of an international nuclear energy complex or world energy corporation). Such a 
project is not easy now to contemplate theoretically, to say nothing of its practical 
implementation. And it goes far beyond the scope of this study.  
As for the present paper, in its focal point (or “ground zero”) is the fundamental 
dilemma for the present time and the foreseeable future: is it possible, first of all, for the US 
and the RF to do away with mutual nuclear deterrence while: (1) retaining thousands or 
hundreds of nuclear weapons and (2) lacking “a clear and present” common enemy strong 
enough for the two nations to unite against and combine their enormous nuclear arsenals?  
Based on the above analysis, the authors of this study think that it is possible, 
provided that sufficient political will, intellectual resources, and administrative efforts are 
applied to this goal by the United States, Russia, and later by other great powers.  
By way of reservation, it is necessary to point out that since many nuclear weapons 
would regardless remain in service and storage, even if the recommendations of this paper 
were turned into reality, nuclear deterrence will still remain a remote and virtual possibility 
among the states that implement such proposals. Also in a more practical operational and 
technical form, nuclear deterrence would be preserved for the states that do not join a regime 
of a new type of nuclear non-deterrence relationship.  
What is most important, however,, is that mutual nuclear deterrence would be 
effectively removed: (1) as a foundation of US-Russian (Russian-Western or great powers’) 
operational strategic relationship, (2) as a material embodiment of their confrontational 
military relations, (3) as an impediment to their security and political cooperation against new 
threats, and (4) as a huge drain on their financial resources and scientific-technological 
innovations.  
The steps to be taken in a bilateral format are as follows in the tentative sequence of 
their practical implementation (see Appendix 2): 
• The US and Russia, in line with their legal commitment, should agree by mid-2006 on 
the counting rules in implementing the 2002 SORT, a schedule of the arms reduction 
and modified verification and confidence building measures. The duration of the 
START I with its system of verification and confidence building measures should be 
 101
extended until 2012, and that of the SORT until 2015, so that the term of the 
implementation of arms reductions under the treaty is not the same as that of its 
duration; 
• The exchange of full lists of data should be arranged concerning the missile threats 
from other countries, the Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow should be unfrozen 
in 2006, and the functions of this center should be expanded; 
• Immediately upon finalizing work on SORT, the US and Russia should start SORT II 
negotiations with the purpose of reducing the strategic nuclear arms down to roughly 
1,000 to 1,200 warheads by 2017; 
• Russia and the US in 2006 should begin talks on limiting and reducing their tactical 
nuclear weapons (TNW), including their non-deployment in Central and Eastern 
Europe, a subsequent full withdrawal of US and Russian TNW from Europe (the CFE 
Treaty zone), and their relocation to centralized storage facilities under mutual 
monitoring by 2012; 
• Transition to a phased termination of the status of mutual nuclear deterrence between 
Russia and the United States should begin, starting by abandoning the operational 
concept of launch-on-warning strike in 2006; 
• Corresponding with the implementation of the SORT, the talks on the SORT II 
negotiations should start on a joint de-alerting of SNF through deactivation aiming to 
reach an agreement by 2008 to de-alert in a verifiable way all forces except 500 
combat ready warheads by 2012 (phase I), then go down to 200 warheads by 2015 
(phase II), followed by de-alerting 90 to 95 percent of SNF by 2020;  
• Corresponding to de-alerting methods — there should be an agreement (joint 
understanding) on the limitation of the number of SSBNs on patrol at sea (primarily 
the US ones), on basing of strategic bombers separately from nuclear bombs and air-
launched cruise missiles, and on limiting the share of mobile ICBMs in land patrol 
areas (primarily Russian ones); 
• Organizational and technical integration of US and Russian missile early warning and 
reconnaissance systems should happen by the year 2012, and interfacing of command-
control systems of the parties by the year 2017; and 
• A full-scale treaty between Russia and the United States on cooperation in 
development and deployment of the BMD system should be concluded in 2007, 
leading to its joint operational commissioning by the year 2020. 
In a multilateral format, the following steps should be taken, relating in time to 
bilateral US-Russian agreements (see Appendix 2): 
• A commitment by the US and Russia in 2006, followed by the rest of P-5, on non-
first-use of nuclear weapons against any NPT-member state and non-first use of 
WMD against any state (including Israel, India, and Pakistan, provided that they also 
adopt nuclear or WMD non-first-use doctrines); 
• Ratification of the CTBT by all states (foremost the US and China) and its entry into 
force by the year 2007; 
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• Accelerated negotiations for the conclusion of the weapons-grade fissile materials cut-
off treaty (FMCT) with due verification provisions, with the first phase dealing with 
uranium enrichment, by the year 2008; 
• Conclusion of full-scale fissile materials treaty (FMT) by the year 2010 (including 
separation of plutonium), full verifiable accounting of all stocks of weapons-grade 
fissile materials, their use for peaceful and legitimate military purposes; 
• A multilateral dialogue should be started in 2007 to involve Great Britain, France and 
China in a regime of verification and confidence-building measures, and eventually 
into agreements on limitations of nuclear arms; 
• Conceptual reduction from 2007 to 2012 of reliance on nuclear deterrence in the 
national security strategies of the United States, Russia, Great Britain, France, and 
China in their respective basic doctrinal document and arms programs;  
• Involvement of third NWS in de-alerting and deactivation procedures after 2012; 
• Expansion after 2015 of the cooperative missile early warning and monitoring regime 
to third NWS which have joined de-alerting regime, and to all states which join 
missile launch notification regime; and 
• Expansion of the cooperative BMD system protection after the year 2020 to all states, 
having joined nuclear arms de-alerting agreements, cooperative missile early-
warning/monitoring, and launch notification mechanisms, as well as the NPT, NSG, 
CTBT, MTCR and FMCT regimes. 
The above proposals at first glance may look more like a wish list than a realistic 
program of action. It is true that the present policies of the US and Russian governments, as 
well as those of the rest of P-5, do not seem very encouraging. Besides, political tensions 
between Moscow and Washington, between Russia and the West, as well as between China 
and the West are rising on a number of international and domestic political issues. 
No doubt, a unique opportunity for such steps was missed during the mid to the late 
1990s. This was a blunder of historic scale, and its consequences are currently noticeable in 
the political and strategic relations of the great powers. If, however, the presently growing 
strategic and political tensions draw attention back to nuclear weapons and nuclear 
deterrence, and provide incentives for taking realistic steps to deal with the problems, then 
there is still time to solve them, as long as Cold War remains something of the past. 
As experience has demonstrated, neither high political tensions, like those during the 
Cold War, nor too deep a relaxation of political tensions, as during the 1990s, are conducive 
to taking serious steps to do away with mutual nuclear deterrence. Hence, if it is at all 
feasible, now may be exactly the right time, if the political elites of the leading nations realize 
the need and understand the methods to achieve this objective.  
After all, there are no insurmountable technical, economic, or strategic obstacles to 
doing away with mutual nuclear deterrence. The main barriers are in the minds of politicians, 
military leaders, weapons designers, and weapons producers. Changing the minds of as many 
of these people as possible, as well as the opinions of the general public and their political 
representatives, may provide yet another opportunity for doing the job.    
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8. Appendix 1: Assumptions in the Model Demonstrated by 
Figures 6, 7, and 8 
The full time that it takes to reconstitute de-alerted missiles depends on: the total 
number of SNF weapons at the given moment; the number of missiles and warheads 
remaining on full alert in each leg of the triad; and the methods of de-alerting, determining 
the technical process of reconstitution. 
Land-based ICBMs have the greatest launch-on-warning capabilities, and are the 
primary candidates in the SNF weapon system for de-alerting. This is why in Figures 6, 7, 
and 8, the model of de-alerting is illustrated by ICBM reconstitution time.  
However, inasmuch as de-alerting is designed to achieve a much greater relaxation of 
SNF postures and go much farther in the transformation of mutual nuclear deterrence 
relationships, abandoning LOW in favor of deep second-strike retaliation, SLBM, and heavy 
bomber de-alerting would also be necessary. This is all the more so since with ever-fewer 
numbers of ICBMs remaining on alert, land-based missiles may become increasingly 
vulnerable to SLBM attack if the latter are not de-alerted as well. This indirectly implies a 
considerable reduction in the number of SSBNs on sea-patrol, since SLBMs de-alerting is 
feasible only in bases. Simultaneously, this would reduce the number of SLBMs that may be 
launched from bases in a first strike of LOW, which is an accepted practice in Russia (at least 
theoretically) and could be adopted in the future by the US as well.  
SLBM reconstitution time varies broadly, depending on the de-alerting method: from 
few hours for each submarine in case of launch tube hatch welding to 30 days in case of the 
removal of SLBMs from launch tubes. Nonetheless, even with limited number of installation 
and loading technical complexes at each base, SLBM reconstitution time (a maximum of 100 
of 180 days for 12 SSBNs) is covered by a significantly longer ICBM reconstitution process. 
Most probably the same is true for heavy bombers, even if their de-alerting is implemented 
through functionally related observable differences (FROD). 
The full time of reconstitution of all ICBM force readiness for launch depends on (1) 
the overall number of ICBM warheads in a de-alerted state, (2) the distribution of these 
warheads at missile bases and separate missile regiments (divisions), (3) the distances from 
the central base to launchers, (4) the capabilities of transportation and support technical 
personnel, and some other factors.    
In Figure 6, the modeling of the procedures of reconstitution of ICBM readiness for 
launch is done for Russia’s ICBM force level in 2005. It is based on the assumption of ICBM 
deployment at 13 missile bases (divisions), four of which contain silo launchers with SS-18 
ICBMs (85 missiles and 850 warheads), SS-19 ICBMs (129 missiles and 774 warheads) and 
SS-27 “Topol-M” ICBMs (40 missiles and 40 warheads). In addition, it is assumed that there 
are 9 divisions of ground-mobile SS-25 “Topol” ICBMs (291 missiles and 291 warheads). 
Altogether, the numbers are 560 missiles and 1970 warheads (the data corresponds to mid-
2005 and is based on the START I data exchange memorandum).   
Under the limit of 500 combat-ready warheads, it is assumed that at each missile base 
of fixed silo-launched ICBMs, there are about 5 to 10 missiles on full alert, and at each 
ground-mobile missile base there are 18 ICBMs on full alert. In a crisis, the reconstitution of 
combat readiness of 360 ICBMs is assumed.  
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Under the limit of 200 combat ready warheads, it is assumed that at each missile base 
of fixed silo-launched ICBMs there are about two to four missiles on full alert, and at each 
ground-mobile missile base there are nine ICBMs on full alert. In a crisis, the reconstitution 
of combat readiness of 430 ICBMs is assumed.  
If the whole ICBM force is de-alerted, it is assumed that reconstitution of full 
readiness for launch would include 560 missiles.  
The dynamic model of the reconstitution of the full readiness is taking into account 
the time of moving transportation-maintenance equipment from one launcher to another and 
the number of support personnel shifts. The maximum reconstitution time (T max) is 
associated with the methods of de-alerting through the removal of warheads, dismantling of 
onboard power supply units and dissection of the pneumohydraulic system of the launch 
preparation and initiation. The minimal reconstitution time (T min) is associated with the 
dismantling of gas generators lifting (shifting) the protective roof of the missile silo. The 
functioning of the support personnel is assumed to consist of three shifts with simultaneous 
work to restore combat readiness proceeding at two launchers. 
In Figure 7, the model is based on the same general assumptions for the reduced SNF 
levels by the year 2012, when both sides would have about 2000 warheads under SORT. 
Allegedly, Russia would have by that time around 1000 warheads on 400 fixed and mobile 
ICBMs. The results of this model demonstrate reconstitution times of 118 to 335 days with 
the work of three shifts, and 30 percent more with two shifts. 
In Figure 7, the model of re-constitution is based on the SNF force level of about 
1000 warheads proposed by the authors of this study by the year 2017. Russian forces are 
assumed to include 600 ICBM warheads on 200 missiles, half of which would be ground-
mobile. The model demonstrates that with 200 warheads remaining on alert, reconstitution 
time would be 76 to 108 days, depending on the method of de-alerting. Obviously, at such 
low levels of overall SNF, and in particular of the forces staying on alert, SLBM and bomber 
de-alerting procedures and reconstitution time would be of much greater importance. 
 105
   
2006
   
 
2007
   
 
2008
         
 
2009
         
 
2010
         
 
2011
         
 
2012
         
 
2013
         
 
2014
         
 
2017
         
 
2016
         
 
2019
         
 
2015
         
 
2018
         
2020
9. Appendix 2: A Tentative Sequence of Practical Bilateral and 
Multilateral Steps in Revising Nuclear Deterrence 
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